27 research outputs found

    Access to Credit in Informal Economies: Does Financial Information Matter?

    Get PDF
    Traders operating in informal economies, characterized by low economic development and growth, rarely use financial information in their credit allocation decisions. However, using this information could improve the efficiency of lending decisions, thereby increasing access to credit and promoting economic growth. We use a combination of survey questions and a hypothetical choice experiment to study traders’ preferences for financial information in a bazaar economy. Although wholesalers value informal information such as retailers’ community membership and relationship length, they also overwhelmingly value retailers’ sales and profits in making credit decisions. Based on estimates of wholesalers’ willingness to pay for various types of retailer information and retailers’ responses to survey questions, our findings suggest that the perceived lack of reliability of financial information, rather than financial illiteracy, drives the current sparse use of financial information

    The Role of CDS Trading in the Commercialization of New Lending Relationships

    Get PDF
    We investigate how the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market affects lenders’ incentives to initiate new lending relationships. We predict that CDSs reduce the adverse selection that non-relationship lenders face when competing for loans, by allowing those lenders to hedge loan exposure and by the revelation of private information through CDS spreads. We find that, following CDS initiation on a borrower’s debt, non-relationship lead arrangers are more likely to originate its loans and non-relationship participants are more likely to join loan syndicates. We also show that lead arrangers that initiate lending relationships following CDS initiation focus more on commercial aspects of lending relationship. These lead arrangers are more likely to pursue new borrowers with high cross-selling potential, which are expected to generate substantial fee business. Further, non-relationship lenders have lower incentives for costly borrower monitoring, as reflected in weaker control rights and in the lower loan share they retain. Relative to relationship lenders, non-relationship lenders are likely to be more distant from borrowers, foreign, and less reputable once CDSs become available, emphasizing their lower monitoring efficiency

    The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

    Get PDF
    ABSTRACT We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media‐initiated, borrower‐specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease

    The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

    Get PDF
    We investigate whether a borrower’s media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of mediañ initiated, borrowerñ specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/136338/1/joar12131_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/136338/2/joar12131.pd

    Accounting quality and debt concentration

    Get PDF
    Singapore Management Universit

    The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market

    No full text
    I explore which firm and loan characteristics decrease or exacerbate information asymmetry in the trading of private debt. I find that loans of public firms, loans with an available credit rating, loans of profit firms and loans syndicated by more reputable arrangers are traded at lower bid-ask spreads, while revolvers, distressed loans and loans issued by institutional investors are associated with higher information costs. I also find that timely loss recognition reduces the bid-ask spread. This finding suggests that conservative reporting decreases information asymmetry regarding a borrower and increases the efficiency of the secondary trading of debt securities.Secondary loan trading Information asymmetry Timely loss recognition Accounting conservatism
    corecore