Public Choice and Altruism

The public choice literature has paid little attention to altruism, and the few works that do deal with it usually focus on the tradeoff between selfish and unselfish preferences, assuming some shared set of unselfish preferences. This focus leaves the question open as to whether unselfish but conflicting beliefs can be the source of public choice problems. This paper examines conflicting ethical beliefs among purely altruistic individuals to show that many of the problems that appear to go away if people are altruistic (assuming notions of the public interest are shared) return if notions of the public interest conflict no matter how altruistic people may be.Altruism

"The Public Commodities Problem"

The decision about how much to spend on a public program depends on the answers to two questions: (1) a normative and binary question-Should the government pursue the goal of this program? (2) a positive and continuous question-Given that the program's goal should be adopted, what is the optimal level of spending to achieve it? If the answer to the first question is yes, it might seem desirable to set spending at the optimal level to achieve the goal; however, spending is often not set at that level and there is likely to be an underfunding bias. This paper uses the median voter theorem to demonstrate that the level that is approved does not depend solely on the amount supporters think is necessary. Opponents of the program's goal and supporters of the goal who favor relatively less spending than other supporters favor may form a coalition that ensures that the level of spending approved will be lower than the level most supporters think is optimal. The more opponents there are and the more disagreement there is among supporters about the optimal level, the greater the difference between the actual level of spending and the amount the typical supporter believes is optimal.

New Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income

Renewed interest in a guaranteed income is evident from the number of books that have been published on the topic in the 1990s. This paper discusses and compares seven of those books: Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform, edited by Philippe Van Parijs; Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? by Philippe Van Parijs; Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal, by A. B. Atkinson; The $30,000 Solution, by Robert R. Schutz; The Benefit of Another's Pains: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income, by Gijs Van Donselaar; "...And Economic Justice for All" Welfare Reform for the 21st Century, by Michael L. Murray; and The National Tax Rebate: A New America with Less Government, by Leonard M. Greene.

"New Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income"

Renewed interest in a guaranteed income is evident from the number of books that have been published on the topic in the 1990s. This paper discusses and compares seven of those books: Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform, edited by Philippe Van Parijs; Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? by Philippe Van Parijs; Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal, by A. B. Atkinson; The $30,000 Solution, by Robert R. Schutz; The Benefit of Another's Pains: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income, by Gijs Van Donselaar; "...And Economic Justice for All" Welfare Reform for the 21st Century, by Michael L. Murray; and The National Tax Rebate: A New America with Less Government, by Leonard M. Greene.

The Public Commodities Problem

One person's public good is another's public bad and so, perhaps, the public goods problem could be more generally described as the public commodities problem, in which disagreement about the basic goal of a spending program complicates the decision of how much to spend to achieve that goal. Although public goods spending is a continuous variable, it often has a binary goal such as win a war, deter crime, provide transportation, or reduce poverty. To decide how much spending is necessary to achieve that goal, society must answer both a normative question—Should the government adopt the goal of this spending program?—and a positive question—Given this spending program's goal, what is the optimal level of spending? If the answer to the first question is yes, it may be desirable that the level of spending be set at the optimal level of spending given the stated goal; spending, however, may not be set at that level. This paper uses the median voter theorem to demonstrate that those who do not believe the government should pursue the stated goal of a spending program, and those who believe that the government can achieve the goal with relatively less spending, can form a coalition to keep spending at a level that most supporters (and possibly most citizens) believe objectively is the optimal amount. Thus, even if voters have rational expectations about the amount necessary to achieve a goal, disagreement about whether or not to pursue the goal can cause an underfunding bias.

Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy

This book looks at how modern philosophers pass on myths about prehistory. Why do political philosophers talk so much about the Stone Age? The state of nature, the origin of property, the origin of government, and the primordial nature of inequality and war are popular topics in political philosophy, but are they being used as more than just illustrative examples? Does the best available evidence from archaeology and anthropology support or conflict with the stories being passed on by political philosophers? This book presents a philosophical look at the origin of civilization, examining political theories to show how claims about prehistory are used and presents evidence that much of what we think we know about human origins comes not from scientific investigation but from the imagination of philosophers

Reciprocity and the Guaranteed Income

This paper argues that a guaranteed income is not only consistent with the principle of reciprocity but is required for reciprocity. This conclusion follows from a three-part argument. First, if a guaranteed income is in place, all individuals have the same opportunity to live without working. Therefore, those who choose not to work do not take advantage of a privilege that is unavailable to everyone else. Second, in the absence of an unconditional income, society is, in effect, applying the principle, "(S)he who does not work, will not eat." If the application of this principle is to be consistent with reciprocity, it must be applied to everyone. Most modern industrial societies exempt many citizens from that choice. For example, the owners of external assets do not face the work-or-starve choice and do take advantage of a privilege that is not available to others. An unconditional guaranteed income is one way to eliminate that violation of reciprocity. Third, this paper addresses the criticism that the guaranteed income exploits middle-class workers by demonstrating that a basic income will have a positive effect on wages, which will at least partially counteract the effect of the taxes needed to pay for it.

Universal Basic Income Roundtable

The Margaret Chase Smith Policy Center invited local, regional, and international experts on universal basic income (UBI) to participate in a new feature: Maine Policy Perspectives. In total, the perspectives of seven individuals are included in this roundtable regarding UBI.https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mcspc_perspectives/1000/thumbnail.jp