Aggregate Implications of Micro Asset Market Segmentation

This paper develops a consumption-based asset pricing model to explain and quantify the aggregate implications of a frictional financial system, comprised of many financial markets partially integrated with one another. Each of our micro financial market's is inhabited by traders who are specialized in that markets type of asset. We specify exogenously the level of segmentation that ultimately determines how much idiosyncratic risk traders bear in their micro market and derive aggregate asset pricing implications. We pick segmentation parameters to match facts about systematic and idiosyncratic return volatility. We find that if the same level of segmentation prevails in every market, traders bear 30% of their idiosyncratic risk. With otherwise standard parameters, this benchmark model delivers an unconditional equity premium of 2.4% annual. We further disaggregate the model by allowing the level of segmentation to differ across markets. This version of the model delivers the same aggregate asset pricing implications but with only one-third the amount of segmentation: on average traders bear 10% of their idiosyncratic risk.Asset pricing; market segmentation; idiosyncratic risk

Liquidity in frictional asset markets

On November 14-15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a conference on “Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets.” In this paper we review the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both finance and monetary theory using a simple search-theoretic model, and we discuss the papers presented at the conference in the context of this literature. We will show the diversity of topics covered in this literature, e.g., the dynamics of housing and credit markets, the functioning of payment systems, optimal monetary policy and the cost of inflation, the role of banks, the effect of informational frictions on asset trading.Liquidity (Economics)

Can Mergers in Europe Help Banks Hedge Against Macroeconomic Risk

European integration, risk sharing, regional specialization, portfolio diversification.

Learning from Private and Public Observation of Other's Actions

We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions. Every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population. The public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity. The private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions. We identify conditions such that the average learning curve is S-shaped: learning is slow initially, intensifies rapidly, and finally converges slowly to the truth. We show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and, under some conditions, reduces welfare. Lastly, optimal diffusion of information requires that agents “strive to be different”: agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average.Learning externality; welfare cost of public information

Liquidity Shocks and Order Book Dynamics

We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors cannot monitor markets continuously. We study how limit order markets absorb transient liquidity shocks, which occur when a significant fraction of investors lose their willingness and ability to hold assets. We characterize the equilibrium dynamics of market prices, bid-ask spreads, order submissions and cancelations, as well as the volume and limit order book depth they generate.

Is corruption an efficient grease?

This paper tests whether corruption may act as an efficient grease for the wheels of an oth-erwise deficient institutional framework. We analyze the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 developed and developing countries. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we observe that corruption is consistently detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis.governance; corruption; income; aggregate productivity; efficiency

A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

Treasury Market, Liquidity, Search

Is Corruption an Efficient Grease ?

This paper tests whether corruption can be viewed as an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It does so by analyzing the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 countries both developed and developing. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we repeatedly observe that corruption is always detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis.Governance, corruption, income, aggregate productivity, efficiency.

Liquidity Premia in Dynamic Bargaining Markets

This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity. I derive a float-adjusted return model (FARM),explaining the pricing of liquidity with a simple linear formula: In equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its free float, the portion of its market capitalization available for sale. This suggests that the free float is an appropriate measure of liquidity, consistent with the linear specifications commonly estimated in the empirical literature.The qualitative predictions of the model corroborate much of the empirical evidence

Leaning against the wind

During financial disruptions, market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure. They buy when the pressure is large, accumulate inventories, and sell when the pressure alleviates. This paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure, and order-execution delays. I show that competitive marketmakers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, provided they have access to sufficient capital. If raising capital is costly, this suggests a policy role for lenient centralbank lending during financial disruptions