The War Against Teachers: How the Discourse of A Nation At Risk Set the Agenda for Contemporary New Mexico Education Policy

A Nation at Risk (ANAR) represented a paradigm shift in national education policy and public education discourse. This Critical Discourse Analysis utilizing the theoretical framework of Fairclough and Wodak (1997) found five major recurring themes between ANAR, national and state discourse, and NMTEACH (as referenced in the Final Report and Recommendations of the New Mexico Effective Teaching Task Force, 2011): 1) The Establishment of Pedagogic Authority; 2) The Common-Senseness of Education; 3) Anti-Teacher Rhetoric and the Artificial Support of Teachers; 4) Deracialisation of Educational Policy and Color-Blind Ideology; and 5) The Movement from Symbolic to Physical Violence. This study has uncovered how both public discourse and NMTEACH not only re-discourse the symbolic violence of ANAR, but how the thematic elements of ANAR are continually reproduced under the guise of “cutting-edge” educational research and policy. The past three decades of educational reform and policy have created a War Against Teachers, from the federal to the state level. While the stated intentions of policy pieces have had altruistic roots or different intentions, what has ultimately emerged is a symbolically violent war against the profession of teaching, which has dehumanized generations of teachers. Teachers have become the scapegoat of all of the ills of public education, while businesses have greatly profited from the marketization of education and the deskilling of teachers. This hermeneutical and reproductive cycle must be broken in New Mexico and nationally while a new educational paradigm must emerge

Long-Term Contracts Under the Threat of Supplier Default

Contracting with suppliers prone to default is an increasingly common problem in some industries, particularly automotive manufacturing. We model this phenomenon as a two-period contracting game with two identical suppliers, a single buyer, deterministic demand, and uncertain production costs. The suppliers are distressed at the start of the game and do not have access to external sources of capital; hence, revenues from the buyer are crucial in determining whether default occurs. The production cost of each supplier is the sum of two stochastic components: a common term that is identical for both suppliers (representing raw materials costs, design specifications, etc.) and an idiosyncratic term that is unique to a given supplier (representing inherent firm capability). The buyer chooses a supplier and then decides on a single- or two-period contract. Comparing models with and without the possibility of default, we find that, without the possibility of supplier failure, the buyer always prefers short-term contracts over long-term contracts, whereas this preference is typically reversed in the presence of failure. Neither of these contracts coordinates the supply chain. We also consider dynamic contracts, in which the contract price is partially tied to some index representing the common component of production costs (e.g., commodity prices of raw materials such as steel or oil), allowing the buyer to shoulder some of the risk from cost uncertainty. We find that dynamic long-term contracts allow the buyer to coordinate the supply chain in the presence of default risk. We also demonstrate that our results continue to hold under a variety of alternative assumptions, including stochastic demand, allowing the buyer the option of subsidizing a bankrupt supplier via a contingent transfer payment or loan and allowing the buyer to unilaterally renegotiate contracts. We conclude that the possibility of supplier default offers a new reason to prefer long-term contracts over short-term contracts.supply chain management, financial default, contracting, game theory