5 research outputs found
Rights, Harming and Wronging: A Restatement of the Interest Theory
This article introduces a new formulation of the interest theory of rights. The focus is on âBenthamâs testâ, which was devised by Matthew Kramer to limit the expansiveness of the interest theory. According to the test, a party holds a right correlative to a duty only if that party stands to undergo a development that is typically detrimental if the duty is breached. The article shows how the entire interest theory can be reformulated in terms of the test. The article then focuses on a further strength of the interest theory, brought to the fore by the new formulation. In any Western legal system, the tortious maltreatment of a child or a mentally disabled individual results in a compensatory duty. The interest theory can account for such duties in a simple and elegant way. The will theory, on the other hand, struggles to explain such compensatory duties unless it abandons some of its main tenets
Animals, Slaves, and Corporations: Analyzing Legal Thinghood
The Article analyzes the notion of legal âthinghoodâ in the context of the personâthing
bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, oneâs chosen definition of âthingâ is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of âlegal thingâ are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, and things as property. The first two definitions are rejected as not being very interesting or serving any heuristic function. Conversely, understanding legal things as property is meaningful, useful, and helps to understand what it means to say that animals are legally things. Defining things as property has certain rather important implications, which are analyzed at the end of the Article. For instance, not everything needs to be either a person or a thing: The historical institution of outlawry involved treating individuals neither as legal persons nor as legal things. One must conclude that the personâthing bifurcation is less fundamental than is often
assumed