Remote monitoring and control system

Master'sMASTER OF ENGINEERIN

Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations

In a typical optimization problem, the task is to pick one of a number of options with the lowest cost or the highest value. In practice, these cost/value quantities often come through processes such as measurement or machine learning, which are noisy, with quantifiable noise distributions. To take these noise distributions into account, one approach is to assume a prior for the values, use it to build a posterior, and then apply standard stochastic optimization to pick a solution. However, in many practical applications, such prior distributions may not be available. In this paper, we study such scenarios using a regret minimization model. In our model, the task is to pick the highest one out of $n$ values. The values are unknown and chosen by an adversary, but can be observed through noisy channels, where additive noises are stochastically drawn from known distributions. The goal is to minimize the regret of our selection, defined as the expected difference between the highest and the selected value on the worst-case choices of values. We show that the na\"ive algorithm of picking the highest observed value has regret arbitrarily worse than the optimum, even when $n = 2$ and the noises are unbiased in expectation. On the other hand, we propose an algorithm which gives a constant-approximation to the optimal regret for any $n$. Our algorithm is conceptually simple, computationally efficient, and requires only minimal knowledge of the noise distributions

Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical distributions. We work in the robust auction design regime, where we assume the seller has no knowledge of the bidders' value distributions and must design a mechanism that is prior-independent. While there have been many strong results on prior-independent auction design in the i.i.d. setting, not much is known for the heterogeneous setting, even though the latter is of significant practical importance. Unfortunately, no prior-independent mechanism can hope to always guarantee any approximation to Myerson's revenue in the heterogeneous setting; similarly, no prior-independent mechanism can consistently do better than the second-price auction. In light of this, we design a family of (parametrized) randomized auctions which approximates at least one of these benchmarks: For heterogeneous bidders with regular value distributions, our mechanisms either achieve a good approximation of the expected revenue of an optimal mechanism (which knows the bidders' distributions) or exceeds that of the second-price auction by a certain multiplicative factor. The factor in the latter case naturally trades off with the approximation ratio of the former case. We show that our mechanism is optimal for such a trade-off between the two cases by establishing a matching lower bound. Our result extends to selling $k$ identical items to heterogeneous bidders with an additional $O\big(\ln^2 k\big)$-factor in our trade-off between the two cases

Online Stochastic Matching with Edge Arrivals

Online bipartite matching with edge arrivals remained a major open question for a long time until a recent negative result by Gamlath et al., who showed that no online policy is better than the straightforward greedy algorithm, i.e., no online algorithm has a worst-case competitive ratio better than 0.5. In this work, we consider the bipartite matching problem with edge arrivals in a natural stochastic framework, i.e., Bayesian setting where each edge of the graph is independently realized according to a known probability distribution. We focus on a natural class of prune & greedy online policies motivated by practical considerations from a multitude of online matching platforms. Any prune & greedy algorithm consists of two stages: first, it decreases the probabilities of some edges in the stochastic instance and then runs greedy algorithm on the pruned graph. We propose prune & greedy algorithms that are 0.552-competitive on the instances that can be pruned to a 2-regular stochastic bipartite graph, and 0.503-competitive on arbitrary stochastic bipartite graphs. The algorithms and our analysis significantly deviate from the prior work. We first obtain analytically manageable lower bound on the size of the matching, which leads to a non-linear optimization problem. We further reduce this problem to a continuous optimization with a constant number of parameters that can be solved using standard software tools

Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define message complexity corresponding to the minimum number of interactive rounds necessary to achieve the best possible outcome. Our main result is that for bilateral trade, agents don\u27t stop talking until they reach an efficient outcome: Either agents achieve an efficient allocation in finitely many rounds of communication; or the optimal communication protocol has infinite number of rounds. We show an important class of bilateral trade settings where efficient allocation is achievable with a small number of rounds of communication

The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design

We study the limits of an information intermediary in Bayesian auctions. Formally, we consider the standard single-item auction, with a revenue-maximizing seller and $n$ buyers with independent private values; in addition, we now have an intermediary who knows the buyers' true values, and can map these to a public signal so as to try to increase buyer surplus. This model was proposed by Bergemann et al., who present a signaling scheme for the single-buyer setting that raises the optimal consumer surplus, by guaranteeing the item is always sold while ensuring the seller gets the same revenue as without signaling. Our work aims to understand how this result ports to the setting with multiple buyers. Our first result is an impossibility: We show that such a signaling scheme need not exist even for $n=2$ buyers with $2$-point valuation distributions. Indeed, no signaling scheme can always allocate the item to the highest-valued buyer while preserving any non-trivial fraction of the original consumer surplus; further, no signaling scheme can achieve consumer surplus better than a factor of $\frac{1}{2}$ compared to the maximum achievable. These results are existential (and not computational) impossibilities, and thus provide a sharp separation between the single and multi-buyer settings. On the positive side, for discrete valuation distributions, we develop signaling schemes with good approximation guarantees for the consumer surplus compared to the maximum achievable, in settings where either the number of agents, or the support size of valuations, is small. Formally, for i.i.d. buyers, we present an $O(\min(\log n, K))$-approximation where $K$ is the support size of the valuations. Moreover, for general distributions, we present an $O(\min(n \log n, K^2))$-approximation. Our signaling schemes are conceptually simple and computable in polynomial (in $n$ and $K$) time