Markov Analysis of an Alternative to Pure Random Assignment

There are many public policy settings in which random assignment of clients to experimental and control groups is not feasible. I will discuss one such case, and the alternative method of assignment which was actually used. The vulnerability of this method to intentional selection bias will be explored using Markov methods of analysis.Prepared under Grant Number 78NI-AX-0007 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice

Optimal Defensive Allocations in the Face of Uncertain Terrorist Preferences, with an Emphasis on Transportation

This article appeared in Homeland Security Affairs (April 2012), supplement 4, article 4"This paper extends a game-theoretic model for identifying optimal defensive resource allocations to the case of realistic multi-attribute terrorist objective functions. In particular, we compare the optimal defensive resource allocations to ten major US urban areas in the face of uncertain terrorist preferences with and without transportation-related attributes. The defender's uncertainty about terrorist preferences is addressed both by probability distributions over the attacker's attribute weights, and by allowing for attributes that are important to the attacker but not known to the defender. Estimates of the various terrorist attribute weights are inferred from (partial) ordinal expert judgments using the technique of probabilistic inversion.

A measure of uncertainty importance for components in fault trees

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, 1983.MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEYBibliography: leaves 335-338.by Vicki M. Bier.Ph.D

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats

Introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. This book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. It provides a set of tools for applying game theory TO reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threat