Cinematic and aesthetic cartographies of subjective mutation

This article exmaines the use of cinema as a mapping of subjective mutation in the work of Deleuze, Gauttari and Berardi. Drawing on Deleuze's distinciton between the reduction of the art-work to the symptom and the idea of art as symptomatology, the article focuses on Berardi's use of cinematic examples, posing the quesiton in each case of to what extent they function as symptomatologies or mere symptoms of cultural and subjective mutations in examples ranging from Bergman's Persona to Van Sant's Elephant to finish on speculations about Fincher's The Social Network as a cirtical engagement with subjective mutation in the 21st Century

The all-pay-auction with complete information

In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium

RENT-SEEKING FIRMS AND CONSUMERS: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

This paper examines the probability of success in a rent-seeking contest as a general function of the resources that both firms and consumers devote to lobbying the government. The object of lobbying is a possible restriction of market supply, where the likelihood that supply will be restricted to a given extent depends on everyone's lobbying efforts. In equilibrium the expected social loss due to rent-seeking activities is at most equal to the size of the contested rent, and this upper bound does not depend on the active participation of consumers in the contest. Markets in which supply is not restricted may also be associated with rent-seeking waste. Finally, consumers' rent-seeking efforts are shown to be socially productive, both on the margin and in total. Copyright 1992 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..