Preventing Crime through Selective Incapacitation

Making the length of a prison sentence conditional on an individual’s offense history is shown to be a powerful way of preventing crime. Under a law adopted in the Netherlands in 2001, prolific offenders could be sentenced to a prison term that was some ten times longer than usual. We exploit quasi-experimental variation in the moment of introduction and the frequency of application across 12 urban areas to identify the effect. We find the sentence enhancements to have dramatically reduced theft rates. The size of the crime-reducing effect is found to be subject to sharply diminishing returns.prolific offenders;incarceration;selective incapacitation;three strikes laws

Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment

As of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary-proof windows and doors. We provide evidence that this large-scale government intervention in the use of self-protective measures lowers crime and improves social welfare. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new-built homes from 1.1 to 0.8 percent annually, a reduction of 26 percent. The findings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes. The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We find no evidence for displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft. Even though the regulation of built-in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.victim precaution;government regulation;crime

Final look at the Dutch election: a campaign of limited drama looks set to produce a remarkably fragmented parliament

Dutch voters will go to the polls today for parliamentary elections against the backdrop of a diplomatic spat between the Netherlands and Turkey. Hans Vollaard writes that until the Turkish incident, the campaign had been surprisingly low-key, but the polling suggests an unprecedented level of fragmentation in parliament, with no party likely to win more than 30 seats

Performance contracts for police forces

In 2003, the government will enter into performance contracts with each of the 25 regional police forces. The performance contracts establish a direct link between meeting a number of quantitative performance targets and financial incentives. A major improvement in police performance is necessary to meet the objective of 20 to 25 percent less criminal and disorderly behavior by 2006. A closer look at the performance contracts learns that they may not be the most appropriate policy instrument to achieve this objective. The nature of police work does not allow for advance planning of outputs. The police consist of professionals who need a high degree of discretion to do their work. The targets invite adverse behavioral effects. Management could become focused on 'meeting the numbers' rather than on delivering results. Because of the wide variety in police tasks and the low measurability of quality, there is a wide gap between performance measures and results. The financial incentives make it worse, by forcing a yes/no decision based on weighing multiple, non discrete performance measures. Moreover, the targets are likely to be off since the government does not have the information to set them at the right level. Less financial resources for poorly performing forces also adversely affect citizens. They cannot choose between providers of police services as in the case of hospitals or schools. Experiences in Australia and the United Kingdom suggest an alternative approach. They focus on benchmarking of police forces without direct financial incentives. Both countries have invested many years in improving the quality and comparability of police data as well as methods for fair comparisons between forces. Based on these comparisons, police forces are hold accountable. Consequently, the police are being forced to develop a clear picture of the effects of their approach in terms of the region's specific problems. The Dutch government could follow a similar approach. A system of peer review and customer satisfaction surveys can be instrumental in assessing a force's performance and in providing ideas for improvement. Critical assessment of performance data by knowledgeable people is a necessary ingredient to a policy of holding the police accountable to results. It stimulates a culture of experimenting, data collection and analysis, and singling out and sharing best practices. Such a change is necessary to bring about the desired improvement in police performance.

Evaluating the push for tougher, more targeted policing in the Netherlands; evidence from a citizen survey

In this study, we estimate the effects of a tougher, more targeted police response to criminal and disorderly behaviour ('proactive policing'). We use a citizen survey providing unique data on hard-to-observe dimensions of police work for every single municipality in the Netherlands. We relate variation in local policing strategies to individual data on victimisation of crime and experience of disorder and fear of crime over the period 1993-2001. The sample includes some 370,000 residents randomly selected from the Dutch population. We control for individual background characteristics and fixed municipality characteristics. We find evidence that stricter law enforcement is effective in reducing disorder, fear of crime, violent crime and property crime. Concentrating visible police presence at 'hot spots' is effective in combating disorder, fear of crime, and property crime. As a result of proactive policing during the period 2003-2005, crime and disorder went down substantially. Fear of crime has been reduced as well.

Police numbers up, crime rates down. The effect of police on crime in the Netherlands, 1996-2003

We present evidence on the effect of greater numbers of police personnel on crime and nuisance reduction in the Netherlands. We use a multiple time series design with police regions as the unit of analysis, covering the period 1996-2003. During this period, police resources increased substantially. The growth in additional resources differed greatly between regions, allowing us to use this policy intervention to identify the effect of police on crime and nuisance. We control for regional economic, social and demographic factors and for national trends that might obscure the effect of police on crime. We find significantly negative effects of higher police levels on property crime, violent crime and nuisance. Our estimates suggest that a substantial proportion of the decline in crime and nuisance during the period 1996-2003 is attributable to the increase in police personnel.police, crime, nuisance, effectiveness, victimisation survey