COLLECTIVE REPUTATION AND QUALITY

Firms who sell a regional or specialty product often share a common or collective reputation, which is based on the group's aggregate quality. The dynamic problem of collective reputation is similar to the natural resource extraction problems. Therefore, for the analysis of this particular problem, we use differential games. If there is unrestricted access to a common property resource (the reputation stock), agents perceive its shadow value to be zero and extract too rapidly; i.e, they all "cheat" on quality, "milking" the rents generated by the existence of the resource (reputation stock). We show that when there exists a collective product reputation without firm traceability, the firms will extract too much from the stock of reputation. A firm is said to "extract" reputation from the reputation stock when it sells low-quality products at high prices given by the high past levels of quality. The firm builds on the group's reputation when it provides a product with a quality level which is higher than the expected level of quality. The results from this work support minimum quality standards for producer groups and regional and specialty products. This is in contrast to the findings of previous work. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington apples. We present the case of Washington apples in light of the results of the analytical model.Agribusiness,

College Athletes and NCAA Violations

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/94513/1/capp850.pd

Markets with Untraceable Goods of Unknown Quality: A Market Failure Exacerbated by Globalization

In markets for fruits, vegetables, and many imported goods, consumers cannot discern quality prior to purchase and can never identify the producer. Producing high-quality, safe goods is costly and raises the "collective reputation" for quality shared with rival firms. Minimum quality standards imposed on all firms improve welfare. If consumers can observe the country of origin of a product, quality, profits, and welfare increase. If one country imposes a minimum quality standard on its exports, consumers benefit, the profits of firms in the country with regulation rise, and the profits of firms in countries without regulation fall.

Regulating An Experience Good In Developing Countries When Consumers Cannot Identify Producers

In developing countries, consumers can buy many goods from either the formal sector or the informal sector and choose the sector to patronize based on the product's price there and anticipated quality. We assume that firms can produce in either sector and can adjust quality at a cost. In the long run, firms produce in the sector that is more profitable. As for the consumers, we assume they cannot assess quality prior to purchase and cannot, at a reasonable cost, identify the producer of what they are purchasing. Many products (meats, fruits, vegetables, fish, grains) sold both in formal groceries and, less formally, on the street fit this description. Using this model, we investigate how a change in regulations in the formal sector affects quality, price, aggregate production and the number of firms in each sector.experience good, formal sector, informal sector, quality

Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: a market failure exacerbated by globalization

In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods, consumers cannot discern the quality of a product prior to purchase and can never identify its producer. Producing high-quality, safe goods is costly for a firm and raises the collective reputation for quality shared with its rivals. Minimum quality standards improve welfare. If consumers observe the country of origin of a product, quality, profits, and welfare increase. Exports from countries with more exporting firms are of lower quality and sell for lower prices. If one country imposes a minimum quality standard on its exports while other countries do not, consumers benefit. As for sellers, the regulation raises the profits of firms in the country with regulation and lowers the profits of firms in countries without regulation.globalization; quality; collective reputation; minimum quality standards

AN OPTION VALUE APPROACH TO VALUING PRESERVATION PROPERTIES

There has been a recent trend towards purchasing land for farmland preservation, wildlife refuges, other conservation, and cultural and historical preservation. There is a great deal of unexplained variation in the dollars paid per acre for these properties. The theoretical basis for this analysis is an option value model with stochastic returns to development. The data used in our analysis is sales transactions data for natural resource conservation and farmland preservation purposes from throughout the United States. We find that land, when it would be best used for development, but is not developed, has a significantly higher price.Land Economics/Use,

SEASONAL OLIGOPOLY POWER IN THE D'ANJOU PEAR INDUSTRY

We estimate seasonal oligopoly power at a disaggregated variety level in the D'Anjou pear market. Our data spans 1993 to 2000, during which time imported pears became more prevalent in the U.S. market. The range of monthly industry-conduct-parameter magnitudes is 0.034 to 0.195 and is most pronounced when the fresh D'Anjou pear crop first becomes available in the earliest months of the marketing year. Possible reasons for timing of oligopoly power relate to the growth of imported pears during the latter portion of marketing year. In addition, oligopoly power may diminish during the marketing year as pears in storage decline in quality.Crop Production/Industries,

Fiber Optic Thermal Health Monitoring of Composites

A recently developed technique is presented for thermographic detection of flaws in composite materials by performing temperature measurements with fiber optic Bragg gratings. Individual optical fibers with multiple Bragg gratings employed as surface temperature sensors were bonded to the surfaces of composites with subsurface defects. The investigated structures included a 10-ply composite specimen with subsurface delaminations of various sizes and depths. Both during and following the application of a thermal heat flux to the surface, the individual Bragg grating sensors measured the temporal and spatial temperature variations. The data obtained from grating sensors were analyzed with thermal modeling techniques of conventional thermography to reveal particular characteristics of the interested areas. Results were compared with the calculations using numerical simulation techniques. Methods and limitations for performing in-situ structural health monitoring are discussed

Cross-ownership, league policies and player investment across sports leagues

Although many sports leagues are viewed as monopolies, research suggests that some economic competition exists between teams in dierent sports leagues. If fans make consumption choices based on the quality of all teams that are present in their region, then economic competition and ownership structure can impact an owner's incentive to invest in talent. This article examines dierences between monopolists, duopolists and cross-ownership. Consumer preferences and fan loyalty are allowed to vary across sports, and the winning percentages of teams in other leagues aects demand. Our model shows that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to a monopolist. A rm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to a duopolist, but the dierence in prots is ambiguous. League policies are studied and are shown to aect the quality of teams in other leagues