The Menstrual Cycle and Performance Feedback Alter Gender Differences in Competitive Choices

Economic experiments have shown that in mixed gender groups women are more reluctant than men to choose tournaments when given the choice between piece rate and winner-take-all tournament style compensation. These gender difference experiments have all relied on a framework where subjects were not informed of their abilities relative to potential competitors. We replicate these findings with math and word tasks, and then show that feedback about relative performance moves high ability females towards more competitive compensation schemes, moves low ability men towards less competitive schemes such as piece rate and group pay, and removes the average gender difference in compensation choices. We also examine between and within-subjects differences in choices for females across the menstrual cycle. We find women's relative reluctance to choose tournaments comes mostly from women in the low hormone phase of their menstrual cycle. Women in the high hormone phase are substantially more willing to compete than women in the low phase, though still somewhat less willing to compete than men. There are no significant differences between the choices of any of these groups after they receive relative performance feedback.competition, tournaments, gender, hormones, menstruation, feedback

Theft and Deterrence

We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.crime, punishment, incentives, deterrence, juvenile, arrest, risk, larceny

An Experimental Test of Criminal Behavior Among Juveniles and Young Adults

We report results from economic experiments that provide a direct test of the hypothesis that criminal behavior responds rationally to changes in the possible rewards and in the probability and severity of punishment. The experiments involve decisions that are best described as petty larceny, and are done using high school and college students who can anonymously take real money from each other. We find that decisions about whether and how much to steal are, in general, rational and responsive to the variations in tradeoffs, and sometimes, though not always, to the overall availability of criminal opportunities.

Children's Altruism in Public Good and Dictator Experiments

We examine the development of altruistic and free-riding behavior in 6-12-year-old children. We find that the level of altruistic behavior in children is similar to that of adults but that repetition has a different effect. Younger children's contributions tend to increase in later rounds of the experiments, whereas the contributions of older children, like those of adults, tend to decline. Group attachment is associated with higher contributions. Contributions in a subsequent dictator experiment are correlated with first-roundn contributions in the public good experiment, but are not strongly correlated with last-round contributions.

Evidence on the Efficacy of School-Based Incentives for Healthy Living

We analyze the effects of a school-based incentive program on children's exercise habits. The program offers children an opportunity to win prizes if they walk or bike to school during prize periods. We use daily child-level data and individual fixed effects models to measure the impact of the prizes by comparing behavior during prize periods with behavior during non-prize periods. Variation in the timing of prize periods across different schools allows us to estimate models with calendardate fixed effects to control for day-specific attributes, such as weather and proximity to holidays. On average, we find that being in a prize period increases riding behavior by sixteen percent, a large impact given that the prize value is just six cents per participating student. We also find that winning a prize lottery has a positive impact on ridership over subsequent weeks; consider heterogeneity across prize type, gender, age, and calendar month; and explore differential effects on the intensive versus extensive margins.health; exercise; children; school; incentives; active commuting

Theft and Deterrence

We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.

Evidence on the Efficacy of School-Based Incentives for Healthy Living

We analyze the effects of a school-based incentive program on children's exercise habits. The program offers children an opportunity to win prizes if they walk or bike to school during prize periods. We use daily child-level data and individual fixed effects models to measure the impact of the prizes by comparing behavior during prize periods with behavior during non-prize periods. Variation in the timing of prize periods across different schools allows us to estimate models with calendar-date fixed effects to control for day-specific attributes, such as weather and proximity to holidays. On average, we find that being in a prize period increases riding behavior by sixteen percent, a large impact given that the prize value is just six cents per participating student. We also find that winning a prize lottery has a positive impact on ridership over subsequent weeks; consider heterogeneity across prize type, gender, age, and calendar month; and explore differential effects on the intensive versus extensive margins.

The causal effect of testosterone on men’s competitive behavior is moderated by basal cortisol and cues to an opponent’s status: Evidence for a context-dependent dual-hormone hypothesis

Testosterone has been theorized to direct status-seeking behaviors, including competitive behavior. However, most human studies to date have adopted correlational designs, and findings across studies are inconsistent. This experiment (n = 115) pharmacologically manipulated men's testosterone levels prior to a mixed-gender math competition and examined basal cortisol (a hormone implicated in stress and social avoidance) and context cues related to an opponent's perceived status (an opponent's gender or a win/loss in a prior competition) as factors that may moderate testosterone's impact on competitive behavior. We test and find support for the hypothesis that testosterone given to low-cortisol men evokes status-seeking behavior, whereas testosterone given to high-cortisol men evokes status-loss avoidance. In the initial rounds of competition, testosterone's influence on competitive decisions depended on basal cortisol and opponent gender. After providing opponent-specific win-lose feedback, testosterone's influence on decisions to reenter competitions depended on basal cortisol and this objective cue to status, not gender. Compared to placebo, men given exogenous testosterone who were low in basal cortisol showed an increased tendency to compete against male and high-status opponents relative to female and low-status opponents (status-seeking). Men given exogenous testosterone who were high in basal cortisol showed the opposite pattern-an increased tendency to compete against female and low-status opponents relative to male and high-status opponents (status-loss avoidance). These results provide support for a context-dependent dual-hormone hypothesis: Testosterone flexibly directs men's competitive behavior contingent on basal cortisol levels and cues that signal an opponent's status. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)