9,102 research outputs found

    Forecasting Value-at-Risk Using the Markov-Switching ARCH Model

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    This paper analyzes the application of the Markov-switching ARCH model (Hamilton and Susmel, 1994) in improving value-at-risk (VaR) forecast. By considering a mixture of normal distributions with varying variances over different time and regimes, we find that the “spurious high persistence†found in the GARCH model is adjusted. Under relative performance and hypothesis-testing evaluations, the VaR forecasts derived from the Markov-switching ARCH model are preferred to alternative parametric and nonparametric VaR models that only consider time-varying volatility. JEL classification: C22, C52, G28. Keywords: Value-at-Risk, Switching-regime ARCH models.Value-at-Risk, Switching-regime ARCH models

    Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response

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    Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may deviate from this full rationality assumption. In this work, we attempt to relax the full rationality assumption with bounded rationality. Specifically, we formulate the bounded rationality of an agent by adopting the quantal response model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). We develop a theory of rationality-robust information design in the canonical setting of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) with binary receiver action. We first identify conditions under which the optimal signaling scheme structure for a fully rational receiver remains optimal or approximately optimal for a boundedly rational receiver. In practice, it might be costly for the designer to estimate the degree of the receiver's bounded rationality level. Motivated by this practical consideration, we then study the existence and construction of robust signaling schemes when there is uncertainty about the receiver's bounded rationality level
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