Sincere Cooperation, Mutual Trust, and Mutual Recognition in Social Security Coordination

This article looks into the meaning of the concepts of sincere cooperation,mutual trust, and mutual recognition in EU social security coordination. Itanalyses the legislative choice of coordination as the main regulatory mechanism in the field, and examines the role of administrative cooperation. Furthermore, the article highlights the challenges that arise in situations where mutual recognition is required under the Regulations, as in connection with portable documents relating to the posting of workers. It also considers the limits to mutual trust via the principle of prohibition of fraud and abuse of rights established in the case law of the CJEU on free movement. In the last few years, this principle has been extended into the field of social security law, notably in Altun. In this way, the coordination regime does not require totally blind trust: rather, it balances the Member States’ interests of maintaining the integrity of their social security systems with the Union interest of simplifying free movement. As in other fields of EU law relating to free movement, the mutual trust between the Member States in social security coordination may therefore be set aside in extraordinary cases

A toolbox for administrative law cooperation beyond the state

The purpose of the article is to identify and look into the function of a number of means of legal international cooperation in administrative law. In this discussion on function, the roles and the interplay of the different tools are highlighted as striking a balance between international cooperation, national self-determination and individual rights. Within this theoretical framework, two main types of tools are discussed with examples from environmental law, transport law, and social security law. First, tools related to the establishment of administrative networks are dealt with. Here, international organisations as a framework for administrative cooperation and other network cooperation structures are highlighted. Second, tools relating to an administrative conflict of laws perspective are treated. Here, situations of coordination, recognition of foreign decisions, harmonisation, and application of foreign law in the administrative field are explored. It is concluded that the use of the different tools make possible a balancing of the conflicting interests of international cooperation and national self-determination. Furthermore, in the legal fields treated in the article, it is difficult to see that administrative action entirely leaves the connection to the state. Rather, in the discussed examples, various structures of cooperation mean that national administrative bodies engage in international contacts as an important part of fulfilling their tasks in the national systems

The constitutional foundations of private international law in Sweden

In a legal system based on democracy and the rule of law, an important fundament for the different branches of law is found in constitutional law. Constitutional rules and principles provide democratic legitimacy of legislation and other forms of exercise of public power. Furthermore, such rules and principles limit the exercise of public power, notably through rules on fundamental rights and on transfer of authority to foreign states and international organisations. All these aspects may be relevant in relation to rules of private international law. However, constitutional aspects of private international law have gained little attention in Sweden. The article aims at identifying and discussing some important parts of the constitutional foundations for private international law in Sweden in the light of the rules and principles mentioned. It is concluded that both constitutional law and private international law may benefit from an increased awareness of the possibilities offered by cross-cutting perspectives. Especially, a constitutional perspective on private international law may clarify its place within the Swedish legal system, and thus possibly contribute to the general understanding of this field of law

Administrative Constitutional Review in Sweden: Between Subordination and Independence

The article examines the power of administrative bodies to assess the constitutionality of legislation (‘administrative constitutional review’), taking examples from Swedish public law. The Swedish constitution explicitly requires all public bodies to engage in administrative constitutional review when necessary. In this way, Swedish administrative authorities have the right and duty to act as guardians of the rule of law. This competence relates to the historical development of Swedish public law, which deviates from most other European constitutional systems by organizing all state administrative authorities as separate public organs detached from the Government and the ministries. The Swedish constitutional obligation is parallel to EU law requirements on national administrative organs to set aside national legislation in conflict with directly applicable EU law (‘the Costanzo obligation’). Against the background of practical examples in Swedish law, the article identifies theoretical and practical challenges for administrative bodies to engage in constitutional review. These include the risk of disturbing constitutional structures by putting lower administrative authorities on par with the parliament. The possible problems of lack of legal expertise and the problem of independence in practice are also discussed. At the same time, the concept of administrative constitutional review has a potential to protect the constitutional system, including the fundamental rights of individuals

Sweden: Non-binding Rules against the Pandemic – Formalism, Pragmatism and Some Legal Realism

Swedish measures to fight the spread of COVID-19 differ from the strategies used in other comparable countries. In contrast to the lockdown approach that has been applied in many European countries, the Swedish strategy has been based to a substantial extent on individuals taking responsibility under non-binding recommendations. This contribution explores the Swedish strategy from a constitutional and administrative law perspective, highlighting the tension between the formalist system for delegating norms under the Swedish Constitution and the pragmatic use of non-binding rules such as the “General Recommendations” adopted by the Public Health Agency. The article concludes that the official use of soft law instruments is confusing from a legal perspective, because non-binding rules do not offer the traditional formal mechanisms for legal protection, the publication of norms or accountability. The legal-realist approach of the Supreme Administrative Court’s case law, however, has the potential of balancing some of the unfortunate effects arising from the Swedish combination of formalism and pragmatism

Förvaltningens lagprövning

Enligt 12 kap. 10 § regeringsformen ska förvaltningsorgan på samma sätt som domstolarna kunna pröva om lagar och andra föreskrifter överensstämmer med högre författning. Bestämmelsen ger upphov till frågor om förvaltningens konstitutionella roll och har kritiserats i den juridiska debatten. I statsvetenskapliga undersökningar har en spänning identifierats mellan förvaltningens roll som å ena sidan ett lojalt redskap för den politiska makten, å andra sidan en motmakt. I bakgrunden finns grundläggande diskussioner om maktdelning och funktionsfördelning mellan statsorgan. Artikeln undersöker innebörden av grundlagsbestämmelsen i ljuset av dessa diskussioner. I artikeln behandlas den historiska bakgrunden, vilka organ som omfattas av bestämmelsen, vilka regler som kan prövas samt förfarandet vid lagprövning i förvaltningen. Artikeln konstaterar att det finns principiella och praktiska svårigheter med en ordning där förvaltningsorgan får och ska ägna sig åt lagprövning. På ett principiellt plan är dock den svenska ordningen i linje med en internationell utveckling mot att förvaltningen uppfattas som mer självständig från den politiska makten. Inte minst passar grundlagsbestämmelsen dessutom väl ihop med krav i EU-domstolens praxis (t.ex. i mål 103/88 Costanzo) på att offentliga organ på alla nivåer ska åsidosätta nationella regler som strider mot EU-rätten