Law, Politics, and International Governance

The politics of international law are inextricably linked to the issue of governance. In this chapter we approach the central themes of the book by considering this vexed issue, developing four key arguments. First, we define and conceptualise institutions and governance so that any alleged distinction between law and politics becomes untenable or irrelevant. Our claim here directly addresses two of the three questions put forward by Christian Reus-Smit (in chapters 1 and 2) as animating this book: How should we think of international law and international politics? What is the relationship between the two? Our empirical discussion responds to the third question: How does rethinking these categories enable us better to understand contemporary international relations? We agree with Reus-Smit that international law and politics infuse and shape each other, although we understand this relationship somewhat differently. Second, we are concerned with the sources and uses of power in international society. Elaborating on the distinction drawn by Reus-Smit between realist and constructivist approaches, we distinguish normative-ideational power (influence through argumentation and suasion, dear to constructivists) from material-physical power (influence through the manipulation of threats and coercion, emphasised by realists). Third, we develop a relatively abstract model of how institutions emerge and evolve in two kinds of social settings: the dyadic and the triadic. Finally, we illustrate our theoretical ideas with reference to the development of triadic forms of governance in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and dyadic in the case of forcible humanitarian intervention

"European integration and supranational governance"

We argue that European integration is provoked and sustained by the development of causal connections between three factors: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and EC rule-making. We explain the transition in any given policy sector, from national to intergovernmental to supranational governance, in two ways. First, cross-border transactions and communications generate a social demand for EC rules and regulation, which supranational organizations work to supply. We thus expect that the Community competencies will be unevenly constructed, both across policy sectors and over time, as a function of the intensity of these demands. Second, once the EC rules are in place, a process of institutionalization ensues, and this process provokes further integration. Although we recognize the importance of intergovernmental bargaining in EC politics, our theory is not compatible with existing intergovernmental theorizing

Polemics: A Response to Tsebelis and Garrett, “The Institutional Foundations of” … etc.

In their recent article, “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union,” George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett profess to offer a “unified model of the politics of the European Union.” Unfortunately, the article provides something much more limited. Along the way, it misrepresents the current state of theoretical and empirical work on the EU. As a consequence, the article fails to recognize the areas of potential agreement between their research and that of others, as well as genuine differences. Our point of reference is the European Integration and Supranational Governance project, collaborative research published in 1998. It is this work that Tsebelis and Garrett crticize in their survey of the literature. Tsebelis and Garrett chose not to reference the full project, but rather a condensed overview published in article form in 1997. In the following sections we correct specific misrepresentations of our positions; note potential areas of agreement; and delineate the real points of disagreement, tying these to current theoretical debates

Law, Politics, and International Governance

The politics of international law are inextricably linked to the issue of governance. In this chapter we approach the central themes of the book by considering this vexed issue, developing four key arguments. First, we define and conceptualise institutions and governance so that any alleged distinction between law and politics becomes untenable or irrelevant. Our claim here directly addresses two of the three questions put forward by Christian Reus-Smit (in chapters 1 and 2) as animating this book: How should we think of international law and international politics? What is the relationship between the two? Our empirical discussion responds to the third question: How does rethinking these categories enable us better to understand contemporary international relations? We agree with Reus-Smit that international law and politics infuse and shape each other, although we understand this relationship somewhat differently. Second, we are concerned with the sources and uses of power in international society. Elaborating on the distinction drawn by Reus-Smit between realist and constructivist approaches, we distinguish normative-ideational power (influence through argumentation and suasion, dear to constructivists) from material-physical power (influence through the manipulation of threats and coercion, emphasised by realists). Third, we develop a relatively abstract model of how institutions emerge and evolve in two kinds of social settings: the dyadic and the triadic. Finally, we illustrate our theoretical ideas with reference to the development of triadic forms of governance in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and dyadic in the case of forcible humanitarian intervention