39 research outputs found
Harnessing Higher-Order (Meta-)Logic to Represent and Reason with Complex Ethical Theories
The computer-mechanization of an ambitious explicit ethical theory, Gewirth's
Principle of Generic Consistency, is used to showcase an approach for
representing and reasoning with ethical theories exhibiting complex logical
features like alethic and deontic modalities, indexicals, higher-order
quantification, among others. Harnessing the high expressive power of Church's
type theory as a meta-logic to semantically embed a combination of quantified
non-classical logics, our work pushes existing boundaries in knowledge
representation and reasoning. We demonstrate that intuitive encodings of
complex ethical theories and their automation on the computer are no longer
antipodes.Comment: 14 page
Against Motivational Efficacy of Beliefs
Bromwich (2010) argues that a belief is motivationally efficacious in that, other things being equal, it disposes an agent to answer a question in accordance with that belief. I reply that what we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is largely determined by stimuli from the environment. We have a standing and default disposition to answer questions honestly, ceteris paribus, even before we are exposed to environmental stimuli. Since this standing and default disposition is innate, and our beliefs have their source in environmental stimuli, our beliefs cannot be the source of the disposition. Moreover, a recent finding in neuroscience suggests that motivation is extrinsic to belief
Truth
Ponència del professor Willard V. Quine en el marc del seminari 'From stimulus to science' dedicat al seu pensamen
Dear Carnap, dear Van: the Quine-Carnap correspondence and related work
Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length - and over a long period of time - on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time.The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. Dear Carnap, I enclose a copy of a paper which I am ready to send off for publication. . . . I am anxious to have you look this over as soon as possible, to see whether you have reason to suppose the system contradictory: for it looks dangerous. Dear Quine: I read your paper very carefully and with the highest interest. . . . So far, I do not see any contradiction in the system itself . . . but I share your feeling that the whole looks rather dangerous