Price Transmission, Market Power and Returns to Scale

In this paper, we aim to model the vertical relation between retailers and suppliers in the food industry whereby retailers exercise seller power in their relation with consumers and buyer power in their relation with producers. We then evaluate the degree of price transmission, relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark, from the farm to the retail sector assuming a supply shock. With the view to evaluating the impact of market power's interaction with industry technology on the degree of price transmission, we assume industry technology to be characterised by variable input proportions and non-constant returns to scale. Our model predicts that, relative to that which obtains when markets are perfectly competitive and industry technology is characterised by constant returns to scale, the degree of price transmission when market power and industry technology interact cannot be unambiguously determined.price transmission, returns to scale, market power, Demand and Price Analysis, Marketing, L11, Q13,

Winners and losers from Johne’s disease eradication from the Scottish dairy herd: a Markov-Chain simulation

In this paper, we evaluated the welfare effects of a hypothetical programme of Johne's disease eradication from the Scottish dairy herd on different stakeholders in the domestic milk market. We undertook the evaluation using a Markov-Chain simulation and applying an economic welfare analysis which takes into consideration the effects of an eradication programme on product price, on output quantity, on cost and on milk yield for given levels of supply and demand elasticities. We found that, following the eradication of the disease, milk yield per cow increased for all herd sizes in Scotland whereas price and unit cost of milk production fell. Consequently, milk consumers gained around £14.3 million in discounted economic surplus and producers with infected herds around £13.4 million whereas producers with uninfected herds lost around £10.7 million in discounted surplus. The gain in surplus made by consumers and owners of infected herds, however, more than made up for the loss in surplus made by owners of un-infected herds. Therefore, on balance, Scotland gained a net economic surplus of £17 million from the programme.Johne's, eradication programme, economic welfare effects, economic surplus, I180,

Managing animal health status information in the cattle market

The paper analyses the problem of information in the cattle market, particularly as it relates to the status of animal health, and discusses ways to limit it with the view to improving social surplus. Against this background, it aims to achieve three major objectives. Firstly, it describes the ways of improving the level of information through such schemes as Conventional Warranties and Third Party Certification and the different choices made by sellers and buyers in the presence of these schemes. Secondly, it studies the various ways by which these schemes make an impact on equilibria in different markets (i.e., the pooling market and the premium market), and, consequently, on the social surplus. Thirdly, it identifies the necessary conditions for a third party/public decision-maker to increase social surplus and reduce the negative externality caused by disease by managing and supporting Third Party Certification. The paper shows that product certification and product warranty cannot coexist because product warranty is suboptimal. It also shows that certification, and a possible supporting of certification or animal testing does not necessarily improve the safety of the trade.Asymmetric information, Third-Party certification, Disease Externalities, Livestock Production/Industries,

Buyer Market Power in UK Food Retailing

The potential existence of buyer market power in UK food retailing has attracted the scrutiny of the UK's anti-trust authorities, culminating in the decision to launch the second of two comprehensive regulatory inquiries in recent years. Throughout, detection of buyer power has been dogged by the paucity of reliable evidence of its existence. In this paper we present a simple theoretical model of oligopsony which delivers quasireduced form retailer-producer pricing equations in which the presence of market power can be detected using readily available market data. Using a cointegrated vector autoregression, we find empirical results that are consistent with the presence of oligopsony power in all six food products investigated.Buyer power, Cointegrated VARs, UK food industry, Agribusiness, Consumer/Household Economics,

Market Power in UK Food Retailing: Theory and Evidence from Seven Product Groups

Establishing the presence of market power in food chains has become an increasingly pertinent line of enquiry given the trend towards increasing concentration that has been observed in many parts of the world. This paper presents a theoretical model of price transmission in vertically related markets under imperfect competition. The model delivers a quasi-reduced form representation that is empirically tractable using readily available market data to test for the presence of market power. In particular, we show that the hypothesis of perfect competition can be rejected if shocks to the demand and supply function are significant and correctly signed in price transmission equations. Using a cointegrated vector autoregression, we find empirical results that are consistent with downstream market power in six out of seven food products investigated, supporting both the findings of the UK competition authority's recent investigation in to supermarkets and renewed calls for further scrutiny of supermarket behaviour by the UK's Office of Trading.imperfect competition, Cointegrated VARs, UK food industry, Marketing, D4, L81,

Price Transmission, Market Power and Returns to Scale

In this paper, we aim to model the vertical relation between retailers and suppliers in the food industry whereby retailers exercise seller power in their relation with consumers and buyer power in their relation with producers. We then evaluate the degree of price transmission, relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark, from the farm to the retail sector assuming a supply shock. With the view to evaluating the impact of market power's interaction with industry technology on the degree of price transmission, we assume industry technology to be characterised by variable input proportions and non-constant returns to scale. Our model predicts that, relative to that which obtains when markets are perfectly competitive and industry technology is characterised by constant returns to scale, the degree of price transmission when market power and industry technology interact cannot be unambiguously determined

Winners and losers from Johne’s disease eradication from the Scottish dairy herd: a Markov-Chain simulation

In this paper, we evaluated the welfare effects of a hypothetical programme of Johne's disease eradication from the Scottish dairy herd on different stakeholders in the domestic milk market. We undertook the evaluation using a Markov-Chain simulation and applying an economic welfare analysis which takes into consideration the effects of an eradication programme on product price, on output quantity, on cost and on milk yield for given levels of supply and demand elasticities. We found that, following the eradication of the disease, milk yield per cow increased for all herd sizes in Scotland whereas price and unit cost of milk production fell. Consequently, milk consumers gained around £14.3 million in discounted economic surplus and producers with infected herds around £13.4 million whereas producers with uninfected herds lost around £10.7 million in discounted surplus. The gain in surplus made by consumers and owners of infected herds, however, more than made up for the loss in surplus made by owners of un-infected herds. Therefore, on balance, Scotland gained a net economic surplus of £17 million from the programme

Managing animal health status information in the cattle market

The paper analyses the problem of information in the cattle market, particularly as it relates to the status of animal health, and discusses ways to limit it with the view to improving social surplus. Against this background, it aims to achieve three major objectives. Firstly, it describes the ways of improving the level of information through such schemes as Conventional Warranties and Third Party Certification and the different choices made by sellers and buyers in the presence of these schemes. Secondly, it studies the various ways by which these schemes make an impact on equilibria in different markets (i.e., the pooling market and the premium market), and, consequently, on the social surplus. Thirdly, it identifies the necessary conditions for a third party/public decision-maker to increase social surplus and reduce the negative externality caused by disease by managing and supporting Third Party Certification. The paper shows that product certification and product warranty cannot coexist because product warranty is suboptimal. It also shows that certification, and a possible supporting of certification or animal testing does not necessarily improve the safety of the trade

Buyer Market Power in UK Food Retailing

The potential existence of buyer market power in UK food retailing has attracted the scrutiny of the UK's anti-trust authorities, culminating in the decision to launch the second of two comprehensive regulatory inquiries in recent years. Throughout, detection of buyer power has been dogged by the paucity of reliable evidence of its existence. In this paper we present a simple theoretical model of oligopsony which delivers quasireduced form retailer-producer pricing equations in which the presence of market power can be detected using readily available market data. Using a cointegrated vector autoregression, we find empirical results that are consistent with the presence of oligopsony power in all six food products investigated