Incorporating the impact of social investments and reforms in the European Union’s new fiscal framework. Bruegel Working Papers, March 2024.

The European Union’s new fiscal framework aims to incentivise public investment and reforms by offering the option to extend the four-year fiscal adjustment period to seven years, thereby lowering the average annual fiscal adjustment requirement. EU countries can propose investment and reforms in the context of their national medium-term fiscal structural plans. When they do, these investments and reforms can be expected to also inform the fiscal adjustment proposed by member states. Yet, the EU lacks an agreed methodology for deciding on the potential quantitative impact of investment and reforms on the fiscal adjustment required under the new rules. This paper first analyses the ‘investment friendliness’ of the new framework. Although the incentives offered for raising investment are powerful, the bar for extending the adjustment period mainly through higher investment is high, and the design of the new rules will make it hard to actually raise investment. We next propose an approach for quantifying the impact of investment and reform on debt sustainability in the context of the new framework, taking into account uncertainty about their implementation and their economic effects. Such a methodology would also help the European Commission evaluate the impacts of recently adopted measures, the impacts of which are not yet observable. Developing this methodology will require revisiting the current commonly agreed methodologies for medium- and long-term capital stock and total factor productivity projections. We illustrate the potential impact of investment on debt sustainability analyses through calculations on three social investment measures, that is, combinations of reform and public spending that aim to increase human capital and labour force participations. While the impact of individual reforms on fiscal adjustment needs is generally modest, the combined impact of several measures could be notable

China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Exports competition in the United States market

This paper uses an augmented gravity trade model to examine the impact of Chinese exports to the United States on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) exports to the same market over the last two decades. The analysis relies on a sample of 33 LAC countries and trade data disaggregated to the 10- digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) level. The results show that the impact of Chinese exports on US imports from LAC is negative and statistically significant across model specifications and levels of aggregation in the trade data. In addition, the model suggests that after accounting for such export competition, Free Trade Agreements with the United States, on average, increased imports from LAC countries by up to 1.5 percent. That is, countries with a trade agreement with the US have an advantage over those without, particularly in the manufacturing sector.Abstract. -- Introduction. I. Export competition between China and Latin America and the Caribbean .-- II. Similarity of Latin American and Chinese export structures. -- III. Gravity models of trade. -- IV. Augmented gravity models and export competition. -- V. Estimation approach. -- VI. Data .-- VII. Results. A. Baseline gravity model. B. Specification tests. C. Instrumental variable results. D. Industry results .-- VIII. Conclusions

The rising cost of European Union borrowing and what to do about it

Debt issuance by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union has increased massively. Of the approximately €400 billion in outstanding EU debt as of May 2023, 85 percent has arisen from borrowing since 2020. Large-scale borrowing is expected to continue until 2026 to fund the remainder of NextGenerationEU, and concessional loans to support Ukraine. When these programmes were launched, interest rates were at historic lows - even negative for maturities below 10 years. However, interest rates rose sharply in 2022. Beyond the widespread rise in euro-denominated interest rates due to monetary tightening by the European Central Bank in response to the inflation surge, the EU has also faced a widening of the spread between its yields and those of major European issuers, including France and Germany. This widening is driven by a combination of market features, circumstantial factors and institutional features. The EU cannot affect the overall cyclical movement of interest rates and will have to learn to live with it, like sovereigns do. However, the European Commission should continue to try to narrow the spread with major European sovereigns by further developing the relevant market infrastructure and improving its issuance strategy. The Commission will not be able to do this alone. Institutional developments, including progress on the development of new own resources and a long-term substantial presence in the bond market, will be necessary to fully reap the benefits of EU borrowing. A large share of EU borrowing (around €421 billion in total by the end of 2026, in current prices) is intended to finance unprecedented non-repayable support: Recovery and Resilience Fund grants and additional funding for existing EU programmes under the EU budget. The interest costs associated with this part of the debt lie with the EU budget. Our estimates suggest that, because of the high current and expected levels of interest rates, this cost could be twice as high as what was initially estimated at the start of the EU's 2021-27 budget cycle. As a result, because interest costs for the borrowing of the non-repayable support are accounted for under the EU budget's 'expenditure ceiling', this will exert further pressure on the funding of important EU programmes, which are already affected by inflation. The EU should thus quickly review how interest costs are accounted for in its budget and financial framework

Incorporating the impact of social investments and reforms in the European Union's new fiscal framework

The European Union's new fiscal framework aims to incentivise public investment and reforms by offering the option to extend the four-year fiscal adjustment period to seven years, thereby lowering the average annual fiscal adjustment requirement. Investments and reforms proposed by EU countries in their national medium-term fiscal structural plans can be expected to also inform the fiscal adjustment proposed by member states. Yet, the EU lacks an agreed methodology for deciding on the potential quantitative impact of investment and reforms on the fiscal adjustment required under the new rules. We first analyse the 'investment friendliness' of the new framework. Although the incentives offered for raising investment are powerful, the bar for extending the adjustment period mainly through higher investment is high, and the design of the new rules will make it hard to actually raise investment. We next propose an approach for quantifying the impact of investment and reform on debt sustainability in the context of the new framework, taking into account uncertainty about their implementation and their economic effects. Such a methodology would also help the European Commission evaluate the impacts of recently adopted measures. Developing this methodology will require revisiting the current commonly agreed methodologies for medium- and long-term capital stock and total factor productivity projections. We illustrate the potential impact of investment on debt sustainability analyses through calculations on three social investment measures, that is, combinations of reform and public spending that aim to increase human capital and labour force participation. While the impact of individual reforms on fiscal adjustment needs is generally modest, the combined impact of several measures could be notable

A quantitative evaluation of the European commiccion's fiscal governance proposal

In the new European Union fiscal framework proposed by the European Commission in April 2023, medium-term fiscal adjustment requirements would be determined by country-by-country debt sustainability analysis (DSA), the 3 percent deficit ceiling and simple rules requiring minimum deficit and debt adjustments ("safeguards"). These elements are controversial, with some EU countries (and ourselves) preferring a DSA-based approach, while others prefer to stick to simple rules. This paper evaluates the proposal by replicating the DSA methodology and computing fiscal adjustment implications for all EU countries with debt above 60 percent or deficits above 3 percent of GDP. We find that the proposed framework would require ambitious fiscal adjustment: on average, more than 2 percent of GDP over the medium term, in addition to the adjustment that is already planned for 2023-24. However, for most high-debt countries, these requirements are below those implied by the current framework. We also find that for most countries with debt above 60 percent of GDP, these adjustment requirements are driven by the DSA rather than the safeguards, but with significant exceptions. The main exception is France, for which the "debt safeguard" - which requires debt to fall within four years - imposes much higher fiscal adjustment than the DSA. If the adjustment period were to be extended from four to seven years (as is possible under the framework for countries that submit growth-enhancing reform and investment plans), the safeguards would also be binding for several other countries. In addition, a requirement to reduce the deficit by at least half a percent per year if it exceeds 3 percent of GDP could become binding ex post, in response to output shocks, even if countries implement the fiscal adjustment required ex ante. Finally, we find that while the Commission's DSA methodology is reasonable, it would benefit from review. This should be done by an independent expert group in consultation with the Commission, member states and other stakeholders, and endorsed by the Council. We recommend the endorsement of the Commission's proposal after ambiguous aspects are clarified, the debt safeguard and other safeguards are removed or modified, the excessive deficit procedure is reformed to avoid procyclical adjustment, and a process for reviewing the DSA methodology is put in place

The implications of the European Union's new fiscal rules

European Union countries are required by the EU Treaty to keep their budget deficits within 3 percent of GDP, and their public debt within 60 percent of GDP. A new framework to enforce these rules is based on country-specific debt sustainability analyses (DSA) and uses a single indicator, a measure of public expenditure, as the annual fiscal policy target. These changes are welcome. To assess the sustainability of public finances, it is much better to focus on the likely evolution of the debt path than to rely on simple numerical rules. Public ex- penditures net of changes to tax policy are a far better target for fiscal policy than the deficit, since they are under the control of the government and cannot give rise to pro-cyclical fiscal policy (excess spending in good times, fiscal cuts in bad times). These features could increase the framework's efficiency and improve compliance. However, the new framework also contains numerical safeguards to ensure a minimum pace of debt and deficit reduction. These might overwrite the DSA-based requirements and could undermine the rationale for the new rules and the incentives for compliance. The safeguards could also introduce some pro-cyclicality and, more importantly, could hold back increases in public investment. Our calculations show that the new framework will require ambitious fiscal adjustments from high-debt countries, though less than would have been required by the previous frame- work. Numerical safeguards will not be a significant constraint in the first application of the framework in 2024, except for Finland. In the next application, in 2028, they imply for France and Italy greater fiscal adjustment than required by the DSA and the 3 percent benchmark. There is ambiguity about the consistency of the new fiscal rules and the largely-unchanged excessive deficit procedure (EDP), and whether proposed reforms and investment will influence the DSA. This could interfere with the successful application of the framework. We recommend that the EDP should require the same adjustment as the DSA, a method- ology should be developed to estimate the quantitative impact of proposed investments and reforms, and the DSA methodology should be revised. In case EU countries' investment plans on aggregate do not fill the green public-investment gap, we recommend a new EU facility to foster such investments

The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow