Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons

This paper investigates the impact of game presentation dependent on ethnical affiliation. Two games representing the same logical and strategical problem are introduced. Presented games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. In the first condition, a positive transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second condition, this externality is negative. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation, presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research

On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game

In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.framing of decision problems, methodology, subject-pool differences

Experimenting over a Long Distance - A method to facilitate intercultural experiments

We report a new method for Experimenting over a Long Distance (ELD)allowing to simultaneously run decentralized interactive experiments in geographically separated subject pools. Applying ELD to an intercultural trust experiment with participants from Argentina, China and Germany we found a striking evidence for transcontinental trust behavior. In addition to Chinese senders’ discrimination of Argentinean players no discrimination in trust and reciprocity behavior was observed. Neverthe- less, we found significantly different levels of trust and reciprocity in the different national cultures.interactive intercultural experiments, investment game, trust

The Janus Face of Cooperation - An Intra- and Cross-Cultural Review

This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for   studies on cooperation based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner's   dilemma games with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured   decision problem. Decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a   given range of possible actions. Within a cross-cultural experimental study involving   Palestinian and Israeli subjects we test for a strategic presentation bias applying our   framework. Palestinians show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality   treatment. In Israel no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings,   we argue that cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if   only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary   application and consideration of different presentations of identical   decision problems within cross-cultural research.Cooperation , presentation of decision problems, framing, methodology, cross-cultural research

It pays to pay - Big Five personality influences on co-operative behaviour in an incentivized and hypothetical prisoner's dilemma game

The authors investigated how the presence or absence of monetary incentives in a prisoner's dilemma game may influence research outcomes. Specifically, the predictive power of the Big Five personality traits on decisions in an incentivized (N = 60) or hypothetical (N = 60) prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Participants were less generous in the incentivized game. More importantly, personality predicted decisions only in the incentivized game, with low Neuroticism and high Openness to Experience predicting more cooperative transfers. The influence of Neuroticism on behaviour in the incentivized game was mediated by risk attitude. The results are consistent with other results suggesting that the Big Five are relevant predictors of moral behaviour, and with results suggesting that the determinants of hypothetical decisions are different from the determinants of real decisions, with the latter being more revealing of one's true preferences. The authors argue that psychologists, contrary to prevailing praxis, should consider making their participants' decisions more real. This could allow psychologists to more convincingly generalize laboratory findings into contexts outside of the laboratory.Big Five, Prisoner's dilemma, Social dilemma, Moral behaviour, Incentives, Stake size

Nowe studia modernistyczne

The main task of this article is to describe the new situation of modernist studies at the turn of the 20th century and an attempt to position this description in a broader history of criticism of modernism in art. The transformations in the studies into modernist literature have been characterized here in three aspects: expanding the time frame (going beyond the basic period of modernism from the end of the 19th c. until 1930s), spatial dimension (abandonment of a privileged position of research into West European and American modernism in favour of a transnational perspective) and vertical dimension (connected with the necessity to rethink the relationship high art-low art, and also the influence of mass media upon modernist literature)

Measuring Individual Risk Attitudes in the Lab: Task or Ask? An Empirical Comparison

This paper compares two prominent empirical measures of individual risk attitudes - the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-item questionnaire advocated by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde and Wagner (forthcoming) - with respect to (a) their within-subject stability over time (one year) and (b) their correlation with actual risk-taking behaviour in the lab - here the amount sent in a trust game (Berg, Dickaut, McCabe, 1995). As it turns out, the measures themselves are uncorrelated (both times) and, most importantly, only the questionnaire measure exhibits test-re-test stability (Ï = .78), while virtually no such stability is found in the lottery-choice task. In addition, only the questionnaire measure shows the expected correlations with a Big Five personality measure and is correlated with actual risk-taking behaviour. The results suggest that the questionnaire measure is a better measure of individual risk attitudes than the lottery-choice task. Moreover, with respect to trust, the high re-test stability of trust transfers (Ï = .70) further supports the conjecture that trusting behaviour indeed has a component which itself is a stable individual characteristic (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000).Risk Attitudes, Trust, Personality, Lab Experiments

Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons

This paper investigates the impact of game presentation dependent on ethnical affiliation. Two games representing the same logical and strategical problem are introduced. Presented games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions. In the first condition, a positive transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second condition, this externality is negative. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from the West Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. Critically discussing our findings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research

Behaving kindly, talking about it, and being rewarded for it?!

In a principal-agent setup, we investigate agents disclosure of conflict of interests revealing deliberate or undeliberate kindness and its affect on principals reciprocal behavior. To this end, we firstly introduce a theoretical model refering to Hart and Moore (2008) which captures aspects of information revelation and reciprocal behavior. Secondly, a laboratory experiment (N = 444) tests behavioral predictions derived from the model. In the experiment, nature randomly determines the agent s choice set: either the agent can deliberately choose to behave kindly towards the principal (conflict of interest situation) or behaving kindly is the default. In any case, the agent can inform the principal about the available choice set. The principal can reciprocate the agent s behavior. We find agents to reveal their state when they are deliberately kind. Moreover, revealing a conflict of interest situation strongly triggers further reciprocal behavior by the principal. Our findings are robust towards different parameter variations. Implications are discussed

Lying and Team Incentives

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.compensation schemes, lying, team, experiment