A state level database for the manufacturing sector: construction and sources

This document describes the construction of and data sources for a state-level panel data set measuring output and factor use for the manufacturing sector. These data are a subset of a larger, comprehensive data set that we currently are constructing and hope to post on the FRBSF website in the near future. The comprehensive data set will cover the U.S. manufacturing sector and may be thought of as a state-level analog to other widely used productivity data sets such as the industry-level NBER Productivity Database or Dale Jorgenson’s “KLEM” database or the country-level Penn World Tables, but with an added emphasis on adjusting prices for taxes. The selected variables currently available for public use are nominal and real gross output, nominal and real investment, and real capital stock. The data cover all fifty states and the period 1963 to 2006.Manufactures

State investment tax incentives: a zero-sum game?

Though the U.S. federal investment tax credit (ITC) was permanently repealed in 1986, state-level ITCs have proliferated over the last few decades. The proliferation of state ITCs and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: (1) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?; and (2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states? To begin to answer these questions, we construct a detailed panel data set for 50 states for 20+ years (depending on the series). The data set contains series on output and capital, their relative prices, and the number of establishments. The effects of tax parameters on capital formation and establishments are measured by the Jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax parameters. Cross-jurisdiction differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost, combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension, are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives. Three models are estimated: (1) a Capital Demand Model motivated by the first-order condition for profit-maximization; (2) a Spatial Discontinuity Model developed by Holmes (1998) that exploits the spatial discontinuity in tax policies that occurs at state borders; and (3) a Twin-Counties Model that matches counties to a cross-border "twin" and relates between county differentials in manufacturing activity to between-county differentials in tax policy. The first model relies on state-level data, while the latter two use county-level data. On balance, the models find a significant channel for state tax incentives on own-state economic activity and document the importance of interstate capital flows, a necessary element for meaningful tax competition. Whether state investment incentives are a zero-sum game among the states is less certain and depends on the definition of the set of competitive states.Tax incentives ; Taxation ; State finance

Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. states

The standard model of strategic tax competition – the non-cooperative tax-setting behavior of jurisdictions competing for a mobile capital tax base – assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers, given the political and electoral environments in which they operate, also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. Firms recognize the factors affecting policymakers’ welfare and may make campaign contributions to influence tax policy. These changes to the standard strategic tax competition model imply that business contributions affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions. Thus, business campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. ; Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, our empirical work uncovers four key results. First, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy. Second, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is nearly$4. Third, the slope of the reaction function between tax policy in a given state and the tax policies of its competitive states is negative. Fourth, we highlight the sensitivity of the empirical results to state effects.Taxation

State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum Game?

Though the U.S. federal investment tax credit (ITC) was permanently repealed in 1986, state-level ITCs have proliferated over the last few decades. Are these tax incentives effective in increasing investment within the state? How much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states? Based on a panel dataset for all 50 states, we find a significant channel for state tax incentives on own-state economic activity and document the importance of interstate capital flows. Whether state investment incentives are a zero-sum game is less certain and depends on the definition of the set of competitive states.state tax incentives, interstate tax competition, business taxes

Can Lower Tax Rates be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking and Tax Competition among U.S. States

The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. This extension to the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions, thus enhancing or retarding the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. The model is estimated with panel data for 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions. Among other results, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy; the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is approximately$6.65.business campaign contributions, state business tax policy, rent-seeking, capital mobility

State investment tax incentives: what are the facts?

There is an ongoing debate in the U.S. among policymakers and the courts concerning the practical effects of state investment tax incentives. However, this debate often suffers from a lack of clear information on the extent of such incentives among states and how these incentives have evolved over time. This paper takes a first step toward addressing this shortcoming. Compiling information from all 50 states and the District of Columbia over the past 40 years, we are able to paint a picture of the variation in state investment tax incentives across states and over time. In particular, we document three stylized facts: (1) Over the last 40 years, state investment tax incentives have become increasingly large and increasingly common among states; (2) these incentives, as well as the level of the overall after-tax price of capital, are to a large extent clustered in certain regions of the country; and (3) states that enact investment tax credits tend to do so around the same time as their neighboring states.Tax incentives ; Taxation ; State finance

Generation of graph-state streams

We propose a protocol to generate a stream of mobile qubits in a graph state through a single stationary parent qubit and discuss two types of its physical implementation, namely, the generation of photonic graph states through an atom-like qubit and those of flying atoms through a cavity-mode photonic qubit. The generated graph states fall into an important class that can hugely reduce the resource requirement of fault-tolerant linear optics quantum computation, which was previously known to be far from realistic. In regard to the flying atoms, we also propose a heralded generation scheme, which allows for high-fidelity graph states even under the photon loss.Comment: Accepted for publication at PRA Rapid Communication

Inhibitory control as a mediator of bidirectional effects between early oppositional behavior and maternal depression.

Maternal depression is an established risk factor for child conduct problems, but relatively few studies have tested whether children's behavioral problems exacerbate mothers' depression or whether other child behavioral characteristics (e.g., self-regulation) may mediate bidirectional effects between maternal depression and child disruptive behavior. This longitudinal study examined the parallel growth of maternal depressive symptoms and child oppositional behavior from ages 2 to 5; the magnitude and timing of their bidirectional effects; and whether child inhibitory control, a temperament-based self-regulatory mechanism, mediated effects between maternal depression and child oppositionality. A randomized control trial of 731 at-risk families assessed children annually from ages 2 to 5. Transactional models demonstrated positive and bidirectional associations between mothers' depressive symptoms and children's oppositional behavior from ages 2 to 3, with a less consistent pattern of reciprocal relations up to age 5. Mediation of indirect mother-child effects and child evocative effects depended on the rater of children's inhibitory control. Findings are discussed in regard to how child evocative effects and self-regulatory mechanisms may clarify the transmission of psychopathology within families

Beyond the information technology agreement : harmonization of standards and trade in electronics

Product standards can have a dual impact on production and trade costs. Standards may impose additional costs on exporters as it may be necessary to adapt products for specific markets (cost-effect). In contrast, standards can reduce exporters'information costs if they convey information on industrial requirements or consumer tastes that would be costly to collect in the absence of standards (informational-effect). Using a new World Bank database of European standards for electronic products, the authors examine the impact of internationally-harmonized European standards on European Union imports. They find that European Union standards for electronic products that are harmonized to international standards have a positive and significant effect on trade. The results suggest that efforts to promote trade in electronic products could be complemented by steps to promote standards harmonization. This might include, for example, re-starting talks to extend the Information Technology Agreement to non-tariff measures and commitments to harmonize national standards in electronic products.Information Security&Privacy,Technology Industry,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education,Labor Policies

Spatial Models to Account for Variation in Observer Effort in Bird Atlases

To assess the importance of variation in observer effort between and within bird atlas projects and demonstrate the use of relatively simple conditional autoregressive (CAR) models for analyzing grid-based atlas data with varying effort. Pennsylvania and West Virginia, United States of America. We used varying proportions of randomly selected training data to assess whether variations in observer effort can be accounted for using CAR models and whether such models would still be useful for atlases with incomplete data. We then evaluated whether the application of these models influenced our assessment of distribution change between two atlas projects separated by twenty years (Pennsylvania), and tested our modeling methodology on a state bird atlas with incomplete coverage (West Virginia). Conditional Autoregressive models which included observer effort and landscape covariates were able to make robust predictions of species distributions in cases of sparse data coverage. Further, we found that CAR models without landscape covariates performed favorably. These models also account for variation in observer effort between atlas projects and can have a profound effect on the overall assessment of distribution change. Accounting for variation in observer effort in atlas projects is critically important. CAR models provide a useful modeling framework for accounting for variation in observer effort in bird atlas data because they are relatively simple to apply, and quick to run