Comment on Véronique Zanetti: On Moral Compromise

In this article, I criticize Véronique Zanetti on the topic of moral compromise. As I understand Zanetti, a compromise could only be called a “moral compromise” if (i) it does not originate under coercive conditions, (ii) it involves conflict whose subject matter is moral, and (iii) “the parties support the solution found for what they take to be moral reasons rather than strategic interests.” I offer three criticisms of Zanetti. First, Zanetti ignores how some parties may not have reason to seek social peace at all. Zanetti’s claim that there is consensus on the aim of social peace can involve idealising away from disagreement in a manner that Zanetti accuses Rawls of. Second, even if there is consensus on the aim of seeking social peace, this leaves open the possibility of disagreement about which society different people should belong to. This idealises away from real world conflict concerning borders. Indeed, Zanetti does not mention that her ‘central example’ of moral disagreement, the German Abortion compromise, was enacted in the wake of German reunification. Third, there are at least two things that can be called the ‘German Abortion compromise.’ The compromise that Zanetti speaks of was imposed by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The court declared unconstitutional a law passed in 1992 that had been negotiated in parliament. Zanetti does not dwell on this lack of democratic credentials. Even the substance of the court-imposed solution is itself a dubious example of a moral compromise between parties based on what is acceptable to their reason. (penultimate version - If you would like the .pdf of the final version for personal scholarly use, please contact me through the email address on my profile or my CV.

Teachers\u27 attitudes toward inclusion: what did they say?

This study used a survey to obtain information regarding regular education teachers\u27 and special education teachers\u27 attitude toward inclusive education and other related issues in inclusive classrooms, such as co-teaching, teaching strategies, instructional planning, learning capabilities, accommodations, and mutual respect. Two hundred copies of the surveys were distributed to 7 public schools, 105 were returned. Of those, 60 were elementary teachers, 14 were special education teachers, 16 were middle school teachers, and 10 were high school teachers. The responses were analyzed using 1-5 points, 1 to indicated strongly agree, 2 to indicate agree, 3 to indicate neither agree nor disagree, 4 to indicate disagree, and 5 to indicate strongly disagree. A factor analysis was used to categorize 20 survey items into 6 factors. Mean and standard deviation were computed. An ANOVA analysis was used to compare the difference between regular and special education groups. Results show a significant difference between regular education teachers and special education teachers on their perspectives of co-teaching. College courses pertaining to special education may benefit regular education teachers, and hopefully prepare them for the job of teaching students with disabilities

Domination Across Borders: An Introduction

This chapter explores the different dimensions of domination, including whether it has a structural approach, its relation to race and imperialism, and how non-domination can be institutionalized and achieved at a global level

An unusual cause of gastrointestinal bleeding: duodenal lipoma.

‘The final, published version of this article is available at http://www.karger.com/ 10.1159/000327219Common causes of chronic upper gastrointestinal bleeding include oesophageal varices, gastroduodenal ulcers and malignancy, and patients mostly present with iron deficiency type anaemia. We present the case of a 60-year-old lady who presented with iron deficiency anaemia and on investigation was found to have a large duodenal polyp requiring surgical excision. On histological examination, the polyp was revealed to be a lipoma. We review the recent literature and formulate a management plan for this rare entity

The joy of torture: Hellenistic and Indian philosophy on the doctrine that the sage is always happy even if tortured

Prominent in Hellenistic philosophy is the debate over whether the sage is really always happy even if tortured. This doctrine that the tortured sage is happy is important because the Hellenistic philosophers used this case to debate the power of moral virtue in a person\u27s life. Modern pain research shows that it is indeed possible to be happy while being tortured because pain is not purely a sensory phenomenon. Based on this modern research, I investigate the positions of Epicurus, the Cynics, the Aristotelians, the Neoplatonists, the Skeptics and the Stoics concerning the sage\u27s complete happiness even if tortured. I show that the Stoics\u27 position agrees with modern pain research and the Stoics are right that the tortured sage could still be happy. This does not show that the Stoic sage is always happy, though. While the common objection to Stoicism, that the Stoic sage is unemotional, is a misinterpretation of Stoic ethics, nevertheless Stoic philosophy cannot prove that the sage is always happy. For the Stoics claim that the sage is happy because of her oneness with God, but the Stoics are unable to demonstrate how a sage realizes this oneness and why this oneness makes a sage happy. Indian philosophy, through Pyrrho\u27s visit to India, influenced Greek philosophy about the doctrine of the tortured sage who is indifferent to pain. Furthermore, Indian philosophy is able to modify Stoic philosophy so that we can show how the sage is always happy. For through the Indian technique of meditation a person can realize her oneness with God and experience deep joy and happiness. Modified by Indian philosophy with its technique of meditation, Stoic philosophy is right that the sage is always happy even if tortured. Stoic philosophy has two more contributions to our ethical concerns. First, Stoic ethics is a very interesting synthesis of impartialism and partialism. Second, the Stoics\u27 understanding of the emotions and anger is better than our current understanding

Redress for colonial injustice: structural injustice and the relevance of history

This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu’s theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu’s account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation