Strict Liability Comes of Age in Ohio: Almost

In June 1977 the Ohio Supreme Court decided Temple v. Wean United, Inc., and adopted the doctrine of strict liability for product liability litigation, thereby following a national trend. Earlier decisions had discussed a theory similar to strict liability and had engendered considerable confusion as to the substantive theory supporting possible recovery. Temple apparently ended the confusion

An Overview of Ohio Product Liability Law

Although claims predicated on harm caused by defective products sounding in warranty and negligence, aided and abetted by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, existed well before the twentieth century, product liability as we now know it was initially foreshadowed in Ohio in the seminal case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. Shortly after the true product liability revolution began, Ohio joined the revolution with the adoption of strict liability in warranty without privity in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp. The Ohio Supreme Court then recognized that this approach to strict liability was no different from the more recognized concept of strict liability in tort and adopted this principle as enunciated in the Restatement of Torts. The common law evolution of Ohio product liability law culminated with abandonment of the unreasonably dangerous requirement of the Restatement definition and recognition that the doctrine of strict liability in tort encompassed crash worthiness or second collision liability

Consular Officer\u27s Amenability as Witness

Contrary to the extensive immunities granted to members of the diplomatic service, members of consular posts are given only limited privileges and immunities. The existence and limitation of consular immunities arise by virtue of the office. Thus the consular officer can be called upon to testify in both civil and criminal matters under common law, international law, and treaty provision. In the absence of a treaty, consuls are generally exempt from giving testimony relating to matters acquired within the scope of their official duties or as to material contained in the consular archives. The purpose of this paper is to examine various treaty provisions in an effort to ascertain the manner in which a consular officer\u27s obligation to testify is set forth, the immunities given such officer and some of the problems raised by both the obligation and the immunities

Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues

For more than a decade a war has been waged between forces seeking legislative reform of tort law, with emphasis on product liability, and the Ohio Supreme Court. The battleground has been the legislative enactments of the Ohio General Assembly. This legislation has faced consistent challenge before the court as a proper exercise of its power of judicial review. Time and time again the court\u27s philosophical approach, predicated on a need to protect injured parties and guarantee compensation for harm, has led to determinations that given legislation fails constitutional scrutiny. In a real sense, the Court has become a super legislature comprised of a somewhat consistent four member majority. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward foreshadows what may be the ultimate battle. The result of that battle could end the war. That end will be the unconditional surrender of tort reform advocates. Absent a significant change in the composition of the court, future efforts at tort reform which in any way impede the right of recovery will be preordained to an early demise

Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform versus State Constitutional Mandates

Tort reform emanates, for our purposes, from two primary bodies: state judicial and legislative branches. The vast panoply of congressional and regulatory federal action that bears on the protections afforded and rights to recover for persons within their ambit is a subject for another day. Similarly, the rare areas in which the Supreme Court of the United States establishes federal common law are subjects for another day. On a national scale, the impetus for state legislative reform action can be found in a series of landmark decisions that were soon adopted, in largely similar form, by almost all state supreme courts. The first such case, described as evidencing the “fall of the citadel,” was the seminal decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. This decision is notable for both its attack upon and abrogation of privity doctrine and for its broad-based policy aspects. Shortly thereafter, the adoption of strict liability in tort by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., began to destroy whatever of the citadel was yet in place while strengthening the policy base for further enlarging tort liability. This expansion was realized through recognition of the crashworthiness doctrine by the Eighth Circuit under its Erie powers in Larsen v. General Motors Corp. With these decisions a revolution in judicial-based tort reform rapidly overwhelmed the nation. This revolution, focused on products liability, initiated debate and change. My presentation will emphasize the legislative response to this revolution primarily in the area of law that generated the battleground: products liability

An Overview of Ohio Product Liability Law

Enactment of the Ohio Product Liability Act (the “Act”), which took effect on January 5, 1988, created an exclusive statutory basis for all tort based product liability claims. The statute, while eliminating the term “strict liability in tort,” is primarily a codification of preexisting common law. The Act provides that product liability claims may be predicated on one of four theories: defects in manufacture or construction; defects in design or formulation; defect in warning or instruction, and failure to conform to representation. Each of these theories had previously been recognized by the courts. For example, the requirements for a cause of action predicated on a defect in design virtually mirror the former law of strict liability in tort. As with the former law, to prevail in a product liability claim the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a defect at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer and that the defect was a proximate cause of the harm for which recovery is sought. Since its adoption, efforts to amend the Act have been ongoing. The most recent effort would, among other things, apply comparative fault principles to product liability claims and provide a defense based on substance abuse. In addition, preemptive federal legislation has been passed in both houses of Congress which would, if enacted, have a significant effect upon Ohio product liability law.The American Law Institute is now drafting a Restatement of Products Liability under the leadership of Co-Reporters James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski. Drafts of several sections have been completed which, if adopted by the Institute, would represent a highly regarded source of new approaches to product liability law. If Ohio accepts the premises of this new Restatement, through amendment of the Act, the effect on the state\u27s law of product liability would be significant

Product Liability: A Consolidated Teaching Approach

At a time when the impact of product liability litigation upon the socioeconomic structure of the United States is becoming better understood and at a time when the legal profession is realizing to a greater extent the impact of developing doctrine it is sad to note that vast numbers of law colleges offer no specialized course in this subject. The number of litigated, reported cases is rising dramatically as an increasing number of states are adopting more sophisticated and liberal approaches to product suits. Nevertheless, many law students are ill equipped to deal with the problems of a product claim, in large part because traditional teaching methods premised upon a casebook approach, regardless of the teaching method (socratic, adversary, or lecture), are essentially inadequate. Further complicating the problem is that a teacher of product liability must approach the subject with an understanding that related disciplines such as economics, medicine and engineering are an integral facet of the successful product claim. The product litigator must be familiar with these additional disciplines, know how to function within them and must also be versed in the developing substantive law. Finally, such an attorney must be expert in the use of discovery and motion practice as opposed to the theory of such procedural devices. Expertise in any one of these areas is not adequte and traditional teaching approaches necessitate the compartmentalization of each such area and the omission of the inter or multidisciplinary apsect. What follows is a discussion of the author\u27s efforts to resolve these problems and to create a viable learning experience which will enable the young lawyer to appreciate the subtleties of the field while gaining the practical experiences necessary to succeed. To an extent the author\u27s efforts were simplified by his former association with a New York law firm which handled a considerable amount of product liability litigation

Ancient Answers to Modern Questions: Death, Dying and Organ Transplants - A Jewish Law Perspective

Core values of the Jewish heritage are life and family, not death. An interpretation of Halachah which permits a broad definition of passive euthanasia without lapsing into acceptance of active euthanasia or its more evil cousin, assisted suicide, is consistent with these values. Also consistent with these values and the Jewish tradition is a modern definition of death which recognizes advances in medical technology that were beyond the knowledge or imagination of those who created the vast body of Rabbinic law. This approach will not only ease the suffering of families, it will allow organ transplants to save the lives of others and to thereby achieve t\u27kun olam, the repair of the world

Consular Officer\u27s Amenability as Witness

The purpose of this paper is to examine various treaty provisions in an effort to ascertain the manner in which a consular officer\u27s obligation to testify is set forth, the immunities given such an officer and some of the problems raised by both the obligation and the immunities