A note on Morato on modality and explanation

This brief note critically assesses the central arguments in Morato’s (Erkenntnis 79:327–349, 2014) recent contribution to the growing literature on Blackburn’s dilemma about necessity. In particular, I demonstrate that (i) neither of Morato’s two novel reconstructions of the dilemma’s contingency horn succeed, since both turn on false premises; and, (ii) Morato fails to adequately motivate his own response to these reconstructions. The upshot is that Morato has set himself a pair of flawed problems, then offered a flawed solution

Grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination

Recently, Kroedel and Schulz have argued that the exclusion problem—which states that certain forms of non-reductive physicalism about the mental are committed to systematic and objectionable causal overdetermination—can be solved by appealing to grounding. Specifically, they defend a principle that links the causal relations of grounded mental events to those of grounding physical events, arguing that this renders mental–physical causal overdetermination unproblematic. Here, we contest Kroedel and Schulz’s result. We argue that their causal-grounding principle is undermotivated, if not outright false. In particular, we contend that the principle has plausible counterexamples, resulting from the fact that some mental states are not fully grounded by goings on ‘in our heads’ but also require external factors to be included in their full grounds. We draw the sceptical conclusion that it remains unclear whether non-reductive physicalists can plausibly respond to the exclusion argument by appealing to considerations of grounding

On Shaky Ground? Exploring the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis

The past decade and a half has seen an absolute explosion of literature discussing the structure of reality. One particular focus here has been on the fundamental. However, while there has been extensive discussion, numerous fundamental questions about fundamentality have not been touched upon. In this chapter, I focus on one such lacuna about the modal strength of fundamentality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis - that is, the idea that the fundamentalia are only contingently fundamental (or, in property-terms, that the property of being fundamental is not a (weakly) necessary property). And while I think this thesis is plausible – indeed, I show here that it lurks in the unexamined shadows/assumptions of some fairly prominent positions – as far as I can tell, nothing has been said either for or against it. Here, I hope to fix this by giving the thesis a proper airing. In this way, this chapter represents a first-pass at exploring not only the modal status of fundamentality, but also offers a starting point for examining broader issues about the relationship between fundamentality and modality

Essential properties: analysis and extension

This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us. The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. The first, ‘what are essential properties?’ is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, ‘what essential properties are there?’ is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters. Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question, introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provide. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed. Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis. Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best. An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis ‘get the essential properties wrong’, relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine’s argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine’s argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman. In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine’s attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question. The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins’ sortal essentialism, the position that objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins’ essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism. Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine arguments concerning origin essentialism. It is shown that these arguments are either inconclusive - in that they do not entail origin essentialism - or assume origin essentialism at the out-set, leaving us little reason to accept origin essentialism. Chapter eight examines Mackie’s minimalist essentialism. After laying out the position, I then examine a series of objections it faces. In particular, I show that even if we accept minimalist essentialism, it would not help us answer the Extension Question. As such, we have no reason to do so. I conclude that essential properties can best be understood as those sparse properties of an object which satisfy a specific modal criterion, as demonstrated in chapter five. However, the number of properties that satisfy this criterion might be quite small, as indicated by the results of chapters six through eight. This result is a mixed one for the essentialist: while we now know what essential properties are, it seems like we lost them all somewhere along the way

Fiction Unlimited

We offer an original argument for the existence of universal fictions—that is, fictions within which every possible proposition is true. Specifically, we detail a trio of such fictions, along with an easy-to-follow recipe for generating more. After exploring several consequences and dismissing some objections, we conclude that fiction, unlike reality, is unlimited when it comes to truth

Virtual reality: Digital or fictional?

Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguat- ing two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then introduce a Waltonian variety of fictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better ac- count of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences