The Impact of the Arab Awakening on Muslim Radicalization in Europe: A Preliminary Assessment

While it is premature to draw conclusions, there are reasons to believe that the events of the Arab Awakening are not triggering a wave of radicalisation among European Muslims but might actually decrease it. This ARI looks at the implications of the events of the so-called Arab Awakening on violent radicalisation among European Muslim communities and, in particular, North African diaspora communities. While acknowledging that it is premature to draw any conclusions, it argues that while a small minority will still radicalise irrespective of the events taking place in the Arab world, the Arab Awakening has to some degree undermined al-Qaeda’s message and deprived jihadists of much of their propaganda ammunition against the West. It then proceeds to analyse how different cross-sections of the diverse Islamist milieus throughout Europe have been reacting to the events. It argues that while several European-based Islamist groups are seeking to spin the events to their advantage, there is little evidence of their efforts gaining much traction. Yet, argues the paper, there are reasons to be concerned about potential negative developments

The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

Radicalisation into violence affects some small segments of the American Muslim population and recent events show that a threat from homegrown terrorism of jihadist inspiration does exist in the US. The wave of arrests and thwarted plots recently seen in the US has severely undermined the long-held assumption that American Muslims, unlike their European counterparts, are virtually immune to radicalisation. In reality, as argued in this ARI, evidence also existed before the autumn of 2009, highlighting how radicalisation affected some small segments of the American Muslim population exactly like it affects some fringe pockets of the Muslim population of each European country. After putting forth this argument, this paper analyses the five concurring reasons traditionally used to explain the divergence between the levels of radicalisation in Europe and the US: better economic conditions, lack of urban ghettoes, lower presence of recruiting networks, different demographics and a more inclusive sense of citizenship. While all these characteristics still hold true, they no longer represent a guarantee, as other factors such as perception of discrimination and frustration at US foreign policies could lead to radicalisation. Finally, the paper looks at the post-9/11 evolution of the homegrown terrorist threat to the US homeland and examines possible future scenarios

Terrorist Chatter – Understanding what terrorists talk about

Since the early 2000s the Internet has become particularly crucial for the global jihadist movement. Nowhere has the Internet been more important in the movement’s development than  in  the  West.  While  dynamics  differ  from  case  to  case,  it  is  fair  to  state  that  almost  all  recent cases of radicalization in the West involve at least some digital footprint. Jihadists, whether structured groups or unaffiliated sympathizers, have long understood the importance of the Internet in general and social media, in particular. Zachary Chesser, one of the individuals studied  in  this  report,  fittingly  describes  social  media  as  “simply  the  most  dynamic  and  convenient form of media there is.” As the trend is likely to increase, understanding how individuals make the leap to actual militancy is critically important. This study is based on the analysis of the online activities of seven individuals. They share several key traits. All seven were born or raised in the United States. All seven were active in online and offline jihadist scene around the same time (mid‐ to late 2000s and early 2010s). All seven were either convicted for terrorism‐related offenses (or, in the case of two of the seven, were killed in terrorism‐related incidents.) The  intended  usefulness  of  this  study  is  not  in  making  the  case  for  monitoring  online  social media for intelligence purpose—an effort for which authorities throughout the West need little encouragement. Rather, the report is meant to provide potentially useful pointers in the  field  of  counter‐radicalization.  Over  the  past  ten  years  many  Western  countries  have  devised more or less extensive strategies aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radical ideas or de‐radicalizing (or favoring the disengagement) of committed militants. (Canada is also in the process of establishing its own counter‐radicalization strategy.

Islamist Homophobia in the West: From Rhetoric to Violence

Executive Summary The global LGBTQIA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual/aromantic/agender) community has historically been subjected to hateful rhetoric, discriminatory practices and acts of violence. In the West, this animosity has traditionally mostly originated from a heterogeneous array of actors that can broadly be identified with the far-right. And while in recent years the LBGTQIA+ community has received rights and a degree of acceptance largely unthinkable only a few decades ago, episodes of intolerance and violence are still very much present. Recently, for example, in June 2022, authorities detained 31 members of a white nationalist group called Patriot Front who were allegedly about to attack the Pride in the Park event in Coeur d\u27Alene, Idaho.1 If animosity against the LGBTQIA+ community from right wing circles is a well-known and fairly uncontested topic, less so is that originating from Islamist milieus.2 Yet, an abundance of evidence indicates that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA+ community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric takes different angles. At times, it focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. In line with some Christian fundamentalists, natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes or diseases like AIDS are also painted as divine punishments against homosexuality. A substantial part of the messaging also views homosexuality and gay rights as a Western plot devised to pervert and weaken Muslims. This report documents several instances of preachers and top-ranking officials linked to prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. and Europe, several of whom are engaged as partners by Western governments and civil society, that espouse such views. Most Islamists agree that punishment of homosexuals is the responsibility of God, and not of ordinary Muslims. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for Islamist preachers to speak about homosexuals with extremely hateful characterizations and invoke brutal punishments against them, contributing to a hate-filled atmosphere which can influence individuals with more immediate violent intentions. Jihadist groups adopt even more extreme positions on homosexuality and justify killing those who engage in it. The Islamic State has been particularly ruthless in its persecution of homosexuals, enacting theatrical executions of individuals it accused of being gay and broadcasting them when it controlled territory in Syria and Iraq. Like antisemitism, anti-Shi’a sectarianism, and views on blasphemy and/or apostasy, homophobia is a bridge issue linking Western non-violent Islamists and their jihadist counterparts. Despite their disagreements about the precise conditions for applying the death penalty against LGBTQIA+ individuals, which remains a matter of great dispute between the factions, an emerging consensus connects Islamists of all stripes, particularly in the West. First, Islamists and jihadists alike view homosexuality--active or passive--as a grave sin, entailing some form of divine retribution. Second, figures on both sides have expressed their views that the promotion of “LGBTQIA+ ideology” is part of a grand conspiracy by Western countries to dissuade Muslims from living out their faith, and that calamities that befall Western countries are a result of divine judgement against them. Lastly, certain prominent Islamists concur with the jihadist viewpoint that, in an ideal Islamic state, the death penalty should be enforced against homosexuals. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in recent years the LGBTQIA+ community in the West has suffered a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals inspired by Islamist and/or jihadist ideology. Successful attacks against LGBTQIA+ targets were carried out in Orlando, Florida (2016, 49 killed), Dresden, Germany (2020, 1 killed), and Oslo, Norway (2022, 2 killed); other attacks were foiled in France, the Netherlands, the U.S. and the UK. In order to provide a general overview of these dynamics, this report will first outline the main Islamist viewpoints on homosexuality. It will then provide examples of how Western-based Islamist actors have framed the issue, examine the views and actions of jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and finally conclude with an analysis of terrorist attacks perpetrated or planned by individuals motivated by Islamist/jihadist ideology against LGBTQIA+ targets in the West

Die Rolle des Internets und sozialer Medien für Radikalisierung und Deradikalisierung

Welche Rolle spielen die Mög­lich­keiten des Inter­nets bei der Ra­di­ka­li­sierung von In­di­vi­duen und Gruppen? Dieser Re­port liefert eine Über­sicht über die be­ste­hende For­schung. Er geht der Frage nach, wie und warum ex­tre­mis­tische Or­ga­ni­sa­tionen und In­di­vi­duen das Inter­net ver­wenden. Darüber hinaus dis­ku­tiert er Mög­lich­keiten (und Grenzen), wie On­line-Ex­tre­mis­mus wirk­sam ent­ge­gen­ge­treten werden kann. Es zeigt sich unter anderem, dass die Nutz­ung von In­ter­net­an­ge­boten durch ex­tre­mis­tische Gruppen oft­mals eher laien­haft und her­kömm­lich ist. Dies sollte auch bei der Ent­wick­lung von Gegen­maß­nahmen be­achtet werden. Reine On­line-Gegen­maß­nahmen stoßen an Grenzen, da Off­line- und On­line-Ra­di­ka­li­sierung auf das engste ver­schränkt sind und nicht ge­trennt be­trachtet werden können. Um der Struk­tur und den Nutzungs­ge­wohn­heiten des Inter­nets ge­recht zu werden, be­darf es einer engen Inter­aktion zwischen öffent­lichen und privaten Ak­teuren in der Stra­te­gie­ent­wick­lung. Der öffent­liche Sek­tor sollte hier An­reize setzen und muss die Kon­se­quenzen von kritischen Maß­nahmen im Bereich der Zen­sur gründ­licher als bis­her ab­wägen

Jihadist Attacks in the West: 2014-2022

Jihadism in the West has a roughly four-decade long history. Its first, embryonal presence dates back to the 1980s, when scattered groups of Western-based volunteers traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Around the same time, a few Middle Eastern and North African jihadists fleeing their countries of origin received asylum in various Western countries. Since then, both Europe and North America have steadily been home to pockets of sympathizers of jihadist ideology. These pockets have historically been extremely heterogeneous and have undergone huge changes over time. They have always varied in size and complexity; while some are relatively large and tied to established recruitment pipelines, others are more spontaneous, constituted by isolated individuals and small groups of friends who radicalize independently. Their composition has always been extremely varied, encompassing men and women, recent arrivals to the West from all over the world and Western converts, old and young, seemingly well-adjusted individuals and those living at the fringes of society, and so on. Moreover, pockets of jihadist sympathy have historically been geographically unevenly distributed, with some countries and regions experiencing a much larger presence than others. Yet, irrespective of all these extremely important differences, it is fair to say that a jihadist scene is a permanent fixture in Europe and, to a lesser degree, North America. The vicissitudes of this scene are shaped by the interactions of two macro variables. The first is internal, and it is constituted by the characteristics of the Western jihadist scene, which is of course different from Western country to Western country. Various elements shape it, from the presence of radicalizing agents to the socio-economic marginalization of local Muslim communities, from the effectiveness of local counterterrorism efforts to migration patterns. The second element, which plays a major role in determining the size and direction of the Western jihadist scene, is constituted by geopolitical developments taking place outside of the West. Historically, it has always been events such as the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Bosnian war in the 1990s, the September 11th attacks and subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally, the surge of the Islamic State (IS) and its June 2014 declaration of a caliphate that drove spikes in the numbers of jihadist sympathizers in the West, the activism of Western-based jihadist networks, and their mobilization choices. In substance, the history of Western jihadism is characterized by ebbs and flows. There are moments, triggered largely by important events that take place outside of the West, in which the numbers of jihadist sympathizers swell and jihadists become more active. That increased activity, in turn, manifests itself in various ways, but principally in the form of travel to join jihadist groups abroad, and planning and execution of terrorist attacks. These moments are followed by others, generally corresponding to a lack of triggering events outside of the West, in which the Western jihadist scene, while still active, no longer attracts large number of new sympathizers and its members mobilize (travel or plan attacks) with a lower degree of intensity

Dollars for Dash: Analyzing the Finances of American ISIS Supporters

This report focuses on the financial component of the Islamic State-related mobilization in the U.S. between 2013, when the first arrest of an individual linked to IS took place, and August 2020. As such, it contains a study of all the 209 individuals charged for Islamic State-related offenses in the country, and shows that, save for a few exceptions, the vast majority of U.S.-based IS supporters left a remarkably small financial footprint. Whether they focused on traveling overseas to join IS, carrying out attacks domestically or providing other forms of support to the group, most American IS supporters raised small amounts of money and often through very simple tactics. More specifically: • The vast majority of them simply relied on personal savings to pay the small costs required for their activities. Many of these individuals held jobs, which ranged from menial and relatively low paying to, in a few cases, relatively high-earning positions. Since most of their expenses (purchasing airplane tickets or weapons, sending small amounts to fellow IS supporters overseas) were no higher than a few thousand dollars, this could sustain them through fnances they already had at their disposal. • Some engaged in additional fundraising activities to supplement their savings: - 49 (23.4%) engaged in legal tactics (donations, asset sales, new credit lines…) - 14 (6.7%) engaged in illegal tactics. For the most part, the ways in which American IS supporters used illegal methods to raise funds required low-levels of sophistication. A handful engaged in relatively complex fnancial frauds. ● In only four cases a nexus between terrorism-related activities and violent crime (armed robbery, two cases) and drug trafficking (two cases) was identifed. Very few US-based IS supporters had a criminal background, a stark contrast with dynamics observed in Europe. ● US-based IS supporters tended to avoid using banking institutions to move funds; instead, they turned with more frequency to money or value transfer services. The use of cryptocurrencies was extremely rare. ● Most individuals raised the funds they needed for their IS-related activities alone. Some relied on pre-existing kinship/friendship connections, others on like-minded individuals they met after radicalizing. Most fnancial exchanges within support networks took place within the U.S., though a few Americans found fellow IS supporters online overseas and exchanged money to facilitate each other’s travel to Syria. ● Direct fnancial exchanges with foreign Islamic State operatives were rare, and in only one known case were these exchanges meant to support an attack on U.S. soil. ● There is no indication that charitable entities were set up or used to fund IS-related activities. The small size of the fnancial footprint of U.S.-based IS supporters is, in itself, good news for U.S. authorities but has a fipside. The scarcity and inconspicuous nature of the financial transactions of many U.S.-based IS supporters can represent a challenge for investigators, which often rely on fnancial operations to uncover terrorism-related individuals and as evidence in prosecutions against them. Overall, the system of triggers, sustained checks, and constant communication between private and public sectors that characterizes the U.S. counter-terrorism fnancing system put in place in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has proven to be quite effective also during the IS-related mobilization of the last years. At the same time, the system needs to be fne-tuned to keep apace with the evolving nature of terrorist networks (which in the case of IS in America, paradoxically, means less sophistication) and technological developments such as online crowdfunding, cryptocurrencies, and deep/dark web transactions

The Islamic State in America: After the Caliphate

The time period in which the Islamic State (IS) controlled territory in Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2019 coincided with the largest groundswell of homegrown jihadist activity in United States history. This unprecedented wave of jihadist activism, which hit its peak between 2014 and 2016, could be measured through several indicators. Senior officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that the Bureau managed, at any given time between 2014 and 2019, 1,000 active investigations into IS supporters throughout the U.S.; at least 239 alleged supporters were charged in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, more than 80 Americans traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, and 16 IS sympathizers that remained in the U.S. conducted terrorist attacks that were inspired by or directed by the group. Others provided resources for IS’ global project in different ways, most notably by supporting IS’ online propaganda dissemination and social media recruitment campaigns

ANTISEMITISM AS AN UNDERLYING PRECURSOR TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICAN FAR-RIGHT AND ISLAMIST CONTEXTS

Executive Summary Antisemitism is pervasive throughout several categories of American extremist movements, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements. During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. Antisemitism, as a belief and world-structuring theory, can at times serve as a gateway issue for individuals into further radicalization to violent extremism. Non-violent and violent iterations of the same extremist milieus often share antisemitic views as central elements of their belief system, and thus antisemitism constitutes a linkage between activist and violent extremist segments of the same movement. Several case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in justifying terrorist attacks. Based on this report’s finding that antisemitism is foundational to multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, counter-extremism practitioners and scholars may consider incorporating antisemitism as a diagnostic factor for extremist radicalization. o While there is no single profile of an American extremist, antisemitism has long been widespread among American extremist movements of multiple persuasions, acting as a least common denominator between extremist groups. o Antisemitic beliefs often serve as a key entry point for individuals to radicalize, join extremist groups, and progress into violent mobilization. o By using promotion of antisemitism as a factor in identifying key influencers and ideologues in extremist movements, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming can isolate key nodes in extremist groups and debunk the narratives they promote without engaging in theological debates. Studying the role of antisemitism in extremist groups can assist scholars in identifying common themes between different types of extremism, as well as between non-violent and violent strands of the same extremist movements. This can improve analysis on the broader relationships between and within extremist groups

Reintegration of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Families: A Framework of Best Practices for the U.S.

This report outlines a comprehensive framework of best practices in the reintegration of foreign terrorist fighter spouses and children (i.e., “the FTF family”). It collates and synthesizes a suite of interlocking principles to guide reintegration policy and implementation, covering practical challenges and programmatic objectives, the organizational structure and process of reintegration management in the U.S. context, the role of strategic communications and trauma-informed care, and the use of specialized risk assessment tools. Drawing on original work conducted in previous investigative streams, this report combines scholarly analyses from both theory and practice, interviews with practitioners and stakeholders, case study investigations, and the authors’ collective experiences in the field. Four key findings are central to this report. First, overarching policy and programmatic planning must take into account a suite of core objectives that are central to the reintegration of FTF families. Four main categories of objectives emerge within which are a range of policy and programmatic goals: align domestic policy and programmatic responses with the scope and nature of the returnee problem, develop a strategically guided approach to reintegration, integrate existing legal bases and systems of reintegration, and consider how FTF management may be instrumentalized towards broader policy objectives. These core objectives provide a compass for guiding how policymakers and practitioners navigate through the complex and interrelated challenges associated with reintegration work. Moreover, in order to achieve the goals and objectives outlined above, this report has identified a set of best practices relating to the formal structures and roles and responsibilities assigned to the reintegration mission community in the U.S. Second, we argue that the coordination and efficacy of reintegration activities can be improved with a greater focus on the role of strategic communications at the overarching planning and management level. It is broadly recognized that reintegration efforts should not be stovepiped. Less acknowledged is the role that a robust and integrated approach to strategic communications can play in helping to improve the sequencing and synchronicity of standard programming activities. This coordination issue also extends to how the age, gender and psychosocial needs of FTF returnees and their families are addressed. Third, we highlight the need for better incorporation of gender, age, and trauma-informed considerations at the program and case levels. The synthesis of trauma-informed approaches during the repatriation and reintegration process is vital and case managers must be appropriately equipped to develop tailored plans that harness gender, age, and familial factors too. Together, the coherent integration of compatible reintegration efforts and supporting activities will enable a more strategically focused approach. Finally, this report presents the broad parameters of a risk assessment tool for assessing FTF returnees and their families based on the project’s multidisciplinary and multisectoral findings. The framework is underpinned by a rigorous methodology and an evidence-based theory of change. However, it also seeks to be accessible and adaptable to ensure usability. The development and further refinement of this risk assessment instrument presents a promising avenue for future applied research