Risk Regulation and the Faces of Uncertainty

Dr. Walker addresses the difficulty of regulators\u27 working with potentially inaccurate information and clarifies related aspects of decision making by presenting a taxonomy for the kinds of uncertainty inherent in necessarily incomplete data

A Default-Logic Paradigm for Legal Reasoning and Factfinding

Unlike research in linguistics and artificial intelligence, legal research has not used advances in logical theory very effectively. This article uses default logic to develop a paradigm for analyzing all aspects of legal reasoning, including factfinding. The article provides a formal model that integrates legal rules and policies with the evaluation of both expert and non-expert evidence – whether the reasoning occurs in courts or administrative agencies, and whether in domestic, foreign, or international legal systems. This paradigm can standardize the representation of legal reasoning, guide empirical research into the dynamics of such reasoning, and put the representations and research results to immediate use through artificial intelligence software. This new model therefore has the potential to transform legal practice and legal education, as well as legal theory

The Concept of Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation

This Article examines what is meant, or should be meant, by normal risk, and how to determine what the normal risks are in a given situation. This Article proposes a new legal concept baseline risk.\u27\u27 The objective is to design a concept of baseline risk that should prove useful in tort litigation by clarifying what is meant by normal risk and providing a well-defined concept upon which a reevaluation of traditional tort concepts might rest. A more precise notion of normal risk may assist in improving the designs of such traditional tort concepts as unreasonable risk, abnormally dangerous activity, product defect, and causation -concepts dangerous activity, that are stubbornly vague in increasingly unproductive ways

Law Schools as Knowledge Centers in the Digital Age

This article explores what it would mean for law schools to be “knowledge centers” in the digital age, and to have this as a central mission. It describes the activities of legal knowledge centers as: (1) focusing on solving real legal problems in society outside of the academy; (2) evaluating the problem-solving effectiveness of the legal knowledge being developed; (3) re-conceptualizing the structures used to represent legal knowledge, the processes through which legal knowledge is created, and the methods used to apply that knowledge; and (4) disseminating legal knowledge in ways that assist its implementation. The Article uses as extended examples of knowledge centers in the digital age the research laboratories in the sciences, and in particular research laboratories in linguistics and information science. It uses numerous examples to suggest how law schools might implement the concept of a knowledge center

Law Schools as Knowledge Centers in the Digital Age

This article explores what it would mean for law schools to be “knowledge centers” in the digital age, and to have this as a central mission. It describes the activities of legal knowledge centers as: (1) focusing on solving real legal problems in society outside of the academy; (2) evaluating the problem-solving effectiveness of the legal knowledge being developed; (3) re-conceptualizing the structures used to represent legal knowledge, the processes through which legal knowledge is created, and the methods used to apply that knowledge; and (4) disseminating legal knowledge in ways that assist its implementation. The Article uses as extended examples of knowledge centers in the digital age the research laboratories in the sciences, and in particular research laboratories in linguistics and information science. It uses numerous examples to suggest how law schools might implement the concept of a knowledge center