Newly exploited area (10³ km²) for each latitude class, averaged over each decade.

<p>Newly exploited area defined as ocean cells where primary production required to sustain fisheries catch exceeds the threshold percentage of primary production. Results based on three exploitation thresholds (10%, 20% and 30%) are presented. Black dots at the base of each histogram represent the mean latitude of the distribution. The dots for each exploitation threshold are fitted with a linear regression; jointly, they suggest the southward expansion of 0.7 to 0.9 degree per year.</p

Primary production required (PPR) to sustain global marine fisheries landings expressed as percentage of local primary production (PP).

<p>Estimates of PPR, PP and PPR/PP computed per 0.5° latitude/longitude ocean cells. PPR estimates based on the <i>Sea Around Us</i> catch database (<a href="http://www.seaaroundus.org" target="_blank">www.seaaroundus.org</a>) and PP estimates derived from SeaWiFS's global ocean colour satellite data. The maps represent total annual landings for 1950 (top) and 2005 (bottom). Note that PP estimates are static and derived from the synoptic observation for 1998.</p

Time series of areas newly exploited by marine fisheries (1950–2005), expressed in km².

<p>Newly exploited areas defined as regions where primary production required (PPR) to sustain reported fisheries landings exceeds the threshold percentage of local primary production (PP). Results based on three exploitation thresholds (10%, 20% and 30%) are presented.</p

Time series of areas exploited by marine fisheries by latitude class, expressed as a percentage of the total ocean area.

<p>‘Area exploited’ defined as regions where primary production required (PPR) to sustain reported fisheries landings is greater than 10% of local primary production (PP).</p

Table_1_Subsidies and allocation: A legacy of distortion and intergenerational loss.DOCX

One of the greatest threats to the conservation of transboundary stocks is the failure of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to equitably allocate future fishing opportunities. Across RFMOs, catch history remains the principal criterion for catch allocations, despite being recognized as a critical barrier to governance stability. This paper examines if and how subsidies have driven catch histories, thereby perpetuating the legacy of unfair resource competition between distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) and coastal States, and how this affects ongoing allocation negotiations in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Using limited publicly available data on subsidies to Indian Ocean tuna fleets, we show that subsidies have inflated catch histories of many DWFN's. As long as historical catch remains the key allocation criterion, future fishing opportunities will continue to be skewed in favor of DWFNs, in turn marginalizing half of the IOTC member States, which collectively account for a paltry 4% of the current catch. Without better transparency in past subsidies data, accounting for this distortion will be difficult. We provide alternative allocation options for consideration, with our analysis showing that re-attributing DWFN catch to the coastal State in whose waters it was caught may begin to alleviate this historical injustice.</p

Histograms of pre-tax profit share of total sales for a sample of 1000 global fishing companies.

<p>Figure taken from <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0040542#pone.0040542-Plimsoll1" target="_blank">[24]</a>.</p

The Schaeffer surplus-production model, based on Gordon [<b>27</b>].

<p>The Schaeffer surplus-production model, based on Gordon <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0040542#pone.0040542-Gordon1" target="_blank">[<b>27</b>]</a>.</p

Summary of resource rent (adjusted for subsidies) from current fisheries.

<p>We see that several countries are in red once the full cost of fishing, including harmful subsidies are taken into account.</p

Sensitivity of present value of rebuilding costs to parameter assumptions.

*<p>Adjustment costs include the cost of vessel buybacks and payouts for fishers to ease the transition to alternate employment.</p

Transition time path of key rebuilding global fisheries variables.

<p>Transition time path of key rebuilding global fisheries variables.</p