24 research outputs found
Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09
In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed
co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s
ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to
Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these
Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will
also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase
of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or
in South America).
Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian
government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian
energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far,
investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and
some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far
also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is
being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled
the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this
policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain
access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce
their positions in international markets.
The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production
will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain
whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development
will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic
shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development
of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure,
may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal
regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors
will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign
support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically
complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic
scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen
to twenty years at the earliest
The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'. OSW Point of View, February 2007
This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets.
As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests
Priceless friendship. The Kremlin’s support for Vladimir Putin’s cronies. OSW Point of View 71, November 2018
The Western sanctions have proved painful for the Russian elite not only in terms of finance, but also of image and prestige. However, thanks to the EU's much softer sanctions policy compared to the US, the Russian oligarchs have still been able to conduct their business in Europe, either directly or through intermediaries. Since March 2014, the Kremlin has tried to compensate selected businessmen for at least some of the losses they have suffered. The activities of the Russian state apparatus are a coordinated policy aimed at supporting oligarchs in the immediate vicinity of the president, the costs of which have been borne by Russian society. The flow of assets among individual persons belonging to the Russian elite (both among private businessmen and state-owned companies) which has occurred as a result of the sanctions and the attempts to minimise losses, has revealed the close symbiosis and the blurring of boundaries between private and state capital in Russia
Russia in Crisis: Year One. OSW Report, January 2010
Economic conditions which had favoured Russia’s development suddenly changed in mid-2008.
The Russian economy was hit, on the one hand, by a drastic slump in oil prices (which fell from nearly
US50 between July 2008 and January 2009), and on the other by the outflow of
investors (a net of US162 billion in the stabilisation funds and
nearly US76 billion, and the central
bank’s reserves shrunk by nearly US409 billion. Meanwhile, however, the money
in the National Welfare Fund, which had been intended almost entirely to subsidise the Pensions Fund
between 2010 and 2015, rose almost three-fold (to US$90 billion). According to government forecasts,
the money from the reserve fund is also supposed to be spent fully in 2010.
The financial crisis has triggered a dynamic outflow of capital from the Russian market. So-called
speculative capital was the first to demonstrate the lack of confidence in the Russian market. In the
first half of 2009, the growth rate of long-term investments also decreased noticeably, although no
spectacular withdrawal of direct investments from Russia has been observed. The economic crisis has
also halted the foreign expansion of Russian private capital, while state-owned capital strengthened
its position as an investor. Russia’s raw materials companies continue to be the main category of
foreign investors; however, new technologies are gaining prominence as the second main direction of
Russian investments
A captive island. Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU. OSW Study 41/2012
The Kaliningrad region can be called a 'captive island', because of its specific geopolitical location - it is part of the Russian legal, political and economic space, yet it is geographically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation, and it is particularly open to co-operation with its neighbours in the European Union. Moscow is trying to compensate the region for its separation, offering it financial support and economic privileges.At the same time, it is sensitive to any potential challenges to Russia's territorial integrity - and the centre's desire for control over the region often limits the latter's potential for cooperation and internal development. This report presents the situation in the region, and is intended to help develop a model for its effective regional co-operation with its EU neighbours
The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. OSW Study 12/2003
The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future