A new law on advance directives in Germany

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney (Bevollmachtiger), or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts (Betreuer), this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations

Physician Attitudes towards Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement: Safety Concerns Are Paramount

The ethical dimensions of pharmacological cognitive enhancement have been widely discussed in academic circles and the popular media, but missing from the conversation have been the perspectives of physicians - key decision makers in the adoption of new technologies into medical practice. We queried primary care physicians in major urban centers in Canada and the United States with the aim of understanding their attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. Our primary hypothesis was that physicians would be more comfortable prescribing cognitive enhancers to older patients than to young adults. Physicians were presented with a hypothetical pharmaceutical cognitive enhancer that had been approved by the regulatory authorities for use in healthy adults, and was characterized as being safe, effective, and without significant adverse side effects. Respondents overwhelmingly reported increasing comfort with prescribing cognitive enhancers as the patient age increased from 25 to 65. When asked about their comfort with prescribing extant drugs that might be considered enhancements (sildenafil, modafinil, and methylphenidate) or our hypothetical cognitive enhancer to a normal, healthy 40 year old, physicians were more comfortable prescribing sildenafil than any of the other three agents. When queried as to the reasons they answered as they did, the most prominent concerns physicians expressed were issues of safety that were not offset by the benefit afforded the individual, even in the face of explicit safety claims. Moreover, many physicians indicated that they viewed safety claims with considerable skepticism. It has become routine for safety to be raised and summarily dismissed as an issue in the debate over pharmacological cognitive enhancement; the observation that physicians were so skeptical in the face of explicit safety claims suggests that such a conclusion may be premature. Thus, physician attitudes suggest that greater weight be placed upon the balance between safety and benefit in consideration of pharmacological cognitive enhancement

The Philosopher's Medicine of the Mind: Kant's Account of Mental Illness and the Normativity of Thinking

Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is what I refer to as “non-pathological.” That is, most mental illnesses are for Kant continuous with normally functioning cognition. Someone with a healthy reason can easily fall into mental illness and someone with mental illness can (perhaps not as easily) re-establish healthy reason. By accepting a non-pathological definition of mental illness, it follows for Kant that humans have more agency and responsibility regarding their mental health than current views allow, which explains why several of his writings aim to prescribe a “diet of the mind” (2:271). Contrary to popular readings of Kant as a champion of reason’s power, Kant’s conception of mental illness shows that he recognizes how fragile human reason can be

Critical appraisal of advance directives given by patients with fatal acute stroke: an observational cohort study

Background: Advance directives (AD) imply the promise of determining future medical treatment in case of decisional incapacity. However, clinical practice increasingly indicates that standardized ADs often fail to support patients’ autonomy. To date, little data are available about the quality and impact of ADs on end-of-life decisions for incapacitated acute stroke patients. Methods: We analyzed the ADs of patients with fatal stroke, focusing on: (a) their availability and type, (b) stated circumstances to which the AD should apply, and (c) stated wishes regarding specific treatment options. Results: Between 2011 and 2014, 143 patients died during their hospitalization on our stroke unit. Forty-two of them (29.4%) had a completed and signed, written AD, as reported by their family, but only 35 ADs (24.5%) were available. The circumstances in which the AD should apply were stated by 21/35 (60%) as a “terminal condition that will cause death within a relatively short time” or an ongoing “dying process.” A retrospective review found only 16 of 35 ADs (45.7%) described circumstances that, according to the medical file, could have been considered applicable by the treating physicians. A majority of patients objected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (22/35, 62.9%), mechanical ventilation (19/35, 54.3%), and artificial nutrition (26/35, 74.3%), while almost all (33/35, 94.3%) directed that treatment for alleviation of pain or discomfort should be provided at all times even if it could hasten death. Conclusions: The prevalence of ADs among patients who die from acute stroke is still low. A major flaw of the ADs in our cohort was their attempt to determine single medical procedures without focusing on a precise description of applicable scenarios. Therefore, less than half of the ADs were considered applicable for severe acute stroke. These findings stress the need to foster educational programs for the general public about advance care planning to facilitate the processing of timely, comprehensive, and individualized end-of-life decision-making