Is colour composition phenomenal?

Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured

Color and transparency

In this paper I argue that all transparent objects are colorless. This thesis is important for at least three reasons. First, if transparent objects are colorless, there is no need to distinguish between colors which characterize three-dimensional bodies, like transparent colors, and colors which lie on the surface of objects. Second, traditional objections against color physicalism relying on transparent colors are rendered moot. Finally, an improved understanding of the relations between colors, light and transparency is provided

Sniff, smell, and stuff

Most philosophers consider olfactory experiences to be very poor in comparison to other sense modalities. And because olfactory experiences seem to lack the spatial content necessary to object perception, philosophers tend to maintain that smell is purely sensational or abstract. I argue in this paper that the apparent poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor experiences does not reflect the "subjective” or "abstract” nature of smell, but only that smell is not directed to particular things. According to the view defended in this paper, odors are properties of stuffs. This view, motivated by several arguments grounded in the phenomenology of olfactory experience, explains in particular why odors appear to be located both in the air around our nose and in the objects from which they emanate. It also explains the power of smell in the task of discriminating chemical compounds

Color and Transparency

In this paper I argue that all transparent objects are colorless. This thesis is important for at least three reasons. First, if transparent objects are colorless, there is no need to distinguish between colors which characterize three-dimensional bodies, like transparent colors, and colors which lie on the surface of objects. Second, traditional objections against color physicalism relying on transparent colors are rendered moot. Finally, an improved understanding of the relations between colors, light and transparency is provided

ontologia dei colori

Mentre il senso comune descrive i colori come proprietà oggettive conoscibili attraverso la percezione sensibile, una lunga tradizione filosofica che può essere fatta risalire almeno a Galileo, Descartes e Locke si è schierata contro questa impostazione, interpretando i colori come proprietà illusorie. Contemporaneamente al rinato interesse per la metafisica e l’ontologia, all’interno della filosofia analitica è fiorito un ampio dibattito volto a indagare quale sia il modo migliore per caratterizzare la natura dei colori. Oltre a discutere la questione dell’oggettività dei colori, i filosofi hanno dovuto confrontarsi con problemi metodologici e con i dati emersi dalla ricerca scientifica. La Rivista di estetica presenta i contributi di studiosi impegnati in questa area di ricerca proponendo una discussione aggiornata sugli sviluppi del dibattito più recente