The all-pay-auction with complete information

In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium

Identification of 30 protein species involved in replicative senescence and stress-induced premature senescence

AbstractExposure of human proliferative cells to subcytotoxic stress triggers stress-induced premature senescence (SIPS) which is characterized by many biomarkers of replicative senescence. Proteomic comparison of replicative senescence and stress-induced premature senescence indicates that, at the level of protein expression, stress-induced premature senescence and replicative senescence are different phenotypes sharing however similarities. In this study, we identified 30 proteins showing changes of expression level specific or common to replicative senescence and/or stress-induced premature senescence. These changes affect different cell functions, including energy metabolism, defense systems, maintenance of the redox potential, cell morphology and transduction pathways