41 research outputs found
Motivations, aims and communication around advance directives A mixed-methods study into the perspective of their owners and the influence of a current illness
AbstractObjectiveWhat are motivations of owners of an advance directive (AD) to draft an AD, what do they aim for with their AD and do they communicate about their AD?MethodsWritten questionnaires were sent to a cohort of people owning different types of ADs (n=5768). A purposive sample of people suffering from an illness was selected from the cohort for an in-depth interview (n=29).ResultsAbout half of our population had no direct motivation to draft their AD. Most mentioned motivation for the other half was an illness of a family member or friend. Many different and specific aims for drafting an AD were mentioned. An often mentioned more general aim in people with different ADs was to prevent unnecessary lengthening of life or treatment (14–16%). Most respondents communicated about having an AD with close-ones (63–88%) and with their GP (65–79%). In the interviews people gave vivid examples of experiences of what they hoped to prevent at the end of life. Some mentioned difficulties foreseeing the future and gave examples of response shift.ConclusionADs can give directions to caregivers about what people want at the end of life.Practice implicationsADs have to be discussed in detail by their owners and caregivers, since owners often have specific aims with their AD
Conceptualizing autonomy in the context of chronic physical illness: relating philosophical theories to social scientific perspectives
The aim of this article is to conceptualize autonomy in the context of chronic physical illness. To this end, we compare and contrast a selection of contemporary philosophical theories of autonomy with social scientific perspectives on chronic illness, particularly models of disability and symbolic interactionism. The philosophical theories mainly depart from a positive conceptualization of autonomy, which involves actively shaping one's life and identifying with fundamental values. This conceptualization is preferred over a negative conceptualization, which defines autonomy as non-interference, for its compatibility with social models of disability and with the assumption that people are interdependent. Interference may disable, but also enable people with a chronic illness to shape their lives. What matters is that people can realize what they want to realize. We suggest that, in the context of chronic physical illness, autonomy might be conceptualized as correspondence between what people want their lives to be like and what their lives are actually like. Disturbed autonomy might be restored either by expanding opportunities to arrange life or by adjusting how one wants life to be arranged. The grounds for the latter approach might be questioned, first, if people have not adjusted what they want carefully, and second, if reorganization of the material and social environment would have made it unnecessary to adjust one's arrangement of life