Prior knowledge about objects determines neural color representation in human visual cortex

To create subjective experience, our brain must translate physical stimulus input by incorporating prior knowledge and expectations. For example, we perceive color and not wavelength information, and this in part depends on our past experience with colored objects ( Hansen et al. 2006; Mitterer and de Ruiter 2008). Here, we investigated the influence of object knowledge on the neural substrates underlying subjective color vision. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, human subjects viewed a color that lay midway between red and green (ambiguous with respect to its distance from red and green) presented on either typical red (e.g., tomato), typical green (e.g., clover), or semantically meaningless (nonsense) objects. Using decoding techniques, we could predict whether subjects viewed the ambiguous color on typical red or typical green objects based on the neural response of veridical red and green. This shift of neural response for the ambiguous color did not occur for nonsense objects. The modulation of neural responses was observed in visual areas (V3, V4, VO1, lateral occipital complex) involved in color and object processing, as well as frontal areas. This demonstrates that object memory influences wavelength information relatively early in the human visual system to produce subjective color vision

Understanding the dynamics of the developing adolescent brain through team science

One of the major goals for research on adolescent development is to identify the optimal conditions for adolescents to grow up in a complex social world and to understand individual differences in these trajectories. Based on influential theoretical and empirical work in this field, achieving this goal requires a detailed understanding of the social context in which neural and behavioral development takes place, along with longitudinal measurements at multiple levels (e.g., genetic, hormonal, neural, behavioral). In this perspectives paper, we highlight the promising role of team science in achieving this goal. To illustrate our point, we describe meso (peer relations) and micro (social learning) approaches to understand social development in adolescence as crucial aspects of adolescent mental health. Finally, we provide an overview of how our team has extended our collaborations beyond scientific partners to multiple societal partners for the purpose of informing and including policy makers, education and health professionals, as well as adolescents themselves when conducting and communicating research.Social decision makingStress and PsychopathologyFSW - Self-regulation models for health behavior and psychopathology - oudPathways through Adolescenc

The quality of perception without attention

Although we experience a rich and detailed world every time we look around, we do not have the capacity to report about all that we experienced if the scene is taken away. Our limited attentional capabilities restrict us to only report about the few items that we happened to attend to. Does this imply that we are never conscious of more than a few items at once? Or should our definition of consciousness include the unattended part of our perceptual experience? The discussion about whether we consider a certain process as conscious or unconscious depends for an important part on definition. In this thesis, I provide data to inform this discussion. I first determined that we can study unattended stimuli behaviorally by examining different stages in visual short-term memory. I then examined whether certain characteristics that are associated with consciousness - such as information integration that support perceptual inference and explicit information processing - are present for these different stages of memory. Last, I looked at the neural signature of unattended stimuli to investigate whether the same type of perceptual processing occurs as for attended stimuli. In sum, I found that unattended processes display many of the characteristics that we normally associate with attended processing. Below, I will first summarize and interpret the main findings of this thesis, and then discuss what this might imply for the study of consciousness

Manipulations of attention dissociate fragile visual short-term memory from visual working memory

People often rely on information that is no longer in view, but maintained in visual short-term memory (VSTM). Traditionally, VSTM is thought to operate on either a short time-scale with high capacity - iconic memory - or a long time scale with small capacity - visual working memory. Recent research suggests that in addition, an intermediate stage of memory in between iconic memory and visual working memory exists. This intermediate stage has a large capacity and a lifetime of several seconds, but is easily overwritten by new stimulation. We therefore termed it fragile VSTM. In previous studies, fragile VSTM has been dissociated from iconic memory by the characteristics of the memory trace. In the present study, we dissociated fragile VSTM from visual working memory by showing a differentiation in their dependency on attention. A decrease in attention during presentation of the stimulus array greatly reduced the capacity of visual working memory, while this had only a small effect on the capacity of fragile VSTM. We conclude that fragile VSTM is a separate memory store from visual working memory. Thus, a tripartite division of VSTM appears to be in place, comprising iconic memory, fragile VSTM and visual working memory

Confuse your illusion: feedback to early visual cortex contributes to perceptual completion

A striking example of the constructive nature of visual perception is how the human visual system completes contours of occluded objects. To date, it is unclear whether perceptual completion emerges during early stages of visual processing or whether higher-level mechanisms are necessary. To answer this question, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt signaling in V1/V2 and in the lateral occipital (LO) area at different moments in time while participants performed a discrimination task involving a Kanizsa-type illusory figure. Results show that both V1/V2 and higher-level visual area LO are critically involved in perceptual completion. However, these areas seem to be involved in an inverse hierarchical fashion, in which the critical time window for V1/V2 follows that for LO. These results are in line with the growing evidence that feedback to V1/V2 contributes to perceptual completion

Seeing without knowing: neural signatures of perceptual inference in the absence of report

Everyday, we experience a rich and complex visual world. Our brain constantly translates meaningless fragmented input into coherent objects and scenes. However, our attentional capabilities are limited, and we can only report the few items that we happen to attend to. So what happens to items that are not cognitively accessed? Do these remain fragmentary and meaningless? Or are they processed up to a level where perceptual inferences take place about image composition? To investigate this, we recorded brain activity using fMRI while participants viewed images containing a Kanizsa figure, an illusion in which an object is perceived by means of perceptual inference. Participants were presented with the Kanizsa figure and three matched nonillusory control figures while they were engaged in an attentionally demanding distractor task. After the task, one group of participants was unable to identify the Kanizsa figure in a forced-choice decision task; hence, they were "inattentionally blind." A second group had no trouble identifying the Kanizsa figure. Interestingly, the neural signature that was unique to the processing of the Kanizsa figure was present in both groups. Moreover, within-subject multivoxel pattern analysis showed that the neural signature of unreported Kanizsa figures could be used to classify reported Kanizsa figures and that this cross-report classification worked better for the Kanizsa condition than for the control conditions. Together, these results suggest that stimuli that are not cognitively accessed are processed up to levels of perceptual interpretation