Multi-soliton solutions for the supercritical gKdV equations

For the L^2 subcritical and critical (gKdV) equations, Martel proved the existence and uniqueness of multi-solitons. Recall that for any N given solitons, we call multi-soliton a solution of (gKdV) which behaves as the sum of these N solitons asymptotically as time goes to infinity. More recently, for the L^2 supercritical case, Cote, Martel and Merle proved the existence of at least one multi-soliton. In the present paper, as suggested by a previous work concerning the one soliton case, we first construct an N-parameter family of multi-solitons for the supercritical (gKdV) equation, for N arbitrarily given solitons, and then prove that any multi-soliton belongs to this family. In other words, we obtain a complete classification of multi-solitons for (gKdV).Comment: 32 pages, submitted, v2: hyperref links adde

Construction and characterization of solutions converging to solitons for supercritical gKdV equations

We consider the generalized Korteweg-de Vries equation in the supercritical case, and we are interested in solutions which converge to a soliton in large time in H^1. In the subcritical case, such solutions are forced to be exactly solitons by variational characterization, but no such result exists in the supercritical case. In this paper, we first construct a "special solution" in this case by a compactness argument, i.e. a solution which converges to a soliton without being a soliton. Secondly, using a description of the spectrum of the linearized operator around a soliton due to Pego and Weinstein, we construct a one parameter family of special solutions which characterizes all such special solutions.Comment: 38 pages ; submitted ; v2: margins modifie

Calibration and Internal no-Regret with Partial Monitoring

Calibrated strategies can be obtained by performing strategies that have no internal regret in some auxiliary game. Such strategies can be constructed explicitly with the use of Blackwell's approachability theorem, in an other auxiliary game. We establish the converse: a strategy that approaches a convex $B$-set can be derived from the construction of a calibrated strategy. We develop these tools in the framework of a game with partial monitoring, where players do not observe the actions of their opponents but receive random signals, to define a notion of internal regret and construct strategies that have no such regret

Approachability of Convex Sets in Games with Partial Monitoring

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension of Blackwell's Criterion in the full monitoring framework, where players observe at least their payoffs. When our condition is fulfilled, we construct explicitly an approachability strategy, derived from a strategy satisfying some internal consistency property in an auxiliary game. We also provide an example of a convex set, that is neither (weakly)-approachable nor (weakly)-excludable, a situation that cannot occur in the full monitoring case. We finally apply our result to describe an $\epsilon$-optimal strategy of the uninformed player in a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information on one side