A Protective Mechanism against Antibiotic-Induced Ototoxicity: Role of Prestin

Hearing loss or ototoxicity is one of the major side effects associated with the use of the antibiotics, particularly aminoglycosides (AGs), which are the most commonly used antibiotics worldwide. However, the molecular and cellular events involved in the antibiotic-induced ototoxicity remains unclear. In the present study, we test the possibility that prestin, the motor protein specifically expressed in the basolateral membrane of outer hair cells (OHCs) in the cochlea with electromotility responsible for sound amplification, may be involved in the process of AG-induced apoptosis in OHCs. Our results from both mice model and cultured cell line indicate a previously unexpected role of prestin, in mediating antibiotic-induced apoptosis, the effect of which is associated with its anion-transporting capacity. The observed downregulation of prestin mRNA prior to detectable apoptosis in OHCs and hearing loss in the antibiotic-treated mice is interesting, which may serve as a protective mechanism against hearing loss induced by AGs in the early stage

Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections

This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio