Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver

In this dissertation I propose and test a refined theory for the calculus of voting. I accomplish this by building on the classic model that includes the “duty” or “D” term as the primary motivating factor behind voting. I theorize that voters have basic expectations for democracy and how it should work for them in their own local context. I posit that voting then becomes an expressive act by voters as they decide to commit to the regime or not based on how they perceive their met or unmet expectations. My primary empirical focus is on developing democracies. Within that context I focus on the expectation that voters have for property rights. As such I place property rights in the broader theoretical context of voters’ expectations for democracies. At a basic level this dissertation adds to well-established literatures on micro political economy and voter turnout. On a theoretical and empirical level I incorporate several literatures by drawing on formal models of turnout and employing data from the newest developing democracies. I test my theory and find support for my proposition that property rights can motivate voter turnout. I then move into a discussion of implications for democracies that fail to meet voters’ expectations. In the face of unfulfilled expectations (often manifested through a lack of property rights protection) declining voter turnout may be just the tip of a looming iceberg. These democracies can expect to see several potential phenomena including reduced support for democracy and the regime as well as potential increases in (often violent) social conflict. Ultimately these regimes could experience severe democratic backsliding and potential full collapse

Residual Votes and Abstentions in the 2016 Election

This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the increase in the residual vote rate from 2012 to 2016, when it increased from 0.99% to 1.87% nationwide. It is reasonable to assume that this spike in the residual vote rate is due to a rise in abstentions. However, there are currently other trends in election administration, such as an increasing reliance on vote-by-mail, that could also be driving up the residual vote rate. And, even if the recent up-tick in the residual vote rate is primarily due to an increase in abstentions in 2016, it is not a priori obvious that the source of new abstentions was equally distributed among disaffected Democrats and Republicans. The analysis in this paper relies on a combination of public opinion data and election returns to address these issues. We find, first, that the increase in abstentions in 2016 was most likely due to disaffected Republicans, rather than an across-the-board phenomenon. We also confirm that the increase in the 2016 residual vote rate was not due to changes in voting technologies between 2012 and 2016. We address three issues in the conclusion that this analysis raises: (1) the potential for the growth of protest voting in the U.S., (2) the likelihood that there is a significant under-reporting of voter abstentions in public opinion surveys, leaving a role for aggregate analysis to study this phenomenon, and (3) cautions about the use of the residual vote rate as a metric to gauge the accuracy of voting technologies

Abstention, Protest, and Residual Votes in the 2016 Election

Objective: We analyze the significant increase in the residual vote rate in the 2016 presidential election. The residual vote rate, which is the percentage of ballots cast in a presidential election that contain no vote for president, rose nationwide from 0.99 to 1.41 percent between 2012 and 2016. Method: We use election return data and public opinion data to examine why the residual vote rate increased in 2016. Results: The primary explanation for this rise is an increase in abstentions, which we argue results primarily from disaffected Republican voters rather than alienated Democratic voters. In addition, other factors related to election administration and electoral competition explain variation in the residual vote rates across states, particularly the use of mail/absentee ballots and the lack of competition at the top of the ticket in nonbattleground states. However, we note that the rise in the residual vote rate was not due to changes in voting technologies. Conclusion: Our research has implications for the use of the residual vote as a metric for studying election administration and voting technologies

Replication Data for Does Information Lead to Emulation? Spatial Dependence in Anti-Government Violence

This study examines whether acts of anti-government violence exhibit spatial dependence across state boundaries. In other words, to what extent can acts of anti-government violence in one country be attributed to violence in neighboring countries? Past research, which has largely focused on civil war or large-scale conflict contagion, finds that geographically proximate states are more likely to experience the cross-boundary diffusion of conflict due to action emulation. However, this assumes that actors are fully aware of conflicts occurring in neighboring countries. To address this, the article argues that the proliferation of communication technology increases access to information about events in neighboring states, thereby allowing emulation to occur and subsequently conditioning the potential for violence to spread. It tests this expectation by modeling the effects of a unique spatial connectivity matrix that incorporates both state contiguity and access to communication technology. An analysis of all acts of anti-government violence in 44 African countries from 2000 to 2011 supports the argument

Elections Performance Index 2016

This dataset includes the calculated index scores for the 2016 EPI and the number of indicators used for each state

Elections Performance Index Indicators 2008–2016

This dataset includes the non-normalized indicator values for all indicators used in the Elections Performance Index

Defining Opposition: An Interview with Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO

Afonso Dhlakama has run in all four multiparty presidential elections in Mozambique. Before that, he led a guerrilla resistance known as RENAMO in a brutal civil war. He is a household name in Mozambique, and he represents over 30 years of opposition to the ruling party of FRELIMO. This transcript is from an interview conducted with Mr. Dhlakama immediately following the 2009 elections. Much of the focus on Mozambican democracy has been on the electoral and economic success of FRELIMO. Nevertheless, RENAMO has played an integral role as the opposition. The future of this role is uncertain, and Mr. Dhlakama and RENAMO are at their weakest point since the civil war ended in 1992. This interview was conducted as part of the African Democracy Project series at Wayne State University