A Transparency Standard for Derivatives

Derivatives exposures across large financial institutions often contribute to – if not necessarily create – systemic risk. Current reporting standards for derivatives exposures are nevertheless inadequate for assessing these systemic risk contributions. In this paper, I explain how a transparency standard, in contrast to the current standard, would facilitate such risk analysis. I also demonstrate that such a standard is implementable by providing examples of existing disclosures from large dealer firms in their quarterly filings. These disclosures often contain useful firm-level data on derivatives, but due to a lack of standardization, they cannot be aggregated to assess the risk to the system. I highlight the important contribution that reporting the “margin coverage ratio” (MCR), namely the ratio of a derivatives dealer’s cash (or liquidity, more broadly) to its contingent collateral or margin calls in case of a significant downgrade of its credit quality, could make toward assessing systemic risk contributions.

Are banks passive liquidity backstops? deposit rates and flows during the 2007-2009 crisis

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when they are heavily exposed to a financial crisis? The standard argument - that banks can - hinges on deposit inflows that are seeking a safe haven and provide banks with a natural hedge to fund drawn credit lines and other commitments. We shed new light on this issue by studying the behavior of bank deposit rates and inflows during the 2007-09 crisis. Our results indicate that the role of the banking system as a stabilizing liquidity insurer is not one of the passive recipient, but of an active seeker, of deposits. We find that banks facing a funding squeeze sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates. Banks offering higher rates were also those most exposed to liquidity demand shocks (as measured by their unused commitments, wholesale funding dependence, and limited liquid assets), as well as with fundamentally weak balance-sheets (as measured by their non-performing loans or by subsequent failure). Such rate increases have a competitive effect in that they lead other banks to offer higher rates as well. Overall, the results present a nuanced view of deposit rates and flows to banks in a crisis, one that reflects banks not just as safety havens but also as stressed entities scrambling for deposits.

Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk

This paper solves explicitly an equilibrium asset pricing model with liquidity risk -- the risk arising from unpredictable changes in liquidity over time. In our liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security's required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with market return and market liquidity. In addition, the model shows how a negative shock to a security's liquidity, if it is persistent, results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a simple, unified framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of these channels.

A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders

We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly available information rather than true income, resulting in an observed income and payout process that adjust partially and over time towards a target. Insiders under-invest in production and effort so as not to unduly raise outsiders' expectations about future income, a problem that is more severe the smaller is the inside ownership and results in an "outside equity Laffer curve". A disclosure environment with adequate quality of independent auditing mitigates the problem, implying that accounting quality can enhance investments, size of public stock markets and economic growth.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting

Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It balances effi ciently the market discipline imposed by owners of risky debt on managerial rent-seeking against the asset-substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this generates an equilibrium featuring systemic risk in which all banks choose inefficiently high leverage to fund correlated assets. A minimum equity capital requirement can rule out asset substitution but also compromises market discipline by making bank debt too safe. The optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be unavailable to creditors upon failure, and be available to shareholders only contingent on good performance.Bank capital ; Moral hazard ; Systemic risk

Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies

We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls, reducing debt - "saving borrowing capacity" - is a more effective way of securing future investment in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate excess cash flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities is low). However, constrained firms will use excess cash flows to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of cash and debt policies of a large sample of constrained and unconstrained firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows, while showing no propensity to reduce outstanding debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs systematically channel free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt.

Capital markets union in Europe : why other unions must lead the way

In 2016, the Eurozone is still coping with the consequences of two financial crises that revealed the shortcomings of an incomplete monetary union. The European economy suffered two severe recessions and a sustainable growth path is still elusive. Risks in the banking system and a severe banking sector debt-overhang played a major role in both crises as Eurozone firms are heavily reliant on bank financing. To foster economic growth in the Eurozone, the European Commission suggested the creation of a capital markets union, in which local capital markets are developed further and integrated across borders as alternative sources for corporate finance. In this paper, we argue that a capital markets union cannot work without a banking union and fiscal union in place

Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Inter-Bank Markets: Evidence from the Sub-prime Crisis

Using data on the behavior of large settlement banks in the UK and the Sterling Money Markets before and during the sub-prime crisis of 2007-08, we provide evidence of precautionary hoarding of liquidity and its e ect on inter-bank borrowing rates. Our evidence consists of three pieces. First, we document that liquidity holdings of the large settlement banks in the UK experienced on average a 30% increase in the period immediately following 9th August, 2007, the widely accepted date of money-market "freeze" during the sub-prime crisis. Second, we show that following this structural break, bank liquidity had a precautionary nature in that it rose on calendar days predicted to have a large amount of uctuations in payment and settlements activity and more so for banks that made larger losses during the crisis. Third, using the payment and settlements activity as an instrument, we establish a causal e ect of bank liquidity on overnight inter-bank rates, in both secured and unsecured markets, an e ect that is virtually absent in the period before the crisis. Importantly, precautionary hoardings by some settlement banks raised lending rates for all settlement banks, suggestive of a contagion-style systemic risk operating through inter-bank rates. Finally, variability in overnight inter-bank rates appears to have a ected rates and volumes in household as well as corporate lending

Are Banks Passive Liquidity Backstops?

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when they are heavily exposed to a financial crisis? The standard argument - that banks can - hinges on deposit inflows that are seeking a safe haven and provide banks with a natural hedge to fund drawn credit lines and other commitments. We shed new light on this issue by studying the behavior of bank deposit rates and inflows during the 2007-09 crisis. Our results indicate that the role of the banking system as a stabilizing liquidity insurer is not one of the passive recipient, but of an active seeker, of deposits. We find that banks facing a funding squeeze sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates. Banks offering higher rates were also those most exposed to liquidity demand shocks (as measured by their unused commitments, wholesale funding dependence, and limited liquid assets), as well as with fundamentally weak balance-sheets (as measured by their non-performing loans or by subsequent failure). Such rate increases have a competitive effect in that they lead other banks to offer higher rates as well. Overall, the results present a nuanced view of deposit rates and flows to banks in a crisis, one that reflects banks not just as safety havens but also as stressed entities scrambling for deposits