spotlight europe 20120/05, August 2012: Confronting the crisis

The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve

The EU Budget and Common Agricultural Policy Beyond 2020: Seven More Years of Money for Nothing? Bertelsmann Shiftung Reflection Paper No. 3 August 2018

At the outset of European integration, farming featured high on the political agenda for good reason: the food security of postwar Europe was at stake. But by the 1980s, subsidies to agriculture still accounted for two-thirds of the EU budget. Today, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounts for roughly 38 percent of spending, the largest single expenditure in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). According to the new Commission pro-posal for the MFF 2021–2027, this will change only slightly. Direct payments to farmers will still constitute the largest item in the CAP budget. This analysis looks into the two main arguments for legitimizing CAP: income protection and European public goods. Our proposal for reform starts from the premise that income protection cannot justify the current level of direct payment from the EU budget. Likewise, the public good justification, which gained substantial rhetoric im-portance in the MFF 2014–2020, has not come to fruition. Evidence indicates that “greening conditions”, set up to protect the environment, have been largely non-binding, unproductive, and thus an unjustifiable expense. Against this backdrop, the Commission’s June 2018 proposal on CAP’s future is disappointing. We conclude that the current proposal is not in line with a sound public goods approach. Without substantial modification, direct payments will remain an ineffective incentive for the provision of agricultural services in the fields of environment, climate policy, and animal protection. In the Commission proposal, the instrument of “eco-schemes” comes closest to a model of public goods-related direct payments. In coming months, there are still opportunities to improve the draft. We rec-ommend that in the future budget a certain share of direct payments – up to 50 percent of national envelopes – is spent on eco-schemes that should reflect a strict “value-for-money” rationale. Eco-schemes would then define compensation for the verified provision of public goods at well-defined unit prices

Flashlight Europe N°3–April 2015. Greece – What else?

The first hundred days in office have become a benchmark for every new government. Early in May, the Tsipras coalition government will reach this date. Given the difficult financial, economic and social situation in Greece, there was no such thing as a closed season for Alexis Tsipras from day one on, and he himself could not have expected one. After all, his new government acceded office with a political agenda demanding nothing less than an end to austerity and the submission to a reform programme seen as unduly imposed on Greece by its creditors, the EU and the IMF

Flashlight Europe N°4–May 2015. Listen carefully to the British

Other than many have predicted the general election in the United Kingdom have not led to a hung parliament but the opposite: An absolute majority for David Cameron and his Tory party. Thus, the way is paved for the EU referendum. Cameron has promised to let his fellow citizens decide whether they would like to stay on in the EU or rather leave. Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, tells us what this means for the UK and its relation to Germany and the European Union

Pushing on a string? An evaluation of regional economic cooperation in the Western Balkans

This study evaluates the success of the EU’s strategy of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans over the last two decades from an economic perspective. First, we define the prerequisites for successful regional cooperation in an institutional, political and economic sense, and assess the extent to which they existed in the Western Balkans at the start of the 2000s. Second, we identify the key facets of the EU’s strategy to deepen trade, investment and infrastructure connectivity in the Western Balkans, and establish the impact that this has had. Third, we assess the state of play in 2020, and make some suggestions for the way forward. Our main findings are a) that many of the most important prerequisites for regional cooperation have not existed in the Western Balkans during the past two decades, and that the potential gains from the EU strategy have therefore always been quite limited; b) that regional trade, investment and infrastructure integration has increased somewhat, but that there are still many gaps and challenges ahead; and c) that these efforts have not fundamentally altered the main obstacles to normalising political relations in the Western Balkans and, ultimately, to the EU accession of its constituent countries. Our findings lead to two main conclusions. First, regional cooperation efforts should continue, but more effort should be focused on securing the maximum possible level of economic integration with the EU. Second, economic development and EU accession in the region are severely hamstrung by territorial disputes and constitutional deadlock. Without a breakthrough on these issues – and especially the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo – no amount of regional cooperation initiatives can fundamentally change the situation

Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour

Kosovo's fifth anniversary - on the road to nowhere?

Fünf Jahre nach dem Einsatz der alliierten Streitkräfte der NATO beschreibt der Autor in seinem Übersichtsartikel den gesellschaftlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Prozess bzw. die aktuelle Situation im Kosovo. In diesem Zusammenhang werden die Sicherheitslage, die vorgesehene Roadmap gemäß der UN-Resolution 1244, die Bevölkerungsstruktur sowie der Verhandlungsverlauf zwischen Serben, Albanern und Bosniern erörtert. Zudem wird der zukünftige Status dieser Region von der unabhängigen Eigenstaatlichkeit über die Staatsbildung bis hin zureuropäischen Integration skizziert. (ICG2

The next Europe: Southeastern Europe after Thessaloniki

"The European Council and the Balkan Summit in Thessaloniki failed to deliver the necessary consistent implementation strategy for the European integration of the Balkans. At the same time, the euphoria related to the successful completion of Eastern enlargement seems to nurture the illusion that this role model of integration suffices to cope with the stability risks and the developmental deficits of the Balkans. In their latest analysis that looks beyond the political statements of Thessaloniki, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research champion a rethinking and renewal of Balkan strategies. The arrangement should contain as many pre-accession instruments as practicable, as much stabilisation policy as needed and as much economic-development assistance as possible. Since 2000, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research have studied potentials and limitations of a 'European perspective' for the Western Balkans. Integration strategies were assessed and designed in cooperation with the Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry and leading think tanks from the region. On the basis of the conclusions from Thessaloniki, the following paper analyses the regional state of affairs and identifies strengths and weaknesses of current European Balkan policies." (author's abstract