131 research outputs found

    Well-Being as Harmony

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    In this paper, I sketch out a novel theory of well-being according to which well-being is constituted by harmony between mind and world. The notion of harmony I develop has three aspects. First there is correspondence between mind and world in the sense that events in the world match the content of our mental states. Second there is positive orientation towards the world, meaning that we have pro-attitudes towards the world we find ourselves in. Third there is fitting response to the world. Taken together these three aspects make up an ideal of being attuned to, or at home in, the world. Such harmony between mind and world constitutes well-being. Its opposite – being disoriented, ill-at-ease in, or hostile to the world – makes a life go poorly. And, as we shall see, many of the things that intuitively contribute to well-being are instantiating one or more of the three aspects of harmony

    Hedonism and the experience machine

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    Money isn’t everything, so what is? Many government leaders, social policy theorists, and members of the general public have a ready answer: happiness. This paper examines an opposing view due to Robert Nozick, which centres on his experience-machine thought experiment. Despite the example's influence among philosophers, the argument behind it is riddled with difficulties. Dropping the example allows us to re-version Nozick's argument in a way that makes it far more forceful - and less dependent on people's often divergent intutions about the experience machine

    Time since Introduction, Seed Mass, and Genome Size Predict Successful Invaders among the Cultivated Vascular Plants of Hawaii

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    Extensive economic and environmental damage has been caused by invasive exotic plant species in many ecosystems worldwide. Many comparative studies have therefore attempted to predict, from biological traits, which species among the pool of naturalized non-natives become invasive. However, few studies have investigated which species establish and/or become pests from the larger pool of introduced species and controlled for time since introduction. Here we present results from a study aimed at quantifying predicting three classes of invasive species cultivated in Hawaii. Of 7,866 ornamental species cultivated in Hawaii between 1840 and 1999, 420 (5.3%) species naturalized, 141 (1.8%) have been classified as weeds, and 39 (0.5%) were listed by the state of Hawaii as noxious. Of the 815 species introduced >80 years ago, 253 (31%) have naturalized, 90 (11%) are classed as weeds, and 22 (3%) as noxious by the state of Hawaii. Using boosted regression trees we classified each group with nearly 90% accuracy, despite incompleteness of data and the low proportion of naturalized or pest species. Key biological predictors were seed mass and highest chromosome number standardized by genus which, when data on residence time was removed, were able to predict all three groups with 76–82% accuracy. We conclude that, when focused on a single region, screening for potential weeds or noxious plants based on a small set of biological traits can be achieved with sufficient accuracy for policy and management purposes

    Willpower Satisficing

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    Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as “good enough”

    Addiction in the Light of African Values: Undermining Vitality and Community

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    In this article I address the question of what makes addiction morally problematic, and seek to answer it by drawing on values salient in the sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. Specifically, I appeal to life-force and communal relationship, each of which African philosophers have at times advanced as a foundational value, and spell out how addiction, or at least salient instances of it, could be viewed as unethical for flouting them. I do not seek to defend either vitality or community as the best explanation of when and why addiction is immoral, instead arguing that each of these characteristically African values grounds an independent and plausible account of that. I conclude that both vitalism and communalism merit consideration as rivals to accounts that Western ethicists would typically make, according to which addiction is immoral insofar as it degrades rationality or autonomy, as per Kantianism, or causes pain or dissatisfaction, à la utilitarianism

    Two Concepts of Basic Equality

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    It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else)

    �ber die Titerstellung

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    Vergleichende ma�analytische Bestimmungen der Essigs�ure

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