Pragmatist reflective equilibrium

Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium has a hybrid character. It is embedded in the pragmatist tradition, but also includes various Kantian and other non-pragmatist elements. I argue that we should discard all non-pragmatist elements and develop reflective equilibrium in a consistently pragmatist manner. I argue that this pragmatist approach is the best way to defend reflective equilibrium against various criticisms, partly by embracing the critiques as advantages. I begin with discussing how each of the three versions of reflective equilibrium in Rawls’ work combines pragmatist and non-pragmatist elements. For Rawls, the primary purpose of reflective equilibrium is epistemic: namely, to construct moral theories or judgments. In a pragmatist approach, there are three connected purposes for moral inquiry: right action, reliable understanding and self-improvement. Depending on the specific context of a reflective equilibrium process, these general purposes can give rise to a variety of specific purposes. In the next sections, I develop a pragmatist approach to reflective equilibrium and discuss the implications of this approach for core elements of reflective equilibrium. These elements are: the initial convictions, facts, personal commitments and comprehensive views of life, coherence and additional methods for critical scrutiny.</p

Pragmatist reflective equilibrium

Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium has a hybrid character. It is embedded in the pragmatist tradition, but also includes various Kantian and other non-pragmatist elements. I argue that we should discard all non-pragmatist elements and develop reflective equilibrium in a consistently pragmatist manner. I argue that this pragmatist approach is the best way to defend reflective equilibrium against various criticisms, partly by embracing the critiques as advantages. I begin with discussing how each of the three versions of reflective equilibrium in Rawls’ work combines pragmatist and non-pragmatist elements. For Rawls, the primary purpose of reflective equilibrium is epistemic: namely, to construct moral theories or judgments. In a pragmatist approach, there are three connected purposes for moral inquiry: right action, reliable understanding and self-improvement. Depending on the specific context of a reflective equilibrium process, these general purposes can give rise to a variety of specific purposes. In the next sections, I develop a pragmatist approach to reflective equilibrium and discuss the implications of this approach for core elements of reflective equilibrium. These elements are: the initial convictions, facts, personal commitments and comprehensive views of life, coherence and additional methods for critical scrutiny.</p

An Interactionist View on the Relation between Law and Morality

Introduction The claim of this book is that many issues may be put into a new light if we analyse them with explicit attention to the role of ideals. The relation between law and morality is one of these themes; indeed, my claim is that we will not only be able to understand the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism better, but also to construct a defensible third theory. In recent decades, the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism has lost most of its sharp edges. Some authors, most notably Ronald Dworkin, construct intermediate positions, which are explicitly referred to as a third theory of law. Various authors have tried to modify positivism and include crucial insights from the Dworkinian criticisms, using phrases such as soft or inclusive positivism. Modem natural law theorists similarly present highly attenuated forms of the old strong positions. However, as critics are eager to point out, these intermediate positions and weaker forms of positivism and natural law also remain quite unsatisfactory, often even much more so than the traditional views. Moreover, as a result of these minor and major modifications, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand what the debate is all about - is there still a genuine disagreement

Dynamic Ethics

Introduction Modern societies are rapidly changing societies, and their moralities are rapidly changing as well. Moral views on sexuality and on the treatment of animals have changed considerably over the past fifty years. The introduction of new medical technology, the creation of the Internet, and the globalization of our economies have confronted us with many new moral problems and challenges. Similar problems and challenges may be expected to arise in the next fifty years. Observations such as these are standard in ethics textbooks and articles by moral philosophers. However, ethical theorists have so far little reflected on the increasingly dynamic character of our morality as such. Whenever this is mentioned, it is usually regarded as an argument for our need of ethical reflection on new problems and, therefore, for the inclusion of ethics in every curriculum. Whenever it is addressed more explicitly, it is usually presented as an example of the problem of moral pluralism in modern societies

De regulering van professionals: twee botsende perspectieven

Botsingen tussen professionals en de staat zjjn onvermjjddjjk. Professionals denken vanuit een centrumperiferieperspectief: zjj zijn vooral gericht op de impliciete maatstaven van de beroepsgroep. De regulerende staat heeft daarentegen een top-down perspectief en concentreert rich op het product van de professionals. Vanuit dit gezichtspunt is het vooral meetbare kwantitatieve productie die telt. Deze twee perspectieven zijn op ten minste zeven punten onverenigbaar. Een tussenliggende managementlaag kan zorgen voor een verzachting van het conflict. Het risico bestaat echter dat ook deze laag onderdeel van het probleem wordt

Two Models of Law and Morality

Introduction The debate on the relation between law and morality has been going on in jurisprudence for such a long time that one may wonder whether anything new could be added to it. Yet, paradoxically, it is unclear what precisely is the issue in the debate. According to H.L.A. Hart, positivists hold (and their opponents dispute) that there is no necessary connection between law and morality; law and morality can be separated. At first glance, this seems a simple thesis; David Lyons has shown, however, that this thesis is very ambiguous and that, in a minimal mterpretation ofthe separation thesis, almost every author, including Aquinas, Fuller and Dworkin, would support it. Therefore, it may be a good idea to seek a new perspective on the debate between positivists and non-positivists

The Morality of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality

Introduction In The Morality of Law, Fuller introduces the distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, and applies it to problems of jurisprudence. 1 In moral theory, both types of morality may be easily associated (though never completely identified) with major philosophical traditions such as utilitarianism and Kantianism on the one hand, and Aristotelianism on the other. While in the 1960s and 1970s the focus of moral philosophy was predominantly on duties and obligations, the recent nee-Aristotelian revival has led. to renewed attention to concepts that belong to the sphere of aspiration, such as virtues and ideals. In legal theory, however, the sphere of aspiration has always been more marginal, as most jurists tend to focus on legal rules and duties. In my view, we should deplore this relative neglect because the idea of a morality of aspiration is very fruitful in legal theory and, as a result of developments in contemporary society, it is becoming even more relevant

The Expressive and the Communicative Functions of Law, especially with Regard to Moral Issues

ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that law has two often neglected functions: the expressive and the communicative functions. They are especially important for legislation on moral issues, such as biomedical ethics and anti-discrimination law. The communicative function of law is a complex one: law may create a normative framework, a vocabulary to structure normative discussions, as well as institutions and procedures that promote further discussion. The expressive function of law is at stake when it expresses which fundamental standards, which values are regarded as important. The recognition of these functions is not only important for descriptive purposes; it is also fruitful for normative theory

Het ideaal van de neutrale staat. Inclusieve, exclusieve en compenserende visies op godsdienst en cultuur

Rede, in verkorte vorm uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie in de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op vrijdag 24 april 2009 door dr.mr. Wibren van der Burg Boom Juridische uitgevers Den Haag 2009 De multiculturele en multireligieuze samenleving geeft aanleiding tot felle debatten. Daarin wordt vaak verwezen naar het ideaal van de neutrale staat. Ten onrechte wordt dit ideaal door sommigen gelijkgesteld met de Franse laïcité (of exclusieve neutraliteit) waarbij voor godsdienst geen plaats is in het publieke domein. Dit boek laat zien dat laïcité slechts één van de drie versies van neutraliteit is, en wel de versie die het minst past bij de Nederlandse traditie. Inclusieve en (in uitzonderingsgevallen) compenserende neutraliteit passen beter in onze rechtsorde. Wibren van der Burg schetst in deze rede de hoofdlijnen van een theorie van neutraliteit. Aan de hand van historische debatten laat hij zien hoe neutraliteit in Nederland gestalte kreeg. Vervolgens ontwikkelt hij een eigen inclusieve en pragmatische positie. Deze benadering wordt uitgewerkt aan de hand van actuele voorbeelden zoals religieuze symbolen in de publieke sfeer, politieagentes met hoofddoeken en subsidies voor religieuze organisaties