The Hayek Pension: An efficient minimum pension to complement the welfare state

A means tested minimum income for old age creates an incentive for some not to save for old age and instead to free ride. Recent literature is undecided to what extent this inefficient savings distortion should be addressed by a compulsory pension system because resulting labour-leisure distortions could be even worse. In a simple optimal taxation framework we show that it is Pareto improving to fully eliminate the savings distortion by means of a compulsory pension termed “Hayek pension” that decreases with after-tax lifetime earnings, with zero pension benefits for middle and high incomes. A combination of the Hayek pension and the contribution dependent Bismarck pension is found to be superior to the tax financed flat benefit Beverage pension.

Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009: An Update. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2009/02, February 20, 2009

[Introduction]. In December 2008, the European Council agreed on an EU‐wide economic stimulus of “around € 200 billion”. However, this agreement is not very specific in two important respects. First, it is unclear which country is to contribute how much to the roughly €170 billion part of the fiscal stimulus that is to be effected by member states, with the remaining €30 billion to be contributed at the EU level. Second, there is no clear timeline detailing which part of the stimulus is to be delivered by when. However, both the geography and the timing of the European stimulus are important dimensions when trying to assess the likely economic impact of the pact and the progress towards it implementation. In order to contribute to the debate on the geography and timing of the stimulus, we presented a first estimate of the size of fiscal stimuli that had recently been proposed by member states (and had, in some cases, already been adopted) just in time for the European Council. The present update of that earlier paper simply presents the latest breakdown of the fiscal stimuli in member states using thesame methodology as before. In addition, an heroic attempt is made to compare the total European package for 2009 to the stimulus packages set to be implemented in theUS and China. To keep the complexity of the EU side of the exercise manageable, we only take into account the 13 largest economies in the EU that make up more than 90 percent of the EU’s GDP, plus the planned boost at the Community level. Despite this simplification, the task of estimating the size of the different programmes remains challenging, not least because of the great variety of different instruments used and the rapid evolution of national debates

Public Debt Requirements in A Regime of Price Stability

The logic of this paper is based on a modernisation of Austrian capital theory as applied to a closed economy growing in a steady state. Here the philosophy is this: capital is time embodied in produced goods. In steady states, this philosophy works well as an aggregation device for an arbitrary number of distinct produced goods. The basic theorem of this approach (Section VII) is this: in a capital market equilibrium without public debt and hence in a general equilibrium without public debt the average period of production equals the average waiting period of households. Calibration of the parameters of the production sector and the consumption sector then leads to the result that the equilibrium risk free real rate of interest (Wicksell´s "natural rate of interest") is negative for the OECD+China area. What distinguishes the twenty-first century from earlier times is the high life expectancy of people and the ensuing extensive average pension period. These characteristics are responsible for the high average waiting period. Only with a negative real rate of interest can the average period of production catch up with the high average waiting period. Under price stability the risk free real rate of interest cannot become negative. Public debt causes the equilibrium risk free rate of interest to rise: the public debt period () plus the average period of production (DT) equal the average waiting period (Z). Thus substantial public debt is required for the goal of price stability. We thus come to a different view of public debt: it is inconsistent with the goal of a zero public debt. This different view of public debt (even apart from "Keynesian" considerations) has been introduced by Samuelson already in the year 1958. My "Austrian" capital theoretic approach allows me to show that it is the relevant view for the 21 st century.

Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems:An Optimum Taxation Approach

The labor-leisure distortion of a pay-as-you-go pension system can be reduced through a stronger tax-benefit link or Bismarck pension system. Distortions of the fertility decision can be reduced through the introduction of a stronger child-benefit or child pension system.Within our optimal taxation framework, we find a Corlett-Hague result regarding the optimal mix of the two: if and only if children are more complementary to leisure should the taxbenefit link be given a positive weight at the expense of the child-benefit link. The model also allows us to examine the infertility insurance argument that may justify redistribution from families with children to those without implied by most pension systems. We find that the opposite redistribution, from the childless to those with children, would be efficient if individuals have low risk aversion. Redistribution in favor of the infertile would only be justified when risk aversion is high.pay-as-you-go pension, fertility, externality, Bismarck pension, optimal taxation

Risk Financing in Labour Managed Economics: The Commitment Problem

Labour managed firms face some serious problems with regard to the provision of capital, especially of risk-bearing capital. These difficulties are discussed in the first part of the paper. Subsequently it is argued that these problems are rooted in the fact that the workers are insufficiently committed to the long run well-being of the labour managed firm, i.e. in the lacking of a sufficient commitment mechanism. An interchange of the roles which capital and labour play under capitalism would require tradable job rights, an arrangement which is not feasible. It is concluded therefrom that any workable labour managed economy needs a special commitment mechanism. A high rate of unemployment might serve for this purpose, or, more attractively, a reduction of labour mobility through appropriate incentives like seniority-dependent remuneration schemes

How Much Fiscal Equalisation?

We treat fiscal equalisation as an insurance device against regional tax revenue variance. This insurance comes at the price of a moral hazard: regional government will spend too little effort on the development of the local tax base. In a simple bargaining model with two identical regions we show that less than total fiscal equalisation combined with lump sum transfers will be optimal. Taking a step back to the constitutional bargaining behind some veil of ignorance which determines the fallback position for later negotiations, we show that writing total fiscal equalisation into the constitution will be optimal.Fiscal equalisation, constitutional bargaining, moral hazard

To what Extent are Public Pensions Pareto-improving? On the Interaction of Means Tested Basic Income and Public Pensions

If there is a means tested basic income for old age, households will tend to reduce precautionary savings to an inefficiently low level. This might serve as a justification for a public pension system. In a representative agent framework, indeed, the introduction of a compulsory pension s ystem is shown to be Pareto improving. This analysis is extended to two income types where compulsory savings are found to be Pareto improving only up to a point. Increases in contribution rates beyond that point simply result in increasingly regressive (implicit) taxation, potentially eliminating all redistribution via the means tested basic income. Using these results in a pay-as-you-go framework, we show that an unfunded pensions system (with intragenerational fairness) plays a role similar to compulsor y savings in preventing the savings moral hazard and could have the same adverse effects on redistribution if it is too large. If the population is aging, however, an unfunded system with a constant contribution rate is found to become less effective at pr eventing the savings moral hazard. In this case, the introduction of a funded system of the right size is needed to restore Pareto efficiency.Public pensions, compulsory savings, means tested basic income

Risk Financing in Labour Managed Economics: The Commitment Problem

Labour managed firms face some serious problems with regard to the provision of capital, especially of risk-bearing capital. These difficulties are discussed in the first part of the paper. Subsequently it is argued that these problems are rooted in the fact that the workers are insufficiently committed to the long run well-being of the labour managed firm, i.e. in the lacking of a sufficient commitment mechanism. An interchange of the roles which capital and labour play under capitalism would require tradable job rights, an arrangement which is not feasible. It is concluded therefrom that any workable labour managed economy needs a special commitment mechanism. A high rate of unemployment might serve for this purpose, or, more attractively, a reduction of labour mobility through appropriate incentives like seniority-dependent remuneration schemes.Commitment; labour management; tradable job rights; mobility

Does an Aging Population Increase Inequality?

The paper reviews recent research on the impact of an aging population on the distribution of income. After briefly discussing the demographic conditions responsible for population aging, a short account is given of demographic trends in the industrialized world. In order to disentangle the many potential channels by which an aging society affects the dispersion of income, several levels of aggregation are distinguished. The paper differentiates between intra- and intergenerational issues, between direct and indirect demographic inequality effects, and between the distribution of current and lifetime income. It emphasizes the critical role of age-related redistributive tax-transfer systems, like public pension schemes and health care systems. Sources of distributional policy conflicts are identified at both the cross-section level and the lifetime level of income inequality. The institutional design of intergenerational burden sharing, individual disincentive reactions, shifts in age-income profiles related to cohort size, and politicoeconomic repercussions are shown to drive the relation between population aging and income distribution in distinct and partially opposite ways