Financing structural interventions: going beyond HIV-only value for money assessments.

OBJECTIVE: Structural interventions can reduce HIV vulnerability. However, HIV-specific budgeting, based on HIV-specific outcomes alone, could lead to the undervaluation of investments in such interventions and suboptimal resource allocation. We investigate this hypothesis by examining the consequences of alternative financing approaches. METHODS: We compare three approaches for deciding whether to finance a structural intervention to keep adolescent girls in school in Malawi. In the first, HIV and non-HIV budget holders participate in a cross-sectoral cost-benefit analysis and fund the intervention if the benefits outweigh the costs. In the second silo approach, each budget holder considers the cost-effectiveness of the intervention in terms of their own objectives and funds the intervention on the basis of their sector-specific thresholds of what is cost-effective or not. In the third cofinancing approach, budget holders use cost-effectiveness analysis to determine how much they would be willing to contribute towards the intervention, provided that other sectors are willing to pay for the remaining costs. In addition, we explore approaches for determining the HIV share in the cofinancing scenario. RESULTS: We find that efficient structural interventions may be less likely to be prioritized, financed and taken to scale where sectors evaluate their options in isolation. A cofinancing approach minimizes welfare loss and could be incorporated in a sector budgeting perspective. CONCLUSION: Structural interventions may be underimplemented and their cross-sectoral benefits foregone. Cofinancing provides an opportunity for multiple HIV, health and development objectives to be achieved simultaneously, but will require effective cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms for planning, implementation and financing

The determinants of technical efficiency of a large scale HIV prevention project: application of the DEA double bootstrap using panel data from the Indian Avahan.

BACKGROUND: In 2004, the largest HIV prevention project (Avahan) conducted globally was implemented in India. Avahan was implemented by NGOs supported by state lead partners in order to provide HIV prevention services to high-risk population groups. In 2007, most of the NGOs reached full coverage. METHODS: Using a panel data set of the NGOs that implemented Avahan, we investigate the level of technical efficiency as well as the drivers of technical inefficiency by using the double bootstrap procedure developed by Simar & Wilson (2007). Unlike the two-stage traditional method, this method allows valid inference in the presence of measurement error and serial correlation. RESULTS: We find that over the 4 years, Avahan NGOs could have reduced the level of inputs by 43% given the level of outputs reached. We find that efficiency of the project has increased over time. Results indicate that main drivers of inefficiency come from the characteristics of the state lead partner, the NGOs and the catchment area. CONCLUSION: These organisational factors are important to explicitly consider and assess when designing and implementing HIV prevention programmes and in setting benchmarks in order to optimise the use and allocation of resources. JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: C14, I1

Optimal control of hepatitis C antiviral treatment programme delivery for prevention amongst a population of injecting drug users.

In most developed countries, HCV is primarily transmitted by injecting drug users (IDUs). HCV antiviral treatment is effective, and deemed cost-effective for those with no re-infection risk. However, few active IDUs are currently treated. Previous modelling studies have shown antiviral treatment for active IDUs could reduce HCV prevalence, and there is emerging interest in developing targeted IDU treatment programmes. However, the optimal timing and scale-up of treatment is unknown, given the real-world constraints commonly existing for health programmes. We explore how the optimal programme is affected by a variety of policy objectives, budget constraints, and prevalence settings. We develop a model of HCV transmission and treatment amongst active IDUs, determine the optimal treatment programme strategy over 10 years for two baseline chronic HCV prevalence scenarios (30% and 45%), a range of maximum annual budgets (£50,000-300,000 per 1,000 IDUs), and a variety of objectives: minimising health service costs and health utility losses; minimising prevalence at 10 years; minimising health service costs and health utility losses with a final time prevalence target; minimising health service costs with a final time prevalence target but neglecting health utility losses. The largest programme allowed for a given budget is the programme which minimises both prevalence at 10 years, and HCV health utility loss and heath service costs, with higher budgets resulting in greater cost-effectiveness (measured by cost per QALY gained compared to no treatment). However, if the objective is to achieve a 20% relative prevalence reduction at 10 years, while minimising both health service costs and losses in health utility, the optimal treatment strategy is an immediate expansion of coverage over 5-8 years, and is less cost-effective. By contrast, if the objective is only to minimise costs to the health service while attaining the 20% prevalence reduction, the programme is deferred until the final years of the decade, and is the least cost-effective of the scenarios

The costs of HIV prevention for different target populations in Mumbai, Thane and Bangalore.

BACKGROUND: Avahan, the India AIDS Initiative, delivers HIV prevention services to high-risk populations at scale. Although the broad costs of such HIV interventions are known, to-date there has been little data available on the comparative costs of reaching different target groups, including female sex workers (FSWs), replace with 'high risk men who have sex with men (HR-MSM) and trans-genders. METHODS: Costs are estimated for the first three years of Avahan scale up differentiated by typology of female sex workers (brothel, street, home, lodge based, bar based), HR-MSM and transgenders in urban districts in India: Mumbai and Thane in Maharashtra and Bangalore in Karnataka. Financial and economic costs were collected prospectively from a provider perspective. Outputs were measured using data collected by the Avahan programme. Costs are presented in US$2008. RESULTS: Costs were found to vary substantially by target group. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working with transgender populations had a higher mean cost (US$116) per person reached compared to those dealing primarily with FSWs (US $75-96) and MSWs (US$90) by the end of year three of the programme in Mumbai. The mean cost of delivering the intervention to HR-MSMs (US $42) was higher than delivering it to FSWs (US$37) in Bangalore. The package of services delivered to each target group was similar, and our results suggest that cost variation is related to the target population size, the intensity of the programme (in terms of number of contacts made per year) and a number of specific issues related to each target group. CONCLUSIONS: Based on our data policy makers and program managers need to consider the ease of accessing high risk population when planning and budgeting for HIV prevention services for these populations and avoid funding programmes on the basis of target population size alone

Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Global Health: Taking a Multisectoral Perspective.

Good health is a function of a range of biological, environmental, behavioral, and social factors. The consumption of quality health care services is therefore only a part of how good health is produced. Although few would argue with this, the economic framework used to allocate resources to optimize population health is applied in a way that constrains the analyst and the decision maker to health care services. This approach risks missing two critical issues: 1) multiple sectors contribute to health gain and 2) the goods and services produced by the health sector can have multiple benefits besides health. We illustrate how present cost-effectiveness thresholds could result in health losses, particularly when considering health-producing interventions in other sectors or public health interventions with multisectoral outcomes. We then propose a potentially more optimal second best approach, the so-called cofinancing approach, in which the health payer could redistribute part of its budget to other sectors, where specific nonhealth interventions achieved a health gain more efficiently than the health sector's marginal productivity (opportunity cost). Likewise, other sectors would determine how much to contribute toward such an intervention, given the current marginal productivity of their budgets. Further research is certainly required to test and validate different measurement approaches and to assess the efficiency gains from cofinancing after deducting the transaction costs that would come with such cross-sectoral coordination

Innovative financing for HIV response in sub-Saharan Africa.

BACKGROUND: In 2015 around 15 million people living with HIV were receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) in sub-Saharan Africa. Sustained provision of ART, though both prudent and necessary, creates substantial long-term fiscal obligations for countries affected by HIV/AIDS. As donor assistance for health remains constrained, novel financing mechanisms are needed to augment funding domestic sources. We explore how Innovative Financing has been used to co-finance domestic HIV/AIDS responses. Based on analysis of non-health sectors, we identify innovative financing instruments that could be used in the HIV response. METHODS: We undertook a systematic review to identify innovative financing instruments used for (1) domestic HIV/AIDS financing in sub-Saharan Africa (2) international health financing and (3) financing in non-health sectors. We analyzed peer-reviewed and grey literature published between 2002 and 2014. We examined the nature and volume of funds mobilized with innovative financing, then in consultation with leading experts, identified instruments that held potential for financing the HIV response. RESULTS: Our analysis revealed three innovative financing instruments in use: Zimbabwe's AIDS Trust Fund (a tax/levy-based instrument), Botswana's National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support (BNAPS) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Buy-Down (a debt conversion instrument), and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt2Health Debt Swap Agreement (a debt conversion instrument). Zimbabwe's AIDS Trust Fund generated US$52.7 million between 2008 and 2011, Botswana's IBRD Buy-Down generated US$ 20 million, and Côte d'Ivoire's Debt2Health Debt Swap Agreement generated US$ 27 million, at least half of which was to be invested in HIV/AIDS programs. Four additional categories of innovative financing instruments met our criteria for future use: (1) remittances and diaspora bonds (2) social and development impact bonds (3) sovereign wealth funds (4) risk and credit guarantees. CONCLUSION: A limited number of innovative financing instruments contributed a very modest share of funding toward domestic HIV/AIDS programs. Several innovative financing instruments successfully applied in other sectors could be used to augment domestic financing toward HIV/AIDS programmes

Is Development Assistance for Health fungible? Findings from a Mixed Methods Case study in Tanzania

The amount of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) available to low- and middle-income countries has increased exponentially over the past decade. However, there are concerns that DAH increases have not resulted in increased spending on health at the country level. This is because DAH may be fungible, resulting from the recipient government decreasing its contribution to the health sector as a result of external funding. The aim of this research is to assess whether DAH funds in Tanzania are fungible, by exploring government substitution of its own resources across sectors and within the health sector. A database containing 28140 projects of DAH expenditure between 2000 and 2010 was compiled from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Creditor Reporting System (OECD-CRS) and AidData databases. Government health expenditure data for the same period were obtained from the Government of Tanzania, World Bank, public expenditure reviews and budget speeches and analysed to assess the degree of government substitution. 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Development Partners (DPs), government and non-government stakeholders between April and June 2012 to explore stakeholder perceptions of fungibility. We found some evidence of substitution of government funds at the health sector and sub-sector levels and two mechanisms through which it takes place: the resource allocation process and macro-economic factors. We found fungibility of external funds may not necessarily be detrimental to Tanzania's development (as evidence suggests the funds displaced may be reallocated to education) and the mechanisms used by DPs to prevent substitution were largely ineffective. We recommend DPs engage more effectively in the priority-setting process, not just with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), but also with the Ministry of Finance, to agree on priorities and mutual funding responsibilities at a macroeconomic level. We also call for more qualitative research on fungibility

A comprehensive framework for considering additional unintended consequences in economic evaluation.

BACKGROUND: In recent years there has been a growth in economic evaluations that consider indirect health benefits to populations due to advances in mathematical modeling. In addition, economic evaluations guidelines have suggested the inclusion of impact inventories to include non-health direct and indirect consequences. We aim to bring together this literature, together with the broader literature on internalities and externalities to propose a comprehensive approach for analysts to identify and characterize all unintended consequences in economic evaluations. METHODS: We present a framework to assist analysts identify and characterize additional costs and effects beyond that of direct health impact primarily intended to be influenced by the intervention/technology. We build on previous checklists to provide analysts with a comprehensive framework to justify the inclusion or exclusion of effects, supporting the use of current guidelines, to ensure any unintended effects are considered. We illustrate this framework with examples from immunization. These were identified from a previous systematic review, PhD thesis work, and general search scoping in PubMed databases. RESULTS: We present a comprehensive framework to consider additional consequences, exemplified by types and categories. We bring this and other guidance together to assist analysts identify possible unintended consequences whether taking a provider or societal perspective. CONCLUSIONS: Although there are many challenges ahead to standardize the inclusion of additional consequences in economic evaluation, we hope by moving beyond generic statements to reporting against a comprehensive framework of additional effects we can support further consistency in this aspect of cost-effectiveness analysis going forward