Noise and disturbance in quantum measurements: an information-theoretic approach

We introduce information-theoretic definitions for noise and disturbance in quantum measurements and prove a state-independent noise-disturbance tradeoff relation that these quantities have to satisfy in any conceivable setup. Contrary to previous approaches, the information-theoretic quantities we define are invariant under relabelling of outcomes, and allow for the possibility of using quantum or classical operations to `correct' for the disturbance. We also show how our bound implies strong tradeoff relations for mean square deviations.Comment: v3: to appear on PRL (some issues fixed, supplemental material expanded). v2: replaced with submitted version; 5 two-column pages + 6 one-column pages + 3 figures; one issue corrected and few references added. v1: 17 pages, 3 figure

The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy

This paper reviews the current state of theoretical and empirical knowledge regarding compliance with the federal income tax laws. We focus on the validity of certain myths that have come to dominate tax compliance discussions. Toward that end, we discuss three general categories--empirical work, theoretical methodology and fiscal policy recommendations--that seem to require more careful assessment and formulation

The Demographic Imperative in Religious Change in the United States

U.S. Protestants are less likely to belong to “mainline” denominations and more likely to belong to “conservative” ones than used to be the case. Evidence from the General Social Survey indicates that higher fertility and earlier childbearing among women from conservative denominations explains 76% of the observed trend for cohorts born between 1903 and 1973: conservative denominations have grown their own. Mainline decline would have slowed in recent cohorts, but a drop‐off in conversions from conservative to mainline denominations prolonged the decline. A recent rise in apostasy added a few percentage points to mainline decline. Conversions from mainline to conservative denominations have not changed, so they played no role in the restructuring

The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement

The existing paradigm for the economic analysis of tax compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue collection process. Even as a purely economic model, its exclusive focus on individual taxpayers' decision-making promotes an unduly restrictive vision of the compliance problem and potential responses to it. In this paper we outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for analyzing tax compliance, and illustrate it with a simple model. We believe our approach to be a significant improvement in the economic theory of law enforcement because it views the noncompliance problem as an interactive system. In our theoretical construct, individual decision-making not only depends upon and responds to the detection and punishment structure, but, unlike prior models, we also explicitly include the law enforcement agency--in this case the Internal Revenue Service--as an important interactive element. Initially we outline our general approach and its differences from the existing economic law enforcement paradigm. We then detail a simple model and its results and compare these results both to the prior literature and to some of our ongoing research in an effort to illustrate how our theoretical construct may affect predictions. Finally, we describe potential extensions of the model, examine its robustness with respect to various underlying assumptions and offer suggestions for further research, including possible applications to other law enforcement contexts

The Effect of Tax and Audit Rates on Compliance with the Federal Income Tax, 1977-85

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of the effects of state and federal income tax rates and audit rates on compliance with the federal income tax. Using data drawn primarily from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1977-85, we find empirical confirmation of the model's prediction that increases in the tax rates increase compliance. We also investigate the overall performance of the federal revenue collection process and find that the entire IRS estimate of the increase in individual noncompliance during 1977-85 is more than accounted for by the decrease in auditing over the same period

The Report of the United States to the International Fiscal Association on the Costs of Tax Administration and Compliance

This is a report prepared for the International Fiscal Association on the costs of tax administration and compliance in the United States. At the federal level, we present comprehensive data on administrative costs and review recent estimates of compliance costs. At the state level, we present new data on the administrative costs of state income taxes and general sales taxes, and review the very limited data on state level compliance costs. We also discuss the growing role of tax preparers, including new empirical results of our own. Finally, we review the recently enacted "Taxpayer Bill of Rights.

State Income Tax Amnesties 1: Causes

The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically for the years 1980-88 the factors which led states with state income taxes to run tax amnesty programs. We find a principal factor to be the level of IRS auditing; in particular, we find that states have tended to "free-ride" on the IRS-if the IRS is active in a state, then that state is less likely to run a tax amnesty program. Indeed, our estimates indicate that had the IRS audit rate remained constant during the 1980-88 period (instead of falling by almost one-half) , then the cumulative probability that an average state would have a tax amnesty by 1988 would have fallen by almost one-half compared to its actual level

A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors

In the midst of various taxpayer "revolts" and federal budget deficits of unprecedented magnitude, noncompliance with federal and state income tax laws has become an issue of significant policy concern. If the IRS' budget is limited, the probability that any individual taxpayer will be audited depends on the behavior of other taxpayers. Thus the problem of compliance involves a "congestion" effect, which generates strategic interaction among taxpayers as well as between taxpayers and the IRS. This paper reflects an initial attempt to explore how the combination of a strategic IRS and asymmetric information affects the traditional theoretical results on tax compliance behavior

The demand for tax return preparation services

We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among other things, we find significant differences in the factors which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of IRS penalties