POTENTIAL CONTRASTS IN CO2 AND CH4 FLUX RESPONSE UNDER CHANGING CLIMATE CONDITIONS: A SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING DRIVEN ANALYSIS OF THE NET ECOSYSTEM CARBON BUDGET FOR ARCTIC AND BOREAL REGIONS

The impact of warming on the net ecosystem carbon budget (NECB) in Arctic-boreal regions remains highly uncertain. Heightened CH4 emissions from Arctic-boreal ecosystems could shift the northern NECB from an annual carbon sink further towards net carbon source. Northern wetland CH4 fluxes may be particularly sensitive to climate warming, increased soil temperatures and duration of the soil non-frozen period. Changes in northern high latitude surface hydrology will also impact the NECB, with surface and soil wetting resulting from thawing permafrost landscapes and shifts in precipitation patterns; summer drought conditions can potentially reduce vegetation productivity and land sink of atmospheric CO2 but also moderate the magnitude of CH4 increase. The first component of this work develops methods to assess seasonal variability and longer term trends in Arctic-boreal surface water inundation from satellite microwave observations, and quantifies estimate uncertainty. The second component of this work uses this information to improve understanding of impacts associated with changing environmental conditions on high latitude wetland CH4 emissions. The third component focuses on the development of a satellite remote sensing data informed Terrestrial Carbon Flux (TCF) model for northern wetland regions to quantify daily CH4 emissions and the NECB, in addition to vegetation productivity and landscape CO2 respiration loss. Finally, the fourth component of this work features further enhancement of the TCF model by improving representation of diverse tundra and boreal wetland ecosystem land cover types. A comprehensive database for tower eddy covariance CO2 and CH4 flux observations for the Arctic-boreal region was developed to support these efforts, providing an assessment of the TCF model ability to accurately quantify contemporary changes in regional terrestrial carbon sink/source strength

Riding the Wave: Getting Faculty on Board with the IR During the Pandemic

The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic initially caused widespread academic conference cancellations, leaving many University of Tennessee Health Science Center (UTHSC) faculty members without a means to present scholarship required for the annual review process. Faculty members concerned about meeting their scholarship requirements appealed to campus administration for assistance. UTHSC’s Health Sciences Library (HSL) was able to step in and offer the library-managed UTHSC Digital Commons repository as a solution to this dilemma. The urgency of faculty concerns, combined with positive messaging about Digital Commons coming from campus administration, increased campus interest in the repository. Ultimately, as conferences transitioned to virtual formats and were rescheduled, the need for Digital Commons to host conference scholarship did not come to fruition. In spite of this, the increased awareness of the repository helped the library overcome some of the common barriers to faculty buy in. This opportunity led to a relatively rapid period of growth for UTHSC Digital Commons in 2020-2021, compared to pre-Covid growth, resulting in several new collections and increased understanding of the benefits of the IR for the campus

Market failure, policy failure and other distortions in chronic disease markets

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The increasing prevalence of chronic disease represents a significant burden on most health systems. This paper explores the market failures and policy failures that exist in the management of chronic diseases.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>There are many sources of market failure in health care that undermine the efficiency of chronic disease management. These include incomplete information as well as information asymmetry between providers and consumers, the effect of externalities on consumer behaviour, and the divergence between social and private time preference rates. This has seen government and policy interventions to address both market failures and distributional issues resulting from the inability of private markets to reach an efficient and equitable distribution of resources. However, these have introduced a series of policy failures such as distorted re-imbursement arrangements across modalities and delivery settings.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>The paper concludes that market failure resulting from a preference of individuals for 'immediate gratification' in the form of health care and disease management, rather than preventative services, where the benefits are delayed, has a major impact on achieving an efficient allocation of resources in markets for the management of chronic diseases. This distortion is compounded by government health policy that tends to favour medical and pharmaceutical interventions further contributing to distortions in the allocation of resources and inefficiencies in the management of chronic disease.</p

Empirical evidence of recall bias for primary health care visits

BACKGROUND: While it is common for an economic evaluation of health care to rely on trial participants for self-reported health service utilisation, there is variability in the accuracy of this data due to potential recall bias. The aim of this study was to quantify the level of recall bias in self-reported primary health care general practitioner (GP) visits following inpatient rehabilitation over a 12 month period. METHODS: This report is a secondary analysis from a larger randomised control trial of an economic evaluation of additional Saturday inpatient rehabilitation. Participants were adults who had been discharged into the community following admission to an acute general rehabilitation hospital. Participants were asked to recall primary health care visits, including community GP visits, via a telephone questionnaire which was administered at 6 and 12 months following discharge from inpatient rehabilitation. Participants were asked to recall health service utilisation over each preceding 6 month period. The self-reported data were compared to equivalent claims data from the national insurer, over the same period. RESULTS: 751 participants (75% of the full trial) with a mean age of 74 years (SD 13) were included in this analysis. Over the 12 month period following discharge from rehabilitation there was an under-reporting of 14% in self-reported health service utilisation for GP visits compared to national insurer claims data over the same period. From 0 to 6 months following discharge from rehabilitation, there was an over-reporting of self-reported GP visits of 35% and from 7 to 12 months there was an under-reporting of self-reported GP visits of 36%, compared to national insurer claims data over the same period. 46% of patients reported the same or one number difference in self-reported GP visits between the 0 to 6 and the 7 to 12 month periods. CONCLUSION: Based on these findings we recommend that an economic evaluation alongside a clinical trial for an elderly adult rehabilitation population include a sensitivity analysis that inflates self-reported GP visits by 16% over 12 months. However caution is required when utilising self-reported GP visits as the data may contain periods of both over and under reporting. Where general practitioner visits are expected to vary significantly between intervention and control groups we recommend that administrative data be included in the trial to accurately capture resources for an economic evaluation

The Public Resource Management Game

Use of public resources for private economic gain is a longstanding, contested political issue. Public resources generate benefits beyond commodity uses, including recreation, environmental and ecological conservation and preservation, and existence and aesthetic values. We analyze this problem using a dynamic resource use game. Low use fees let commodity users capture more of the marginal benefit from private use. This increases the incentive to comply with government regulations. Optimal contracts therefore include public use fees that are lower than private rates. The optimal policy also includes random monitoring to prevent strategic learning and cheating on the use agreements and to avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. An optimal policy also includes a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the use contract. This penalty must be large enough that the commodity user who would gain the most from noncompliance experiences a negative expected net return.Renewable resources, public resources policy, optimal contracts