Cooperative Motion of Active Brownian Spheres in Three-Dimensional Dense Suspensions

The structural and dynamical properties of suspensions of self-propelled Brownian particles of spherical shape are investigated in three spatial dimensions. Our simulations reveal a phase separation into a dilute and a dense phase, above a certain density and strength of self-propulsion. The packing fraction of the dense phase approaches random close packing at high activity, yet the system remains fluid. Although no alignment mechanism exists in this model, we find long-lived cooperative motion of the particles in the dense regime. This behavior is probably due to an interface-induced sorting process. Spatial displacement correlation functions are nearly scale-free for systems with densities close to or above the glass transition density of passive systems.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts

A popular myth in American constitutional law is that the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to enforce rights such as free speech and equal protection is \u27strict\u27 in theory and fatal in fact. \u27 This phrase, coined by the late legal scholar Gerald Gunther in 1972, has been called one of the most famous epithets in American constitutional law \u27 and has effectively defined the strict scrutiny standard in the minds of lawyers for two generations. Born of Gunther\u27s observation, supported by the iconic decisions of the Warren Court, and reinforced in constitutional law teaching and scholarship, the myth teaches that strict scrutiny is an inflexible rule that invalidates every (or nearly every) law to which it applies. In recent years, however, this traditional understanding of strict scrutiny\u27s inevitable deadliness has been challenged, most notably by Justice Sandra Day O\u27Connor. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, O\u27Connor\u27s majority opinion expressed the wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is \u27strict in theory, but fatal in fact. \u27 The fact that strict scrutiny applies says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying that standard. In Grutter v. Bollinger, O\u27Connor\u27s opinion for the Court turned wish into action and upheld an affirmative action policy under strict scrutiny. Rather than create insurmountable hurdles that indiscriminately invalidate laws, O\u27Connor argued, the fundamental purpose of strict scrutiny is to take relevant differences into account. In short, when applying strict scrutiny, [c]ontext matters. This Article contributes to this debate by offering a systematic empirical study of strict scrutiny in the federal courts. Reporting the results of a census of every strict scrutiny decision published by the district, circuit, and Supreme courts between 1990 and 2003, this study shows that strict scrutiny is far from the inevitably deadly test imagined by the Gunther myth and more closely resembles the context-sensitive tool described by O\u27Connor. Courts routinely uphold laws when applying strict scrutiny, and they do so in every major area of law in which they use the test. Overall, 30 percent of all applications of strict scrutiny-nearly one in three-result in the challenged law being upheld. Rather than fatal in fact, strict scrutiny is survivable in fact

Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History

Surely, corporate managers themselves, who must operate within the broader law of business, are aware of the legally imposed duties to protect workders, consumers, and larger communities. Perhaps it is time corporate lawyers caught up to this reality

Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech

My objective here is to provide a little historical background on business corporations and their place in First Amendment law. In the course of that overview, I will also make a few observations that I believe can be helpful in thinking about corporate speech rights. First, I will argue that one aspect of the constitutional status of corporations-the notion of corporate personhood-has not played the central role in shaping corporate speech rights that some believe. Corporations have free speech rights, but they are more limited than those held by individuals. Second, I will argue that there is not a single right of corporate speech. Rather, there are at least four distinct free speech rights held by corporations. Each one is subject to its own set of rules and restrictions, and there are a number of inconsistencies in the reasoning of the relevant decisions, breeding a set of doctrines with little coherence. I will conclude with some thoughts on the effectiveness of limiting corporate speech in an age of loose corporate law