Towards a killer app for the Semantic Web

Killer apps are highly transformative technologies that create new markets and widespread patterns of behaviour. IT generally, and the Web in particular, has benefited from killer apps to create new networks of users and increase its value. The Semantic Web community on the other hand is still awaiting a killer app that proves the superiority of its technologies. There are certain features that distinguish killer apps from other ordinary applications. This paper examines those features in the context of the Semantic Web, in the hope that a better understanding of the characteristics of killer apps might encourage their consideration when developing Semantic Web applications

A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts : The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Hulya Dagdeviren, Simon A. Robertson, 'A Political Economy of Privatization Contracts: The Case of Water and Sanitation in Ghana and Argentina', Competition & Change, Vol. 18 (2): 150-163, April 2014. The final, published version is available online at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1179/1024529414Z.00000000053. Published by SAGE.In general, the process and outcomes of privatization have been studied from the point of view of efficiency. In this article, we consider issues in the course of contract design, implementation, management and enforcement in privatized public services and utilities. The study is based on two case studies, involving several water concessions in Argentina and a management contract in the urban water sector in Ghana. Three key arguments are presented on the basis of these case studies. The first is that an individualistic analytical framework is often utilized by the mainstream economic perspectives, but these are inadequate for a comparative assessment of private versus public provision in public services where there are distinct collective or group interests and hence a wider socio-economic context and representation of different interests becomes highly important. Instead, the article proposes a political economy perspective, which pays due attention to distributional issues, group interests, ideology of states and power relations for the assessment of privatization contracts. Second, the administrative capacity of states and their resources play a key role for the outcomes of privatization. Finally, while some contractual issues could be resolved through resourcing and experience over time, others are inherent to the contractual relations with little prospect of remedy.Peer reviewe

Financialization directing strategy

Original article can be found at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01559982 Copyright Elsevier Ltd. DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2008.08.001This paper constructs an account of how financialization is directing strategy in the S&P 500. Financialization describes how changes in US accounting regulations require firms to account for the market value of capital market transactions where corporate strategy is not simply concerned with delivering value creation but also reacting to value absorption in an era of shareholder value. Financialization is directing strategy and arbitrage to modify stakeholder financial settlements where an increased share of income is extracted as surplus cash and more of this cash from operations is being distributed to shareholders. Share buy-backs account for a substantial increase in the share of corporate cash distributed to shareholders in the S&P 500 which, we argue, reflects a strategic process of value creation and value absorption.Peer reviewe

Trust and control interrelations: New perspectives on the trust control nexus

This article is the post-print version of the published article that may be accessed at the link below. Copyright @ 2007 Sage Publications.This article introduces the special issue on New Perspectives on the Trust-Control Nexus in Organizational Relations. Trust and control are interlinked processes commonly seen as key to reach effectiveness in inter- and intraorganizational relations. The relation between trust and control is, however, a complex one, and research into this relation has given rise to various and contradictory interpretations of how trust and control relate. A well-known discussion is directed at whether trust and control are better conceived as substitutes, or as complementary mechanisms of governance. The articles in this special issue bring the discussion on the relationship between both concepts a step further by identifying common factors, distinctive mechanisms, and key implications relevant for theory building and empirical research. By studying trust and control through different perspectives and at different levels of analysis, the articles provide new theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the foundations of the trust-control interrelations

Generating Sustainable Value from Open Data in a Sharing Society

Part 1: Creating ValueInternational audienceOur societies are in the midst of a paradigm shift that transforms hierarchal markets into an open and networked economy based on digital technology and information. In that context, open data is widely presumed to have a positive effect on social, environmental and economic value; however the evidence to that effect has remained scarce. Subsequently, we address the question how the use of open data can stimulate the generation of sustainable value. We argue that open data sharing and reuse can empower new ways of generating value in the sharing society. Moreover, we propose a model that describes how different mechanisms that take part within an open system generate sustainable value. These mechanisms are enabled by a number of contextual factors that provide individuals with the motivation, opportunity and ability to generate sustainable value

Trust and normative control in multi-agent systems: an empirical study

Despite relevant insights from socio-economics, little research in multi-agent systems has addressed the interconnections between trust and normative notions such as contracts and sanctions. Focusing our attention on scenarios of betrayal, in this paper we combine the use of trust and sanctions in a negotiation process. We describe a scenario of dyadic relationships between truster agents, which make use of trust and/or sanctions, and trustees characterized by their ability and integrity, which may influence their attitude toward betrayal. Both agent behavior models are inspired in socio-economics literature. Through simulation, we show the virtues and shortcomings of exploiting trust, sanctions and a combination of both