Integrating Fiscal Decentralization Reforms and the Challenge of Implementation

South Africa\u27s struggles with an ambitious and complex fiscal decentralization program are presented in detail in the first six chapters of this book. In this chapter, we summarize our key findings and turn to a discussion of the way forward with the assignment of powers and functions, the development of local sources of revenue, and the redesign of the intergovernmental transfer system. We give special emphasis to the interrelationships among the pieces of the fiscal decentralization system. We also briefly consider two dimensions of the system - development transfers to support capital investment and municipal borrowing powers - that are not discussed at length in the previous chapters

An annotated information source for university-level second language educators

Chapter 15 includes a series of annotated references for second language teachers, researchers, program administrators, and others who are interested in exploring further the topics addressed in this handbook. The information was contributed by the authors of the chapters of this volume and is listed alphabetically within seven categories: organizations (foundations, associations, centers, etc.), books and reports, journals, electronic discussion groups, Web sites, videotopes, and C D - R O M s and other multimedia. Every effort has been made to provide accurate, up-to-date information. Nonetheless, addresses, phone numbers, Web sites, and the like do change, and readers may have to use their own initiative to locate resources when this has happened

Decentralisation's effects on public investment: evidence and policy lessons from Bolivia and Colombia

This paper examines decentralisation in Bolivia and Colombia to explore its effects on the uses and spatial distribution of public investment, as well as government responsiveness to local needs. In both countries, investment shifted from infrastructure to social services and human capital formation. Resources were rebalanced in favour of poorer districts. In Bolivia, decentralisation made government more responsive by re-directing public investment to areas of greatest need. In Colombia, municipalities increased investment significantly while running costs fell. Six important lessons emerge from the comparison. For decentralisation to work well: (i) local democracy must be transparent, fair and competitive; (ii) local governments must face hard budget constraints; (iii) central government must be scaled back; (iv) significant tax-raising powers must be devolved; and (v) decentralisation is composed of distinct, separable components, the sequencing of which is important. Finally, (vi) what decentralisation achieves, and whether it is advisable, hinges on how central government behaved pre-reform

Inefficient Local Regulation of Local Externalities

The consequences of commitment failure have been missing from debates about the decentralized regulation of automobile emissions and other sources of local consumption externalities. Even when the direct external effects of such products are limited to a single jurisdiction, the presence of increasing returns-to-scale production causes one jurisdiction's choice of regulatory standard to affect the prices and availability of goods elsewhere. Decentralized regulatory equilibria may be inefficient as a result. Because of a commitment failure, production may be split between standards-and consumers denied the full range of products-when it is efficient to have standards that allow products to be consumed everywhere. Coordination failures may cause similar inefficiencies. The results question the usefulness of the principle of subsidiarity as commonly employed. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..