Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation In The Internet Age

This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence between antitrust and regulatory policy.

First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

The increasing centrality of the Internet in modern communications, together with massive changes in the landscape of the telecommunications market, have intensified the calls for Congress to overhaul the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In this paper, we analyze this looming legislative challenge by dividing it into two sets of issues: first, issues concerning the proper substance of telecommunications policy reform; and, second, issues concerning the appropriate institutions for carrying out that reform. In Part I, we argue that Congress should require regulators to adhere more closely to (and justify departures from) basic antitrust principles in developing the substance of competition policy. In particular, we explore how those principles would have brought greater predictability and analytical rigor to the FCC's implementation of statutory provisions requiring incumbent telephone providers to lease parts of their networks to competitors. Moreover, we explain how antitrust principles can now inform the current debate over whether to regulate broadband platforms to prevent discrimination against independent providers of applications like voice over Internet protocol. In Part II, we turn to Congress's institutional choices in reforming telecommunications regulation.Despite our advocacy for antitrust-oriented rules of decision, we argue for a continued reliance on the FCC, rather than antitrust courts, as the appropriate institution for superintending the efficient development of competition throughout the industry.Not only does the FCC enjoy specialized expertise in the economics and technology of the telecommunications industry, it also enjoys a distinct advantage over courts in developing and enforcing complicated ,and necessary,prescriptive rules, such as those governing interconnection and its associated intercarrier fees. At the same time, the FCC will increasingly need to refocus its energies from prescriptive regulation to a new emphasis on after-the-fact enforcement and market-monitoring, much like the role played today by the Federal Trade Commission.

Book review: blood, dreams and gold: the changing face ofBurma by Richard Cockett

In Blood, Dreams and Gold: The Changing Face of Burma , Richard Cockett provides readers with a beautifully written overview of the nation’s history from the colonial era to more recent experiences of civil war and authoritarian government. Sonia J. Weiser highly recommends this detailed and humane book both to those newly encountering the country as well as those looking to further immerse themselves in understanding its complexities

Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy

The FCC is now facing a set of issues that will help shape the future evolution of the Internet and the role of government in its development. In particular, the FCC is in the midst of designing a regulatory regime for broadband platforms. To do so, the FCC must decide both on the appropriate regulatory classification for such platforms and what legal rules (if any) should govern access to such platforms. This Article explains how the FCC, using its ancillary jurisdiction authority under Title I of the Communications Act, can develop a reactive regulatory regime that examines allegations of discriminatory access based on a factual record through complaint proceedings. This approach envisions that the FCC would not follow the prescriptive model of regulation (such as that provided by common carrier regulation), but instead would develop a common law, antitrust-like model that would focus on competition policy concerns that actually arise