The Countess Cathleen

The programme was scanned from an original held in the University Archives.This play was produced under the direction of Patricia Hackett and was staged at The Hut on 23, 24, 26 and 27 June 1947

Use of computer forensics in the digital curation of removable media

The purpose of this paper is to encourage the discussion of the potential place and value of digital forensics techniques when dealing with acquisitions on removable media in the field of digital curation. It examines a basic computer forensics process, discusses a typical file system for removable media, and raises questions about necessary processes and incentives for addressing data capture in the field of digital curation

The distribution of amorphous computer outputs

Fitness distributions (landscapes) of programs tend to a limit as they get bigger. Markov minorization gives upper bounds ((15.3 + 2.30m)/ log I) on the length of program run on random or average computing devices. I is the size of the instruction set and m size of output register. Almost all programs are constants. Convergence is exponential with 90% of programs of length 1.6 n2N yielding constants (n = size input register and size of memory = N). This is supported by experiment

SMARANDACHE GROUPOIDS

In this paper we study the concept of Smarandache Groupoids, subgroupoids, ideal of groupoids, semi-normal subgroupoids, Smarandache-Bol groupoids and Strong Bol groupoids and obtain many interesting results about them

Smarandache Non-Associative (SNA-) rings

In this paper we introduce the concept of Smarandache non-associative rings, which we shortly denote as SNA-rings as derived from the general definition of a Smarandache Structure (i.e., a set A embedded with a week structure W such that a proper subset B in A is embedded with a stronger structure S

SMARANDACHE NEAR-RINGS AND THEIR GENERALIZATIONS

In this paper we study the Smarandache semi-near-ring and nearring, homomorphism, also the Anti-Smarandache semi-near-ring. We obtain some interesting results about them, give many examples, and pose some problems. We also define Smarandache semi-near-ring homomorphism

SMARANDACHE COSETS

This paper aims to study the Smarandache cosets and derive some interesting results about them. We prove the classical Lagranges theorem for Smarandache semigroup is not true and that there does not exist a one-to-one correspondence between any two right cosets. We also show that the classical theorems cannot be extended to all Smarandache semigroups. This leads to the definition of Smarandache Lagrange semigroup, Smarandache p Sylow subgroup and Smarandache Cauchy elements. Further if we restrict ourselves to the subgroup of the Smarandache semigroup all results would follow trivially hence the Smarandache coset would become a trivial definition

Decentralized International Risk Sharing and Governmental Moral Hazard

This paper studies the issue of moral hazard in the presence of decentralized international risk sharing.In the model presented, risk sharing is achieved through macro markets (markets in which claims to the GDP of a country can be traded).Moral hazard arises for the following reason: if foreigners hold claims to domestic GDP due to risk sharing motives, the country will not receive the full benefit from its production anymore.This can motivate for example a tax on investment (which reduces production) or simply result in reduced governmental effort to increase productivity.We show in a two-country general equilibrium framework that the moral hazard problem does not lead to a reduction in the risk sharing (households hold half of world output).This results ultimately in a 100% tax on investment and creates a huge distortion.We conclude that unregulated macro markets pose a serious threat to world welfare.The analysis also raises concern about the desirability of decentralized risk sharing in general, in particular risk sharing through international trade of equity.moral hazard;international risk sharing

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. We show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.loan market competition;risk shifting;bank stability