What Kind of Modality Does the Materialist Need For His Supervenience Claim?

Materialists who do not deny the existence of mental phenomena usually claim that the mental supervenes on the physical, i.e. that there cannot be a change in the mental life of a man without there being a change in the man"s body. This modal claim is usually understood in terms of logical necessity. I argue that this is a mistake, resulting from assumptions inherited from logical empiricism, and that it should be understood in terms of synthetic necessity

If God brought about the Big Bang, did he do that before the Big Bang?\ud

If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding cause? The standard answer is: yes, it is caused by a divine willing. I propose an alternative view, based on a certain non-compatibilist solu-tion of the dilemma of free will: God"s actions, unlike human actions, are not initiated by willings, undertakings, or tryings, but God brings about the intended event directly. I explain what "bringing about directly" means

Libet's experiment provides no evidence against strong libertarian free will because readiness potentials do not cause our actions

This article argues against Benjamin Libet's claim that his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by brain events which begin before we decide and before we even think about the action. It clarifies what exactly should be meant by the RP causing, initiating, or preparing an action. It argues that Libet's claim is incompatible with strong libertarian free will. It shows why Libet's experiment does not support his claim and why the experiments by Herrmann et al. and by Trevena \& Miller provide evidence against his claim. The empirical evidence is compatible with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness potential (RP, Bereitschaftspotential) nor the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) causes our actions

Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?

If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding cause? For example, if the universe began with the Big Bang and if God brought it about, did the Big Bang then have a preceding cause? The standard answer is: yes, it was caused by a divine willing. I propose an alternative view: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are not initiated by willings, undertakings, or volitions, but God brings about the intended event directly. Presenting a solution to the dilemma of free will I explain what ‘bringing about directly’ means and show that the question of what an action begins with is distinct from the question whether it is a basic action

Libet's experiment provides no evidence against strong libertarian free will because it does not investigate voluntary actions

It is widely believed that Libet's experiment has shown that all our actions have preceding unconscious causes. This article argues that Libet's claim that the actions he investigated are voluntary is false. They are urges, and therefore the experiment shows at most that our urges have preceding unconscious causes, which is what also strong libertarianism leads us to expect. Further, Libet's correct observation that we can veto urges undermines his claim that our actions are initiated unconsciously and supports the thesis that we have strong libertarian free will

The Tendency Theory of Causation

I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with “tendencies” as causal connections. Not, however, as “necessary connexions”: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa-tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic one