A gazdasági szankciók politikai hatékonysága

A politikatudósok és döntéshozók évtizedek óta vitáznak arról, hogy vajon mennyire lehet hatékonynak tekinteni a gazdasági szankciókat. A szerzők többsége lenézi a korlátozó intézkedések hatékonyságát, hiszen véleményük szerint képtelenek elérni külpolitikai céljaikat. A szakirodalomban tapasztalható kutatói pesszimizmus ellenére a világon számos állam, különösen pedig az Egyesült Államok alkalmazza a gazdasági nyomásgyakorlás e formáját politikai céljaik elérése érdekében. Az utóbbi években az Európai Unió is sorra vet ki gazdasági szankciókat. A korlátozó intézkedések egyre szélesebb körű használata ugyanakkor nem jelentett valódi áttörést a szankciók megítélésében, hiszen a szerzők többsége szerint képtelenek a kívánt eredményt meghozni a világpolitikába

Transnational Parliamentary Activities in EU Foreign Policy:The Role of Parliamentarians in the Establishment of the EU's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

Although the literature is increasingly interested in the parliamentary dimension of EU foreign policy, to this point no research has covered the role of parliamentarians in EU sanctions policy. This article argues that parliamentarians were successful in keeping the issue of a human rights sanctions regime on the EU's agenda and used all the tools at their disposal to push the EU foreign policy-making machinery in the direction of adopting a new sanctions regime. This article does not limit itself to the study of the European Parliament but argues that parliamentary assemblies of different levels (national, cross-level and European) are interconnected and worked together intensively on the adoption of the EU's human rights sanctions regime

Making Faster and Better Decisions in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

Delayed, or even vetoed, decisions on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have marred the efficiency of decision-making in CFSP for years – and by extent, they hinder the EU on its path to becoming a more assertive global actor. This brief shows realistic options the EU can use to implement more qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP and closely related policy areas. In addition to activating underused CFSP Treaty provisions, the EU could boost its use of trade, and to some extent, internal competences – and thereby QMV – to pursue CFSP objectives.1. Use EU trade competences to pursue CFSP objectives by QMV2. Rely on internal policies to exert external influence3. Keep pushing towards QMV in CFSP frameworks4. Convince hesitant Member States through the QMV variations offered by the Treatie

Making Faster and Better Decisions in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

Delayed, or even vetoed, decisions on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have marred the efficiency of decision-making in CFSP for years – and by extent, they hinder the EU on its path to becoming a more assertive global actor. This brief shows realistic options the EU can use to implement more qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP and closely related policy areas. In addition to activating underused CFSP Treaty provisions, the EU could boost its use of trade, and to some extent, internal competences – and thereby QMV – to pursue CFSP objectives.1. Use EU trade competences to pursue CFSP objectives by QMV2. Rely on internal policies to exert external influence3. Keep pushing towards QMV in CFSP frameworks4. Convince hesitant Member States through the QMV variations offered by the Treatie

Assessing Current CFSP Structures and Processes and Formulating Recommendations

This paper comprehensively assesses the current governance structures, policy processes, instruments and tools of the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It proposes reforms, formulates recommendations and indicates the level of complexity of the implementation of these recommendations. We argue that many of the recommendations do not necessarily require a Treaty change. Instead, EU institutions could use the “sleeping beauties” of the Treaties that currently exist, in particular the special CFSP passerelle clause under Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union, to shift from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). As a complete shift to QMV seems a bridge too far at the moment, we propose a step-by-step approach. Apart from voting rules, we also reveal that decision-making more generally might need to be looked at to make full use of CFSP, as well as a further investment in sharing the necessary intelligence information