Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution

The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now). OSW Commentary NUMBER 249 | 01.09.2017

The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exercises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercises, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in operational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be considered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western strategic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size

The best army Ukraine has ever had. Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression. OSW Studies 66, July 2017

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the first weeks of the war in the Donbas revealed what Ukraine’s armed forces were in reality – a petrified structure, incapable of any effective action in the face of minimal enemy engagement. A considerable section of the armed forces’ personnel gradually became aware of whom they were representing only in the course of the conflict and it was not rare that from the perspective of service in one of post-Soviet military districts they sided with Russia

Towards a professional army. Changes to the structure of the officer cadre and the manning system of the Russian armed forces. OSW Commentary No. 73, 2012-03-28

The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts

Eyes west! A shift in focus in Russia’s Southern Military District. OSW COMMENTARY 2020-09-08.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Military District (SMD), which is the smallest of all the main administrative units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in terms of landmass, has been one of the most powerful districts and one of those playing the greatest roles in the armed conflicts in which Russia is engaged. In the two Chechen wars and the strike against Georgia in 2008, it bore the main brunt, and at present currently, along with the Black Sea Fleet (which is under its command), it bears the main responsibility for operations against Ukraine and for the military operation in Syria. Until the mid-2010s, the natural theatre for operations and area of SMD military activity was: the Caucasus, Turkey, the Middle East, and Iran. The conflict with Ukraine caused the SMD’s centre of gravity to shift to regions directly bordering Ukraine and occupied Crimea. The changes to the structure and the twofold increase in the SMD’s capability observed since that time show that the southern direction is no longer a priority. Examples of this increase include: the forming of the new 8th Army (A) on the Ukraine border and expansion of the group in Crimea. The vast majority of SMD units are currently preparing for operations in the western direction. Ukraine has become the main target, but if a conflict should break out on NATO’s eastern flank, the SMD’s task would be to provide direct support for operations in Central Europe

The S-400 for Turkey The crisis in Turkish-American relations escalates. OSW Commentary Number 305, 12 June 2019

In late May and early June 2019, the contract for Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made missile launchers which make up the S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile system entered the final stage of its implementation. This has been confirmed by unequivocal statements from the Turkish leadership, the fact that the first group of servicemen (system operators) have undergone training in Russia, and the announced arrival in Turkey of the Russian technical personnel responsible for the system’s assembly. The first S-400 launchers are likely to be dispatched to Turkey as early as July (around six months sooner than the planned supply date). At the same time the US, which has blocked Turkey’s attempts to purchase anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia and China for years, is stepping up its pressure on Turkey; for example, it has announced that the unprecedented sanctions package prepared last year will be imposed if the Russian-Turkish deal is finalised. The crisis around the S-400 is a manifestation of the deep crisis in Turkish-American relations that has been mounting for several years. More broadly speaking, it is an element of the crisis in the relationship between Turkey and the West, and de facto amounts to a major aggravation of the situation. The absence of will to make concessions on both sides makes any compromise between Ankara and Washington unlikely. At stake are the cohesion of NATO, the present and future nature of the US’s leading role, and Turkey’s place in its relations with the West and Russia. To some degree, all this affects the position of Russia, which itself is interested in undermining the positions of NATO and the US

The assessment method of human exposure to noise emitted by lawnmowers equipped with single-cylinder combustion engines

Appliances equipped with single-cylinder combustion engines generate noise which may have an adverse effect on human health. Lawnmowers are one of the most popular examples of appliances utilising a drive of this type. This paper presents the results of measurements of sound levels emitted by such mowers and received in the whereabouts of their users. The effect was analysed of a change in the technical condition of their drive on the sound level and a method was proposed to assess its impact on users. The basis of the method is the summation of selected 1/3 octave bands, in which the main energy of noise generated by mowers with single-cylinder combustion engines is radiated

Holes in the skies over NATO's Central European member states. OSW Commentary No. 119, 22.10.2013

Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will determine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the details following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same decision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in airspace are durably limited. The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire continent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be termed an ever more porous sky

Condition monitoring of the cam chain tensioner in the motorcycle engine

Timing gear systems of motorcycle engines are equipped with chain tensioners, which are subject to premature damage in certain engine models. Early detection of such damage is essential, as it may protect the user from unexpected engine failure while the motorcycle is running. This paper presents the results of research whose purpose was to use the measurements and analyses of vibration signals for the diagnosing of damage to the hydraulic tensioner in the timing gear system. Stand tests were conducted of the motorcycle engine in which new, used or damaged tensioners were installed. The research results allow to conclude that a change in the technical condition of the tensioner caused by wear contributes to an increased level of engine vibrations and that it is possible to detect damage to the timing gear system tensioner by means of measurement, processing and analysis of vibration signals